

















The Dissertation Committee for Hugh Clevenger Wiese Certifies that this is the 
approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
Playing Around the Real:  








Jeffrey Walker, Supervisor 
Lester Faigley 
Min Liu 






 Playing Around the Real:  










Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 













For my mother. 
 v 
 
Playing Around the Real:  
Games, Play, and the Declamation Dynamic in Ancient and Modern 
Rhetorical Pedagogy 
 
Hugh Clevenger Wiese, Ph.D 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
Supervisor:  Jeffrey Walker 
 
This dissertation reassesses declamation, a pedagogical exercise that was prominent in 
the rhetoric schools of ancient Greece and Rome but that is now, by many accounts, a 
mere historical artifact.  On the contrary, this dissertation presents declamation as the 
source of an essential and ongoing dynamic that not only survives but actually underlies 
much of what continues to take place in contemporary rhetoric classrooms.  As such, this 
dissertation is not only about ancient declamation itself, but about a “declamation 
dynamic” – what Wittgenstein might have called a “family resemblance” – that is 
essential to any form of rhetorical instruction, particularly approaches that involve games, 
performance, and role-playing. This dynamic is traced to its ancient roots, and the 
argument is made that the study and reevaluation of this type of ancient exercise will give 
contemporary rhetoric teachers a clearer view of their own practices and better equip 
them to instill modern students with that most enduring of rhetorical values, habitus – the 
ability to intuitively grasp the constructed and contingent nature of any rhetorical 
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Chapter One:  
Introduction 
 
Imagine this: students in a hi-tech classroom pore over individual computers and 
work furiously to decipher a cryptic email from a mysterious teaching assistant who 
claims to be hiding from an ominous secret society embedded in the very university the 
students themselves attend. This is a true story: As part of an experimental alternate 
reality game designed to teach rhetoric, a team at the University of Texas at Austin used 
this far-fetched scenario as the starting point for a game in which real students learned 
about rhetorical concepts and skills and ultimately crafted real— and, in some cases, 
really impressive—multimodal arguments.  
This moment in the game, the first day, the first clue was, in many ways, a testament 
to the power of games and play as pedagogical tools. The students were deeply engaged, 
losing track of time and focusing intently, creatively, and critically on the task at hand. 
They worked collaboratively with little or no prompting from the instructor, 
independently populating an online forum with tips, ideas, and progress reports. And they 
seemed to genuinely enjoy the task at hand, possibly even demonstrating that magic 
fusion of focus, awareness, and pleasure known as “flow.1” 
At the same time, this moment epitomized the fundamental challenge facing 
educators who try to bring play in to the classroom workspace: To make such a game 
                                                
1 Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly. Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience. New York: 
Harper, 2008. Print.	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pedagogically effective, it must have pedagogical “content.” But to make the game a 
game worthy of the designation (and effective in the ways that make games appealing to 
teachers in the first place), it must also be fun and intrinsically rewarding on its own 
terms. The question of how to bridge this gap between content and game—or, phrased 
differently, between work and play—is among the most important and challenging 
theoretical issues of our day. And not just for writing teachers: As Jane McGonigal and 
others have persuasively argued, games (broadly defined) have the potential to make 
almost every scene of modern life, from household to office to public space, more 
fulfilling, more ethically engaging, even more efficient—a magical, quasi-utopian 
prospect sometimes referred to as the “gamification” of reality.  
But many game scholars and enthusiasts note that while games indeed have the 
potential to remake a wide array of environments and activities in more “fun” images, for 
this very reason they are also open to an equally wide array of shallow forms of 
exploitation. Thus the term “gamification” has become a withering insult from the 
keyboard of hip scholars such as Ian Bogost, one of the pioneers of game rhetoric, even 
as it gains cachet and currency among hip advertising and marketing mavens at a variety 
of gamification-themed industry conferences and summits.2  According to Bogost, 
gamification is a bad thing if it involves the importation of superficial aspects of games—
levels, points, etc.—into a new domain for the purpose of product promotion or image 
renewal without really engaging with the deeper forms of cognitive activity that make 
                                                




games and play special. From a marketing perspective, however, the early evidence 
seems to suggest that gamification can, to at least some extent, make products, 
companies, and public spaces more fun, appealing, marketable—which makes it a very 
good thing, regardless of the level of real “play” (a notoriously ambiguous concept3 
anyway) involved. Which raises the question: Where is the line between good 
gamification and bad? And when we, as writing teachers, bring games into the rhetoric 
classroom, which side of it are we on?   
The question is more complex than Bogost makes it out to be; if the mark of what he 
calls “bullshit” gamification is an ineffective engagement with the deep dynamics of 
play, then plenty of plot-heavy commercial videos could be critiqued on the same 
grounds. In fact, the true integration of content and play is not a litmus test for a game’s 
authenticity; it’s the essential challenge of game design itself. And a badly designed game 
still qualifies, I would argue, as a game, just as a badly written student essay still qualifies 
as an essay, or a badly planned syllabus still counts as a class. Bogost is right to 
distinguish between effective and ineffective uses of games and play, but in drawing a 
sharp distinction between these two domains, he begs his own question. The challenge is 
not separating real games from phony gamification but understanding what makes good 
gamification possible. If this dilemma seems intuitively familiar to writing teachers, 
that’s probably because—though usually phrased in different terms to emphasize more 
                                                
3 Brian Sutton-Smith’s landmark text The Ambiguity of Play, for example, is perhaps the 
most persuasive accounting of the concept precisely because it explores the very different 
discourses surrounding play rather than attempting (like Caillois and Huizinga) to define 
play itself in any absolute sense. 
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traditional media—it’s also the essential challenge of rhetorical instruction, if not of 
rhetoric itself.  
 
In the classroom, on that first day of our alternate reality game designed to teach 
rhetoric, the students really were engaged with our game4, and they were engaged 
because of the play dynamic that it mobilized: They were (at least initially) intrigued by 
the story, they were challenged by the puzzle without being overly discouraged by its 
difficulty, and they were immediately plugged into a broader class community suddenly 
mobilized for a palpably shared goal. But despite these successes on the play side of the 
equation, in the final analysis, we concluded, our game failed to fully capitalize on the 
power of its medium—the very power evident in this initial student response—because 
we, as game designers, were never able to completely bridge those remarkable bursts of 
ludic energy, those fleeting moments of flow, with the rhetorical concepts that we were 
trying to teach. The rhetoric, the content, or—to use an ancient term to which I will 
return— the techne remained on the uninteresting, gamified (in Bogost’s pejorative sense 
of the word) margins.5  
                                                
4 This assertion is supported by our classroom observations and notes; but we 
acknowledge that those observations, like this conclusion, are inherently subjective. 
5 In this first level, the key to crack the “code” required students to distinguish between 
fair and unfair examples of paraphrasing in a series of emails. By arranging the nonsense 
subject headings of the “good” emails, they gained access to a website with the next clue. 
But the students never picked up on this “lesson” and instead applied the (to the game 
designers) totally unexpected power of enthusiasm and teamwork to crack the code by 
brute force, simply trying every possible combination until one worked. 
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But it doesn’t have to be this way. Yes, it is always a challenge to bridge the content 
of a game with the ludic energy of play, particularly when gamifying (in either sense of 
the word) a typically non-playful activity or environment.  But gaming in rhetoric classes 
is different. In rhetoric, games aren’t moving from the outside in—they’re already on the 
inside. In fact, as this dissertation will argue, games and play are at the heart of the 
rhetorical traditional that we, as rhetoric teachers, have inherited from classical culture 
and continue to transmit in the classroom. Unlike marketing executives or management 
consultants, we don’t have to rely entirely on other disciplines to inform our use of 
gaming. Of course, outside disciplines such as game studies, ludology, and cognitive 
science can inform our practice in powerful ways. But the foundations of a gamified 
rhetoric were laid in antiquity, even as rhetoric was coming into focus as distinct 
discipline. As rhetorical pedagogy changed and became more systematic and 
standardized in the Roman Empire, so too its games. As Greco-Roman rhetoric has 
continued to evolve through the centuries in its long transmission to the writing teachers 
of today, its unique and pervasive play dynamic has evolved as well; and even now the 
play dynamic is present on some level in almost everything we do in the classroom. As 
rhetoric-teacher game-designers, our mistake was to think of and present “rhetoric” as 
content and “game” as delivery system, a medicine and sugar dichotomy, when rhetoric 
is already, by its nature, a playful enterprise, rhetorical pedagogy already a kind of game.   
But this aspect of our field has become so deeply buried (deliberately, perhaps) that 
we’ve forgotten where to find it, let alone how to use it effectively. And so now, as 
games gain currency in other cultural contexts, we find ourselves transfixed by the 
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seemingly exotic and foreign power of games, and we humbly borrow strategies and 
concepts in an attempt to invent a gamified rhetoric ex-nihilo without noticing the 
venerable, time-tested game machine moldering in our own basement. That machine—
and I use the term to indicate both its power and replicability—is the practice of 
declamation. 
 
 In ancient Rome, teachers used play speeches based on fictional legal cases or 
scenarios drawn from history or literature to train orators; this practice provides us with a 
very different, and much more playful, learning paradigm from within the heart of our 
own tradition. Declamation dates back to the earliest Greek rhetoricians: Its purpose was 
almost always pedagogical, and, although (much like video games now) its practicality 
and ethicality were frequents topics of debate, most commentators of the day agreed to at 
least some degree on its effectiveness6. In some ways, as I will discuss, declamations are 
a direct ancestor of the modern argumentative essay. But declamation differs in that it 
was also a fun game; in Rome (particularly in the Augustan period) people voluntarily 
declaimed long into adulthood at both public and private social gatherings (Kennedy 
316). Also unlike the argumentative papers we typically assign, a declamation never 
functioned as a direct model of a real-world rhetorical situation or a presentation of the 
declaimer’s “real” opinions or beliefs. Instead, “Sophistopolis,” as D.A. Russell refers to 
                                                
6 Quintilian ultimately agreed on this point, even though he was perhaps the fountainhead 
of a “pragmatic” line of critique that took issue with overly far-fetched or salacious 
declamation themes. 
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the world of the declamation (22), had its own (imaginary) time, place, and characters; its 
own government and legal system; even its own style of speech.  
 Of course, in antiquity these were the very features that aroused criticism about the 
practical value of rhetorical schools in general and of declamation exercises in particular, 
and many (indeed most) ancient commentators seemed to take issue with the practice in 
one way or another, even as they promoted or practiced it themselves. But the sheer 
longevity and pervasiveness of declamation in ancient culture is perhaps the strongest 
evidence that it not only survived these critiques but actually absorbed them into its larger 
rhetorical “game.” Ancient anti-declamatory discourse in antiquity is often, as other 
scholars have noted, highly declamatory in form and tone.  
 A similar paradox is evident, I would argue, in writing pedagogy today. Most of our 
assignments emphasize carefully researched and reasoned (read serious) judgment, yet 
even the most seemingly straight-forward and pragmatic essay prompts are, in certain key 
ways, implicitly reflective of the playful and unreal declamation dynamic so explicit in 
those bizarre relics of a distant age. In a typical essay, when we ask students to research a 
controversial topic and make a judgment or argument about it, we are asking them to play 
the role of an interested and informed person who cares about this issue and takes a well-
supported stand on it. Our hope, of course, is that this role will become reality, that the 
student will not only become what she plays in this particular instance, but that she will 
gain the skills to truly engage in other rhetorical situations as well. With this trajectory in 
mind, we downplay the role-playing element as much as possible, wishing, perhaps, for it 
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to simply disappear (thus accomplishing our goal). From a modern perspective, such a 
strategy seems almost self-evident.  
 But it is a distinctly modern point of view, with roots that trace as directly to 
Romantic individualism as to the rhetorical traditions of Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian. 
The default model of rhetorical instruction today is premised on the idea that students 
should produce—or should convincingly pretend to produce—real writing from their real 
perspectives to convey what they actually think about things in the real world. Post-
modernism has had an important impact on the field, of course, and in its exposure of the 
constructed nature of subjectivities has made the role-playing element implicit in these 
kinds of assignments more visible—it makes sense, now, to speak of training students to 
inhabit different subject positions rather than to help them channel their one true voice. 
But it has not dislodged this essential idea, or ideal. Even if writers lack a monolithic, 
stable self, we still try to train them to write as themselves, however contingent or 
variable this designation might be.  
 The theory that most writing textbooks and teachers rely on to inform this practice 
is, to one degree or another, generally drawn from classical rhetoric. Yet, I suspect that it 
would have seemed quite strange to an ancient rhetorician. In fact, much of the very 
theory that we now adapt for self-consciously realistic writing assignments was probably 
designed for the self-consciously unrealistic activity of declamation, the largely forgotten 
capstone of classical rhetorical pedagogy. From the earliest modular exercises taught 
under the auspices of a grammarian, ancient Greek and especially Roman students were 
moved not so much towards the forum or courtroom as towards the front of the 
 9 
classroom. It seems strange to think of declamation as an end in itself, and yet for many 
declaimers and declamation fans, it almost certainly was. That is not to say, however, that 
students were not also being trained in “real world” cultural literacy and rhetorical 
efficacy. It is to say that the game of declamation was part of that literacy and efficacy, 
despite (or, perhaps, because of) the well-defined distinction between its themes and 
actual speaking situations.  
 As mentioned above, many ancients were suspicious of declamation as a form of 
practical training on exactly these grounds, and declamation critique appears to have been 
something of a commonplace (not unlike the commonplace backlash teachers and 
administrators anticipate today when considering ways to introduce gaming into the 
classroom). But declamation was always already in the rhetoric classroom, so the 
backlash against it could hardly be separated from backlash against rhetoricians 
themselves (even if rhetoricians were among the harshest critics). Quintilian, the 
paradigmatic Roman rhetoric teacher, defended declamation (and perhaps himself) by 
demanding that it be as pragmatic and realistic as possible; this way, he argued, it would 
provide real preparation for the law courts students were, as least ostensibly, being 
trained to enter. Unlike many of his counterparts, Quintilian actually had considerable 
experience speaking in the courts, and he still believed that declamation, of a certain 
comparatively dry variety at least, could indeed serve as effective preparation for this 
real-world role (Bonner 82).  
 On first glance this might appear to be a clear line connecting ancient and modern 
approaches to writing pedagogy. But in actuality it exemplifies the fundamental 
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difference between them. If Quintilian is representative of the most pragmatic, realistic, 
and—in this respect—modern form of rhetorical pedagogy found in ancient Rome, then 
the emphasis on declamation in his classroom is itself worthy of note given the absence 
of anything explicitly resembling declamation, as such, in the modern classroom. But 
even more striking is the continuity between Quintilian’s pragmatic form of declamation 
and the salacious variety that he derides. For Quintilian and his more extravagant 
colleagues alike, key aspects of the practice were so essential as to be beyond question; 
even the most pragmatic critiques of declamation left them untouched. They formed its 
conceptual bedrock; both pedagogical analysis7 and critical commentary8 of actual 
declamations from the period tended to focus on them. Which is why it seems 
remarkable—from a modern perspective—that all of these key principles reify the 
distinction, rather than the continuity, between courtroom and classroom, between play 
speech and serious speech, between declamation and reality. 
 In this dissertation, I identify in ancient declamation four key principles that 
together constitute what I refer to as the declamation dynamic: 1) color-ation or 
freehanded scenario-creation 2) imaginative audience construction 3) role-playing or 
imaginative persona construction, and 4) a game-like mediation between rules9 and free 
play. My interest in these principles goes beyond historical inquiry. I believe that by 
theorizing ancient declamation we can come to a clearer understanding of the dynamic 
elements that made the play work—that made this original and originary rhetorical game 
                                                
7 As in the sermos of psd.-Quintilian’s Lesser Declamations. 
8 As in the Elder Seneca’s memoirs. 
9 I.E., the handbook or techne tradition. 
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both pedagogically effective and intrinsically rewarding for centuries of teachers, 
students, and, indeed, lifelong fans. And a better understanding of how this historical 
practice worked will provide modern writing teachers with an invaluable model for the 
self-conscious integration of gaming and play into today’s classrooms. I say self-
conscious integration because I believe that the declamation dynamic has always been an 
integral part of our ongoing rhetorical tradition. Games and play are, therefore, already 
part (and parcel) of our pedagogy.    
  
 Each of the four following chapters expands upon one of the key principles of the 
declamation dynamic outlined above. Since I see this dynamic as always operative 
(though not always apparent) in both past and present rhetorical pedagogy, in these 
chapters I discuss both ancient declamation texts and modern rhetorical theory and 
praxis, and I freely call on the critical tools afforded by other disciplinary perspectives 
whenever they seem useful. But I try to never lose sight of my primary purpose, which is 
to provide modern rhetoric teachers with insight that they can actually use in the 
classroom. And since I believe the value of ancient declamation for this audience lies 
primarily in its crystal-clear embodiment of these abiding but elusive principles, I begin 
each chapter by identifying an aspect of the ancient practice that plays this kind of 
metonymic role. I then move on to analyze its philosophical, rhetorical and, in many 
cases, scientific foundations and, most importantly, its ongoing implications.  
 The following brief summaries are intended to introduce the elements of the 
declamation dynamic that are the subjects of each of my primary chapters.   
 12 
Scenario construction:  
 To be sure, declamation was a tightly constrained game with a clear set of rules. In 
many ways, declaimers were much more constrained than a modern writing student 
working on a standard essay: They were not allowed to select their own topic; they could 
not research their theme or rely on inartistic evidence; they were expected to adhere to a 
fairly rigid form. But in other ways they had an amazing degree of creative flexibility, 
and over aspects of the assignment that most teachers of today would consider sacrosanct. 
Not only could a declaimer manipulate his persona, he could also artistically manipulate 
the parameters and tone—what ancients called the color— of his already blatantly 
artificial rhetorical situation. More specifically, declaimers were allowed to freely 
augment the bare bones scenarios outlined in controversy themes with additional facts or 
unmentioned events, freewheeling characterizations or entirely new characters, context 
and backstory, details and anecdotes. The game was not so much to write a speech for a 
particularly challenging situation as to take a few unarguable facts and build them into a 
rhetorical situation and speech suited, to the best possible degree, to each other.  
 In this chapter I analyze the critical considerations declaimers and their critics 
focused on when thinking about this part of the game. Furthermore, I argue that a facility 
in the skill of color-ation actually served to instill a flexible view of all rhetorical 
situations and to performatively undermine the kind of rigid subject/object dichotomies 
that scientific objectivity in all its variations has so deeply engrained in the modern 
psyche. To some limited extent, as I discuss in this chapter, rhetoric teachers and 
textbooks today do engage with this principle—allowing, for example, students to choose 
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their ideal audience or publication for an argumentative essay. But I believe that a much 
more radical engagement would yield correspondingly richer results, enabling students to 
recognize the ways in which speaking in a situation to some extent creates that situation. 
This insight is similar to Kenneth Burke’s observation that actors  (in the “real world” 
sense of the word) define the situations they act in through the language they use and 
through their language-based motive-systems or orientations.10 It also offers a model of 
reality closely supported by the findings of second and third generation cognitive science. 
In this chapter, I expand on my argument that a writing pedagogy that cultivates this 
awareness would pay off both in terms of rhetorical skills and ethical development.  
Audience construction: 
 Declamation was a self-consciously theatrical activity. Not only were teachers and 
commentators such as Quintilian and the Elder Seneca explicit about parallels between 
play-oratory and plays on the stage, extant texts of declamations contain many meta-
theatrical allusions to their own conditions of performance. For this very reason, perhaps, 
the live delivery of student declamations was, by most accounts, a spirited and fun 
exchange involving at least two levels of meaning: Declaimer-as-fictional persona 
performing in a fictional scenario that included the directly addressed student-audience, 
on the one hand; student-as-student addressing a group of peers, on the other. Since 
modern writing pedagogy focuses so intensely on training people to write or speak in 
“real” situations, this kind of performative double consciousness is usually overlooked, 
despite its presence in any kind of class presentation or even peer review dynamic. In 
                                                
10 See in particular Language as Symbolic Action. 
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declamation, however, it was not only made explicitly obvious by the very conditions of 
classroom or public performance, it was deliberately emphasized in the declamation 
themes themselves and foregrounded as a key part of the practice.  
 This matters today because theatrical consciousness is an essential part of any 
occasion for speaking or writing, and it is deeply intertwined with a rhetorical view of the 
world. Richard Lanham notes that theater provides an “alternate conception of human 
reality” characterized by artifice and self-consciousness, and, although our historical 
tendency has been to “ritually condemn” this rhetorical point of view, according to 
Lanham our ability to thrive in a new information economy depends largely on our ability 
to toggle back and forth between conceptions of “life as information” and “life as drama” 
(177).  That declamation, by its mode of performance, provided a sophisticated method of 
training in exactly this area is one of the more remarkable aspects of the practice. In this 
chapter, I will examine how it achieved this in antiquity, why an engagement with 
broadly-defined modes of performance is essential to any rhetoric pedagogy today, and 
how we can find and exploit this dynamic in the classroom practices we already employ.   
Persona construction: 
 On perhaps no single principle do ancient and modern approaches to rhetoric 
instruction diverge more dramatically than in the practice of role-playing. Strange as it 
seems today, an ancient declaimer never spoke in his own skin: whether the particular 
theme was a fictional legal case (referred to hereafter as a controversy) or a fictional or 
historical scenario, the speaker always spoke from an imaginary subject-position—not 
even the eminently pragmatic Quintilian questioned this aspect of the practice. And while 
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this may seem like an inevitable result of the structure of the game—in controversies 
speakers made legal arguments, so of course they had to speak as legal advocates rather 
than students, one might object—the role-playing in declamation went far beyond playing 
an imagined future self.  
 In fact, the careful selection and design of role was an essential part of the game, 
and declaimers’ strategic decisions about exactly who to be were as carefully critiqued 
and praised or blamed by teachers and other observers as lines of argument, style, or 
delivery. In some cases it was even advisable to play not the lawyer representing a 
disinherited son, a divorced wife, or a deposed ruler but the son or ruler himself. Either 
way, the who created for these performances was in most cases far too specific and far 
too implausible for the student to simply self-identify in a one-to-one fashion; in fact, the 
themes seem designed to prevent this from happening, while nevertheless opening (like 
any good role playing game) avenues for the exploration of themes and value-conflicts 
that were very real and relevant to the real students’ lives.  
 In this chapter, I will explain the importance of role-playing in declamation, I will 
point out elements of modern pedagogy that already reflect it, and I will argue that a 
more open and deliberate engagement with this principle in the classroom decreases 
writing-induced anxiety, loosens the hold of deeply ingrained thought patterns and ego-
identifications, and generally makes for a more fun and effective learning environment.  
Mediation between rules and free play: 
 From one perspective, classical declamation exercises formed a bridge between two 
persistent “images” of rhetoric—systematic rules and precepts as elaborated in 
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handbooks or techne, on the one hand; spontaneous, context-dependent receptivity to 
situation and kairos, on the other. But these images were actually two aspects of a unified 
pedagogical program: technical precepts and progynmasmata exercises laid the 
groundwork for skill integration through holistic exercises such as declamation and, 
ultimately, for the acquisition of an overall rhetorical habit or hexis.  
 Although rules paved the way for and theoretically informed declamation practice, 
particularly at beginning stages, the advanced student or professional sophist was 
expected to eventually transcend them in the crucible of performance. But this process of 
transition has always been ambiguous and difficult to teach since it is, by definition, 
beyond the kind of discrete content easily conveyed in the classroom. Ancient 
rhetoricians such as Isocrates believed that, for this very reason, the singular rhetoric 
teacher had to be at the very center of any pedagogical program; it was only by imitating 
and absorbing the teachers unquantifiable rhetoric habit that students could build on 
whatever natural talent they already possessed and become true orators.  
 In this chapter, however, I make the argument that mass export of a more-or-less 
standardized rhetorical curriculum across a far-flung empire resulted in the Ancient 
Romans’ finding themselves in need of a more easily replicable method of mediating 
between the technical and kairotic aspects of a rhetorical curriculum. I suggest that the 
practice of declamation became so popular in Roman rhetoric schools because it was able 
to fill this gap. I use a close reading of one of Isocrates’ most famous speeches to support 
my claim that the ultimate role of the teacher, as envisioned by Isocrates, was always 
already analogous to the function of a game such as declamation, insofar as it also 
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involved the creating an authority-governed space within which free play could occur 
rather than the direct conveyance of static knowledge.  
 In short, declamation provided rhetors the opportunity to both practice and go 
beyond the rules that undergirded their rhetorical education and, in the process, to hone 
their philosophical receptivity to situation and audience in a playful, safe space. When the 
University of Texas design team mentioned at the beginning of this introduction was 
struggling with the fluid integration of rhetorical content in the structure of a game, we 
could have benefitted greatly from a deeper consideration of the ways declamation, an 
open-ended and unpredictable game, was built upon and directly engaged with the techne 
tradition. In this chapter I will examine how this worked in antiquity and what we can 




Chapter Two:  
The “Gilded Pill”: Persuasive Play and The Declamation Dynamic in 
Ancient and Modern Contexts 
 
 In short, declamation was a popular performance game played in Ancient Greece 
and Rome by rhetoric students, professional sophists, rhetoric teachers—even, for the 
sheer pleasure of the practice, by adult citizens in a variety of social situations. As 
previously mentioned, the game involved composing and delivering speeches based on 
themes or scenarios in the form of either fictional legal cases or scenarios drawn from 
history or literature. The former variety, which was generally considered to be more 
complex and advanced, allowed speakers a wide range of rhetorical approaches to any 
given theme and, as such, they would often preface speeches with a brief overview of the 
scenario as they had decided to interpret it , specifying which side was being taken and 
whether they would be playing the plaintiff or defendant directly or acting as a fictional 
advocate and generally giving some indication of the spin or color being applied to the 
basic facts (Kennedy 316-318). This was helpful because, in the speeches themselves, 
declaimers were free to modify almost everything about the cases except details explicitly 
laid out in the wording of themes, which was itself often a matter of close analysis and 
debate (Bonner 51).  
 Our knowledge of this ancient practice is actually based on a quite limited corpus of 
surviving texts. Of the four Roman sources, only one—Quintilian’s Major 
Declamations—contains complete speeches, which were most likely showpieces or 
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example texts from one or several rhetoric schools. Another of the collections, the Lesser 
Declamations also attributed to Quintilian, is another artifact from one or more rhetoric 
schools, and probably consists of a teacher’s lecture notes. Although it includes excerpts 
of speeches, it is perhaps most notable for its “sermo” passages, in which this rhetoric 
teacher provides direct commentary on the best way to approach specific themes.11 
 The most idiosyncratic and, in some ways, most interesting source is the Elder 
Seneca’s Controversiae, the author’s first-person accounts of many of the most famous 
declaimers of his day. This work is striking in part because it comes neither from a 
teacher nor from an active declaimer but rather from an enthusiastic fan of the practice: 
According to its introduction, Seneca employed his astonishing memory to record short 
quotes (in most cases pithy epigrams) and general reflections from a lifetime of attending 
declamations at the request of his rhetorically inclined sons. The performers he describes 
seem less like students or former students or even teachers than professional athletes 
passionately devoted to their sport and keenly aware of the stakes each game held for 
their lives and reputation. This is, at any rate, the way Seneca evidently perceived them, 
and he describes his literary project in grand terms as an act of preservation, a lasting 
memorial to those he sees as the greatest speakers of his day, despite the wholly fictitious 
nature of their performances: “Indeed, I think I shall be doing a great service to the 
declaimers themselves, who face being forgotten unless something to prolong their 
memory is handed on to posterity” (Seneca 1.11). He claims to be uniquely qualified for 
                                                




this task because he has “heard everyone of great repute in oratory, with the exception of 
Cicero,” and he further laments how close he came to hearing even this Republican icon. 
Tellingly, however, the speeches of Cicero that he regrets so narrowly missing weren’t 
the real speeches we think of today as the great statesman’s primary and most lasting 
achievements in public oratory but rather his completely made-up and utterly ephemeral 
declamations. If not held home by raging civil wars, Seneca opines, he “might have been 
present in that little hall where [Cicero] says two grown-up boys declaimed with him, and 
got to know that genius, the only possession of Rome to rival her empire” (Seneca 1.13).  
 Clearly, then, while declamation is generally thought of as a schoolroom practice, 
and while that was certainly its origin and primary venue, in Rome it also evolved into a 
much more pervasive social and recreational activity. Declamations could be public 
spectacles (particularly if a teacher were trying to advertise for his school by showcasing 
his own rhetorical prowess) or private social events (Kennedy 316). They could also be 
personal, even therapeutic, exercises. Cicero himself writes in a letter to his friend 
Atticus, composed during a politically uncertain and dangerous point in his life, of 
declamation’s simultaneously relaxing and stimulating effects: “In order not to give in 
entirely to depression, I have taken up certain so-called theses, which are both of a 
political nature and appropriate to the times, that I may keep my mind from complaints 
and practice myself in the subject proposed” (qtd. in Kennedy 236). He goes on to 
emphasize both the playfulness and ideological flexibility natural to declamation, writing 
that “speaking on both sides of the question, now in Greek, now in Latin, I both divert my 
mind for a bit from my troubles and deliberate about a relevant problem” (qtd. in 
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Kennedy 237). Although these two benefits may seem, on the surface, contradictory, for 
orators who were habituated to declamation throughout their student and professional 
lives, they were actually quite consonant: Indeed, Cicero seems to have found 
declamation so intellectually stimulating in part because of its freedom from the positions 
and loyalties of ordinary political life.  
 His view here is echoed by modern scholars such as Michael Winterbottom, who 
have also identified a positive virtue in the unrealistic nature of many declamation 
themes. Winterbottom argues that the play element of the practice allowed declaimers to 
focus on rhetorical skills rather than on real world issues that might have obscured and 
complicated the learning process (65). This dynamic would have created a safe space for 
learning and practice that was, for these very reasons, also fun to inhabit.  In a similar 
vein, Jeffrey Walker has pointed to the “fictive” nature of declamation themes as a key 
source of the pleasure students evidently derived from the practice. Indeed, Walker points 
out, many students felt nostalgia for their rhetoric school days in general, and for 
declamation in particular, throughout the rest of their lives: “Through declamation, 
rhetoric’s regime of ‘exercise in evenly balanced cases’ in a fictive parallel reality, 
students both cultivated through performance their rhetorical capacities and entered the 
‘sweet garden’ of practical philosophia and a democratic civic imaginary, where 
students… experienced a kind of revelation and intellectual liberation” (Genuine 
Teachers 199). This may explain why so many graduates of rhetoric schools continued to 
declaim long into their adult lives (Kennedy 316). 
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  A specific theme from psd.-Quintilian’s Lesser Declamations will provide a sense 
of the tone of these exercises and the room for improvisation that they afforded: “A rich 
man took ship with a poor friend and a daughter. He was shipwrecked. The poor man 
rescued the rich man’s daughter” (259). To this point, the theme is entirely focused on 
backstory; none of these details have a direct bearing on the actual legal case at issue, 
except insofar as they affect the ethos of the poor man. But they are integral parts of the 
game because they give direction and scope to the much more elaborate colors or stories 
that individual declaimers would be expected to supply in their speeches to flesh out the 
bare-bones of the scenario.  
 The theme continues: “There was a report that she was to marry a certain young 
nobleman. On a day there was a commotion in the rich man’s house. The poor man and 
the girl were found together. Both said that the girl had been violated. The rich man 
commanded the girl to opt for marriage. Brought before the magistrate, she opted. Later 
on the rich man discovered that the girl had not been violated. He commands her to leave 
the poor man. On her refusal to leave, he disowns her” (259).  
 A number of important and typical features of controversies are illustrated here, the 
most obvious being their highly dramatic nature: Typical declamation motifs include 
shipwrecks, pirates, poison, parricides, tyrants, heroes, and, most common of all, 
disownings for any manner of perceived violations of paternal authority. Indeed, the most 
widespread critique of declamation from antiquity to the present day has been its 
predilection for fantastical, seemingly unrealistic scenarios. Even in Seneca’s 
predominantly enthusiastic accounts, the power of Roman pragmatism at times 
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overwhelms his sheer ludic pleasure in declamation for declamation’s sake: Although his 
early chapters laud declamatory eloquence as a kind of “holiness” (Seneca 1.10), he later 
claims to have become “ashamed of a long period of trifling” (Seneca 10.1), and he 
suddenly recasts declamation as a potentially debilitating waste of time that takes place in 
“safe surroundings” where “folly costs… nothing” and flashy, ineffective rhetorical 
flourishes can often trump reasoned argument, all of which leads to bad habits that dog 
“declaimers… right into the courts” (Seneca 9. preface. 2).  
 But the harshest critiques often came from rhetoricians themselves, Quintilian 
being the preeminent example.  He was the most successful and famous teacher of 
rhetoric in Rome, so the fact that he advocated declamation as a pedagogical tool shows 
how widespread and deeply ingrained the practice was in the rhetorical curriculum of the 
day. But he was also very insistent about verisimilitude: In his Institutes, he insists 
declamation themes should bear “a very close resemblance to reality”  (2.10.2); since 
students are, at least ostensibly, being prepared for the law courts, declamation scenarios 
should mimic as directly as possible the real court cases they will some day plead, while 
grand or “poetical” topics are merely so much “theatrical ostentation, or insane raving” 
(2.10.8).  
 Actual declamation themes, however, were by most accounts usually not realistic at 
all—at least not in the narrowly pragmatic sense for which Quintilian seems to be 
advocating. This gave rise to a widespread, commonplace tradition of declamation 
critique. Thus Messala, the Quintilian-like character in Tacitus’ Dialogue on the Orators, 
argues that declamations are actually harmful to budding advocates because of the fact 
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that they are fictitious and separated from reality rather than focused on the important 
aspects of knowledge that form the material for real debates in the forum (119). In the 
opening scene of Petronius’ Satyricon, the protagonist Encolpius attacks the rhetorician 
Agamemnon for his declamatory curriculum on very similar grounds: 
No, I tell you, we don’t educate our children at school; we stultify them 
and then send them out into the world half-baked. And why? Because we 
keep them utterly ignorant of real life. The common experience is 
something they never see or hear. All they know is pirates trooping up the 
beach in chains, tyrants scribbling edicts compelling sons to chop off their 
fathers’ heads or oracles condemning three virgins—but the more the 
merrier—to be slaughtered to stop some plague. Action or language, it’s 
all the same: great sticky honeyballs of phrases, every sentence looking as 
though it had been plopped and rolled in popyseed and sesame. (21)  
 It is important to note, however, that these examples from Tacitus and Petronius are 
literary works and—despite the fact that modern scholars have cited both as evidence of 
widespread anti-declamatory discourse in antiquity—the negative view they present is at 
least somewhat mitigated by their larger context. In Tacitus’ Dialogue, orator-turned 
playwright Maturnus is defending his decision to abandon a narrowly defined pragmatic 
form of legal rhetoric in favor of the epideictic rhetoric of the stage, a venue which the 
dialogue as a whole seems to present as allowing for a more politically (and artistically) 
effective rhetoric than speech in the Imperial courts (Rhetoric and Poetics, Walker 105). 
And the debate between Encolpius and Agamemnon in The Satyricon is, despite its 
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overtly anti-declamatory tone, marked by the performative, playful norms of declamation 
itself; needless to say, a declamation against declamation should probably not be taken at 
face value, especially in a Menippean satire (Gunderson 10). Even Seneca, after voicing 
the complaint quoted above about the unrealistic nature of declamation themes, continues 
his memoir, focused as it is on unrealistic declamation themes, with just as much relish as 
before. Perhaps the conventions of his day dictated that he take a time-out to give 
pragmatism its due (he is writing for his sons, after all) before enthusiastically returning 
to the game.   
 If this is a contradiction, at any rate, it is one that is just as evident today as it was in 
antiquity, with many modern scholars taking these ancient commentators’ critiques at 
face value and making superficial plausibility the primary criterion in their pragmatically 
oriented praise or blame of declamation. George Kennedy, for example, has interpreted 
declamation as having little real pedagogical benefit, particularly from a modern point of 
view, because its circumscribed, artificial nature and the boldly drawn, extreme scenarios 
it featured bore little resemblance to the subtleties of real life and, as such, did not 
demand of the student “careful observation of the world” or “profound background 
knowledge,” key goals of modern classroom approaches (333). In his influential, 1959 
study of Roman declamation, S.F. Bonner took a slightly more charitable view, though 
with the same basically dismissive attitude towards declamation’s more fantastical 
elements. Like Quintilian, Bonner argues that the “only justification” for declamation 
was its “preparation for an public life” (70). Nevertheless, he accepts the argument that 
salacious themes can play a justifiable role as the “the gilding on the pill” of an otherwise 
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purely pragmatic practice, insofar as they might help to hold the interest of adolescent 
male students (Bonner 39). But he sees this as a necessary evil. Indeed, his commitment 
to realism as the key criterion in his evaluation of the practice is perhaps most evident in 
his painstaking comparisons between the laws of declamation themes and their real Greek 
and Roman counterparts, a primary focus of his book on the subject.  
 This commitment to realism is at least partly reflected in Sharon Crowley and 
Debra Hawhee’s Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, one of the most 
compelling adaptations of ancient rhetorical theory currently on the textbook market. 
These authors set forward the Quintilian position that declamation was (or could be) 
directly engaged with reality as “preparation for a life of active citizenship” but with the 
caveat that the themes in question — like the highly realistic (because based on real 
events) controversies they introduce as student exercises in their own book—depended 
on realism for their effectiveness (22). 
 I would suggest that a narrow emphasis on realism somewhat misses the point of 
the ancient practice. Even for Quintilian, it is worth noting that the somewhat 
conservative line he takes with regards to declamation in his Institutes of Oratory is 
strikingly at odds with the actual declamation themes (including the one quoted above) 
found in the Lesser and the Major Declamations, collections attributed to him in antiquity 
and across the intervening centuries. Those attributions may be incorrect, of course, but 
the distinctively Quintilian character of much of the rhetorical advice accompanying the 
themes and declamation fragments in the Lesser Declamations at least proves that, as 
D.R. Shackleton Bailey notes in his introduction to that collection, “their author was 
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intimately acquainted with his Orator’s Education” whether or not it was actually 
Quintilian himself (2). More was at play, it would seem, than a simplistic binary between 
realism and fantasy.  
 In fact, the age-old contradiction between the commonplace view that declamation 
depended solely on realism for its pedagogical effectiveness and the obvious unrealism of 
declamation as it was actually practiced may reflect deeper tensions about the very nature 
of rhetoric as a discipline12. Jeffrey Walker’s alternative history in Rhetoric and Poetics 
in Antiquity can help to provide one likely explanation of how this cognitive disconnect 
became so widespread in the ancient (and, for that matter, modern) world. Walker calls 
into question the traditional rhetorical origin narrative, in which the discipline begins as 
pragmatic political and legal discourse in Ancient Greece and gradually degenerates into 
increasingly less practical and more vacuous forms of epideictic speech13 as opportunities 
for real, democratic discourse gradually diminish under the Roman Empire. Walker flips 
this account on its head, and a different story in which “the art of rhetoric, techne 
rhetorike, in fact originates not from the pragmatic discourse of the fifth-to-fourth 
century rhetor but from an expansion of the poetic epideictic realm to include, first, 
various kinds of epideictic prose and, ultimately, epideictic imitations of pragmatic 
prose” (Rhetoric and Poetics 18).  In other words, Walker makes a claim for the 
historical primacy of epideictic rather than pragmatic rhetoric, which he sees as originally 
                                                
12 And particularly narratives about rhetoric’s supposed decline during the Second 
Sophistic period, which was precisely when Roman declamation was at its most popular 
and, by many accounts, most self-indulgent point. 
13 Of which declamation would, presumably, be the most egregious. 
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part of the poetic tradition and which he points to as having a fundamentally important 
persuasive function as a shaper of values within a community, even if it did not have the 
narrowly defined purpose of deliberative or judicial rhetoric (Rhetoric and Poetics 9, 18). 
Viewed in light of Walker’s narrative, then, declamation seems more like a return to the 
roots of the rhetorical tradition than a symptom of its fundamental decline.  
 But while this compelling alternative history would help to account for the nature 
of actual rhetorical practices like declamation, it is decidedly at odds with the stories 
rhetors have always told about themselves. Walker notes, for example, a kind of 
cognitive disconnect in Cicero’s description of rhetoric at the beginning of his youthful 
work On Invention, in which he characterizes the discipline not “in the narrow sense of 
practical civic oratory” (64) but rather “as an unlimited art of persuasively spoken 
wisdom, one whose function is not only to win lawsuits or accomplish legislation or 
bestow civic honors but to shape culture,” and the rest of his text, which is almost entirely 
devoted to precisely the narrow vision of rhetoric he begins by deriding: the “rhetoreia 
practiced in ‘the petty disputes of private citizens’—private lawsuits” (Rhetoric and 
Poetics 65).   
 This paradox is perhaps echoed in the similar contradiction between virulent 
critiques by many ancient authorities of declamation themes for being too unrealistic, on 
the one hand, and the cultural pervasiveness of the practice as it was actually taught in the 
schools of those same authorities14, on the other. But I would argue that it is also echoed 
in the seemingly contradictory desire of the ancient world’s foremost declamation 
                                                
14 Psd.-Quintilian’s Minor and Major Declamations being the prime examples.  
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“fan”—the Elder Seneca—to keep his favorite pastime and the real world of the forum as 
firmly delineated as possible. In marked distinction to the pragmatic perspective outlined 
above that declamations should always be as realistic as possible, Seneca insisted that 
real law cases should be as little like declamations as possible, and he directed some of 
his most pointed criticism towards declaimers who attempted to employ their play skills 
in the real world of the forum. Perhaps Seneca’s anxiety of this count can be read as a 
further manifestation of the same internal contradiction that Walker notes in Cicero’s 
early work. But--where Cicero professes his allegiance to a broad, Isocratean view of 
rhetoric that is perfectly compatible with a variety of epideictic genres such as 
declamation— then ends up focusing entirely, in practice, on realistic, narrowly 
pragmatic discourse without reconciling  these two visions—Seneca focuses entirely on 
an epideictic form of discourse while paying lip service to the narrowly pragmatic forms 
of courtroom discourse that he ignores in his text.  
 Viewing declamation as a form epideictic rhetoric that existed in an uneasy tension 
with pragmatic forms of deliberative and judicial speech also helps to support the view, 
held by many modern scholars, that the practice functioned as an important method of 
ideological training for the young elite and, as such, did reflect the very real value system 
of the ancient world15, regardless of its level of superficial verisimilitude. Robert Kaster 
                                                
15 Such a view of declamation makes even more sense given its place in the overall 
progression of ancient rhetoric school curriculum. Craig Gibson has recently argued that 
the progymnasmata exercises that preceded declamation were also part of a carefully 
engineered system of ethical training, and that the “banal, derivative, and utterly 
commonplace” nature of many of their moral messages is an indication of “how well the 
curriculum worked to reflect and reinforce the values of elite society” (30). Gibson 
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has argued, for example, that the extreme nature of the crises featured in declamation 
themes was less important than the highly traditional values by which declaimers tended 
to resolve them. According to Kaster, “it was one of the main effects of declamation to 
inculcate, by sheer repetition, approved values in the still impressionable minds of the 
next generation of the elite; that one aspect of declamation which most commended it to 
its culture was the reassuring ability it developed in the declaimer to respond to the most 
startling, novel, or extravagant circumstances by appealing to the most traditional 
sentiments and by marshaling the most conventionally ‘reasonable’ arguments (325). 
Similarly, Martin Bloomer has warned against the temptation to find in declamation a 
kind of counter-cultural mechanism encouraging empathy for the marginalized elements 
of ancient society or for engaging in social critique: “Speaking on behalf of the prostitute 
who applied to be a priestess or the rape victim who hesitated between choosing death of 
the rapist or marriage with him was not an exercise in situational ethics nor did it 
necessarily impart any enlightened state. It did naturalize the speaking rights of the 
freeborn male elite.” Furthermore, “such school exercises with their projection of 
idealized social and family order are a kind of social comfort, a reassurance to and from 
the elite as well as a linguistic training of that elite” (Bloomer 58). In a more recent 
monograph on the subject, Neil Bernstein also accepts this interpretation, arguing that by 
performing “the roles of characters subject to social pressures that they knew they would 
                                                                                                                                            
claims are, in a way, parallel to Kaster and Bloomer’s claims about declamation, insofar 
as his sees the ideological content of the progymnasmata as one of their most important 
features.  
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never encounter in their real lives,” ancient rhetoric students were actually being taught 
“that the right to speak publicly was reserved for men like themselves” (7).  
 In fact, it has become something of a critical commonplace in contemporary studies 
of ancient declamation that it did not provide a forum for social critique, that it did not 
engender critical awareness, and that it was not intended to have these effects. But at least 
one scholar, Christy Friend, has directly questioned these interpretations of the 
normalizing ideological function of the practice, arguing instead that it did create a 
discursive space for possible social critique, even if the effect was not always very 
subversive. According to Friend, “the prominence of legally disenfranchised groups in 
the controversia themes cannot be underestimated” (306), and she even goes so far as to 
claim that declamation embodies “several practices advocated by contemporary critical 
pedagogy: a focus on ethical and political conflict; a concern with the positions of legally 
disenfranchised groups; an insistence that students, no matter what their initial opinion, 
listen to and sometimes try out unfamiliar perspectives on the issue—including those of 
oppressed groups; and teacher advocacy of nonmainstream perspectives” (310). Friend 
does not claim that transformative social critique always occurred through declamation, 
and she admits that the arguments outlined above—the view that declamation was, at 
least in part, a reflection and reinforcement of elite roman values—are “a valid critique, 
for all declamations are framed within the context of a legal system that assumed the 
noncitizen status of women, children, and slaves” (311). She admits, as well, that  
“declamation was not perceived by its proponents as a subversive forum, nor did it 
motivate large-scale social change”; but she nevertheless parts ways with Kaster and 
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Bloomer in contending that the practice “did foreground conflict, focus on minority 
concerns, open spaces where radical arguments could be voiced, and encourage students 
to think in these terms” (312). Like my own project in this dissertation, she finds in 
declamation direct implications for present-day pedagogy. Less similar, however, is her 
marked personal investment in critical pedagogy, which leads her to search for specific 
correspondences between declamation and this contemporary school of thought, and 
perhaps limits her structural analysis of the practice as a whole. All the same, comparing 
ancient declamation to contemporary critical pedagogy is an undeniably bold and 
inspiring move.  
 By contrast, other scholars who have also identified in declamation a kind of 
critical function—or at least the potential for one—have tended to describe it as an 
indirect or even inadvertent result of the practice. Erik Gunderson, for example, has 
found in ancient declamations “a zone of intellectual engagement where serious questions 
are elaborated in a pointedly frivolous context” (6). Gunderson argues that the unrealistic 
nature of many declamation themes can be seen as a kind of political buffer that enabled 
off-limits, dangerous topics and points of view to be examined and performed. He notes 
the way that, in controversy themes, “the real keeps on intruding: political allegory, 
individual advancement, and the nature of authority in general return endlessly to the 
scene of declamation” (6). But where Friend suggests that declamation might actually 
have been intended to function as a forum for direct social critique, according to 
Gunderson, any critique it allowed for occurred on a more subtle, psychological, 
structural level. For example, he argues that because the practice “did not merely mime 
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‘real’ rhetoric in the sense of offering an imitation of forensic oratory,” but also mimed 
“the very psychic rhetoric by which [ancient Romans’] self-relation is produced and 
sustained,” it had the power to “reveal the syntax and grammar of Roman identity” and 
thus to inspire a kind of critical awareness (18). But this awareness was neither 
revolutionary nor overt; rather, it was a “mode of reflection” mobilized not “in the name 
of critical break with the rules of the game, but instead… in the name of a fuller 
reinvestment in the game itself” (233).  
  
 Regardless of their interpretation of the ancient declamations’ critical function or 
pedagogical effectiveness, almost all modern scholars writing about the practice have 
noted that it was, first and foremost, a kind of game. This is important because many 
contemporary scholars in a variety of other disciplines, though not writing specifically 
about declamation, have come to recognize the potential benefits of games and play as 
legitimate classroom practices. Furthermore, since the most common pedagogical uses of 
games involve some form of role-playing, a connection is easily drawn to the practice of 
declamation. James Gee in his landmark What Video Games have to Teach Us About 
Learning and Literacy argues, for example, that games facilitate the acquisition of 
complex sets of skills through “identity work,” as players (particularly in role playing 
games) adopt different identities and form bridges between old and new identities as new 
kinds of knowledge are gained (51). The essential dynamic involved in this process of 
skill acquisition, according to Gee, is the eventual recognition by students/players that the 
play identity they’ve adopted for purposes of a classroom exercise lies within their real 
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reach: “If learners in classrooms carry learning so far as to take on a projected identity, 
something magic happens… The learner comes to know that he or she has the capacity, at 
some level, to take on the virtual identity as a real world identity” (66). Similarly, in his 
groundbreaking book Augmented Learning, Eric Klopfer explores the use of handheld 
technologies such as PDAs or smart phones to create mobile, immersive games involving 
realistic scenarios that place players in the role of an expert in a given field (for example, 
an environmental engineer investigating a chemical leak). Klopfer argues that such 
“epistemic games” are effective learning tools, particularly when they cause players to 
truly see “themselves in the role that they are playing—this means that the game 
effectively creates the simulated real-world experience for the player” (124). In addition, 
situating games like these in real environments reinforces learning by incorporating a 
wide range of sensory details: “Buildings, people, smells, sounds, and even feel become a 
part of the game, allowing for tight connections between the player, the game, and the 
real world” (123). This approach uses technology to take the “very close resemblance to 
reality” that Quintilian called for in declamation themes to an extreme (2.10.2). 
 In an interesting twist on this line of thought, Jane McGonigal has recently garnered 
considerable scholarly and popular attention with the argument that games should not 
more closely resemble reality but that reality should more closely resemble games. 
According to McGonigal, “games are fulfilling genuine human needs” and “providing 
rewards that reality is not” (4). As such, she calls for an application of “the lessons 
learned in game design to reality itself,” so that we can “engineer alternate realities: new, 
more gameful ways of interacting with the real world and living our real lives” (115). The 
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kind of pervasive gamification that McGonigal calls for is increasingly plausible, as 
Montola, et. al discuss in their practically oriented manual Pervasive Games: Theory and 
Design. Indeed, this technique is becoming more and more common not only in schools, 
but in offices, stores, city streets, and even cemeteries.  
 The wide range of scholars and game designers creating or theorizing these types of 
games differ in their particular techniques, technical terms, and agendas. But they all 
share an essentially pragmatic orientation: Whether they believe that reality can be 
improved by becoming more like games or that games can better prepare people for 
professional life by closely mimicking reality (or some combination of the two points of 
view), they have the same underlying goal of improving reality through play. Other 
scholars, however, have warned that this seemingly noncontroversial (and, as seen above, 
highly traditional) point of view entails subtle dangers. As discussed in my introduction, 
the game-oriented rhetorician Ian Bogost recently penned a controversial online article 
decrying the rise of shallow, exploitative gamifiction in exactly these kinds of contexts 
(“Gamification”). His dissatisfaction really isn’t all that surprising: Though often grouped 
with pragmatically inclined (in the sense I’ve been discussing in this chapter) game 
scholars like those discussed above, Bogost’s influential Persuasive Games: The 
Expressive Power of Videogames approaches games and play with a very different—and 
perhaps more rhetorical—emphasis than scholars such as McGonigal or Gee. In this text, 
Bogost outlines his concept of “procedural rhetoric”: video games, he argues, do have 
singular pedagogical value because of their similarity to real world contexts and 
institutions. But this value lies not in their ability to directly prepare students through 
 36 
mediated trial runs; rather, as artifacts for rhetorical analysis, games expose their own 
constructed, rule-governed nature, which in turn exposes the constructed and rule 
governed nature of real situations and institutions.  
 According to Bogost, games frame arguments by crafting “possibility spaces” 
delimited by sets of rules; as such, they persuade by modeling how social or cultural 
systems function, successfully or unsuccessfully, in the real world. By critically engaging 
(or even creating) these systems, then, students learn to question and critique broader, 
often implicit, social systems at work in their lives16. While this exposure or heightening 
of awareness may have pragmatic benefits as preparation for living in the real world, 
these benefits more closely resemble the benefits of cultivating what Dionysius calls the 
“one great character” than the direct, one-to-one benefits of either the kind of “epistemic” 
role playing/career preparation games that Klopfer describes or the realistic court cases 
that Quintilian seems to be calling for in his Orator’s Education.  
 The arguments are not as radically new as they might seem, even in a modern 
context. In a fashion perhaps more akin to the pervasive games that McGonigal describes, 
theatre scholars and practitioners have long used theatre games to reflect and re-imagine 
their immediate environments. Augusto Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed is perhaps the 
most interesting and illustrative technique for achieving this result. In the introduction of 
Boal’s Games for Actors and Non-Actors, a collection of theatrical instructions and 
prompts not unlike declamation themes, he calls theatre “the art of looking at ourselves” 
                                                
16 This bears comparison to Gunderson’s view of the critical function of ancient 
declamation (discussed above), although the process is much more conscious and 
deliberate in Bogost’s analysis.  
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(xxx). In his games, participants perform social problems or anxieties and, through 
performance, allow the “Spect-Actors” the chance to learn about and creatively address 
these issues. By thinking about the world in a more theatrical sense, he writes, people are 
better prepared to deal with its contingencies: “Actors talk, move, dress to suit the setting, 
express ideas, real passions — just as we all do in our daily lives. The only difference is 
that actors are conscious that they are using the language of theatre, and are thus better 
able to turn it to their advantage” (xxx).  
 In this way, theater games help to bridge discussions of ancient declamation and 
modern game studies, and perhaps even to provide a synthesis between the different 
approaches to games exemplified by McGonigal and Bogost. For example, ethnographer 
Victor Turner, like Bogost, uses games to heighten student awareness of social or 
institutional structures. In From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play, 
Turner argues that students learn much more effectively about a foreign culture by 
actually enacting that culture through organically developed performances. This practice 
of what he calls “ethnodramatics” enables students to understand and experience other 
social structures in a far richer and more nuanced fashion than by simply reading or 
watching films (89). Ethnodramatics, then, bears comparison in terms of both purpose 
and method to ancient declamationas interpreted by Friend (see above), and provides 




 I began this chapter with a general description of the institution of Roman 
declamation and then focused on a specific area of tension in the ancient literature 
between pragmatically realistic and playfully fictive views of the practice. I then 
discussed a similar area of tension in modern discussions of pedagogically-oriented play 
between, on the one hand, games that function pragmatically as direct preparation for real 
life and, on the other, games that use procedural rhetoric to stimulate critical awareness, 
before briefly discussing performance and theatre games as a possible bridge between 
these notions of games-as-pragmatic-training and games-as-structural-critique.  
 I would like to conclude with the claim that what I refer to as the trans-historical 
declamation dynamic accounts for the similarity between discussions of declamation in 
antiquity and discussions of gaming today, and it also accounts for the power of theater 
and performance as a kind of critical middle ground. From a theatrical perspective, the 
declamation dynamic uses performance to train people to function more skillfully in a 
variety of real situations by learning to see those situations theatrically (or rhetorically). 
But the same can be said of this dynamic from the perspective of game studies, or, 
indeed, from the perspective of ancient rhetoric. In all of these contexts, a similar result is 
achieved by very similar (performative, playful) means. The constantly-shifting common 
ground that makes this possible—the declamation dynamic, the “one great character,”—
will be the focus of the following chapters.  
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Chapter Three:  
Make the Road By Walking: Declamatory Colores as Emergent 
Cognition 
 
 Picture yourself as an elite, intergalactic agent on a mission to rescue an obscure 
space colony that has been attacked by aliens. Upon arriving, you find that a mysterious 
plant with the power to control minds has overpowered the free will of most of the 
surviving human inhabitants, turning them into an army of killer zombies determined to 
stop you at all costs. Should you try to save them? Or should you simply blast your way 
through to complete your mission? Decide whether they still qualify as humans in their 
zombie state. Then explain your decision to your team of soldiers.  
 Now picture yourself as a leader in an isolated island colony recently stricken by a 
sudden and unnatural famine. A month earlier your city sent an agent in search of grain. 
You gave him your fastest ship; you pooled your resources; you set a date for his return. 
But in his absence, things soon became so desperate that the populace – including you – 
resorted to eating the bodies of the dead. The agent returned on the agreed upon date with 
twice as much grain as expected, thanks to some shrewd business dealings during a time-
consuming extra stop on his way home. Find a way to redeem your city’s collective 
humanity by blaming the agent for this moral disaster and convicting him in a court of 
law. 
 The first scenario is adapted from a mission in BioWare’s bestselling video game 
Mass Effect. The second is a declamation problem traditionally attributed to the Roman 
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rhetorician Quintilian. In both cases, though, the “solutions” available to players depend 
on their ability to not only intervene in a crisis situation through speech but also to 
transform the very nature of the situation through the way they speak about it. Players 
must, in other words, speak into being a world in which actions, responsibility, and the 
very sanctity of human life are viewed and valued in ways conducive to their particular 
arguments.  
 I introduce these two examples because they highlight what I see as an important 
similarity between the ways declamation themes and virtual environments such as video 
games train people to think about rhetorical situations. In the video game Mass Effect, a 
player confronted with this dramatic crisis would have to not only fight her way out in 
order to survive the level (the game is a “first-person shooter,” after all) but also use 
strategic dialogue with other characters to determine goals, define enemies, and rally 
enough friends to make winning even possible. Similarly, to “win” in the game of ancient 
declamation, a student needed to not only find the available means of persuasion in the 
imaginary situation at hand but also to actively invent the rhetorical situation within the 
broad parameters of the overarching declamation theme.  This paradoxical dynamic 
reflects the highly rhetorical manner in which the ancients saw “reality”—a view 
strikingly applicable to many digital environments. Nevertheless, this view is just as 
strikingly at odds with most approaches to contemporary process-oriented composition 
theory. This is true even (perhaps especially) of the “social-epistemic” approach that now 
dominates our discipline, despite its focus on the constructed nature of social discourses 
and their relation to the writing process. I see this as a problematic contradiction.  
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 In this chapter, then, I briefly trace the rise of this social view in the history of 
process theory, and I make the argument that it harbors an often implicit but powerful 
investment in scientific realism. I then analyze two ancient sources as paradigmatic 
examples of the very different way Imperial Romans saw the relationship between 
imagined and “real” worlds before situating this distinction in the context of a broader 
conflict between scientific realism and kairotic indeterminacy in the history of rhetoric. 
The training that ancient rhetoric students received in declamation was deeply informed 
by this broader, anti-foundational view, and I present a key aspect of the ancient 
practice—the color—as an alterative pedagogical model that achieves many of the ethical 
and critical goals of social-epistemic composition theory but without its philosophical 
investment in realism. Finally, I return to the world of Mass Effect to demonstrate the 
particular relevance of the kind of training afforded by declamation for the digital and 
virtual worlds contemporary students are increasingly faced with in their “real” lives 
outside and after school.   
 Realism in the Social View of Process Theory  
 Almost thirty years ago, Lester Faigley famously observed that “expressive” and 
“cognitive” views of process theory were being increasingly called into question by an 
emergent approach to process that he dubbed the “social view” (157). Since then, the 
social perspective has become so dominant in the field that, despite its roots in the 
process movement, it is often seen as something fundamentally different – a new 
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paradigm shift17 altogether. According to Ronald Brooks, such “post-process” scholars 
tend to define themselves in opposition to the process movement on the grounds that, 
first, it “attempts to make generalizations about the writing process, which is far too 
complex a phenomenon to measure empirically; and second, the method of teaching that 
has emerged from the process movement too often ignores social and cultural factors of 
writing” (96). What is perhaps most interesting about these “post-process” critiques is 
how precisely they replicate Faigley’s decades-old, three-part breakdown of the process 
movement itself, taking something very similar to the “social” view of process Faigley 
identified and called out cognitive and expressive views for almost identical reasons. 
Process or post-process, it seems, the conversation has stayed largely the same. 
 Even so, the power relations have certainly shifted. Now, the scholarly consensus 
has definitively moved beyond strong views of subjectivity and authentic expression, on 
the one hand, and computer-influenced cognitive models of the stages of the writing 
process, on the other. Almost everyone can now agree, to a greater or lesser extent, on the 
social nature of the act of composition. This is clearly reflected in contemporary rhetoric 
textbooks, regardless of their more subtle theoretical allegiances.  
 For example, John Trimble’s long-lived Writing with Style opens with the decided 
social view that every profession, including writing itself, has a distinct “style of thought 
that must be mastered before a person feels at home in it” (3). This recognition of the 
                                                17	  The notion process theory as a “paradigm shift” in writing instruction goes back to 
Maxine Hairston’s influential 1982 article “The Winds of Change: Thomas Kuhn and the 
Revolution in the Teaching of Writing,” from College Composition and Communication 
3 (1982): 76-88.	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power and importance of what discourse analyst James Paul Gee refers to as “’Big D’ 
Discourses”18 is perhaps a key reason Trimble’s text – despite its decidedly expressivist 
bent—has remained so relevant and marketable, even in a “post-process” world19. 
Similarly, the first lines of the preface to Gerald Graff, Kathy Birkenstein, and Russel 
Durst’s much more recent and very popular textbook They Say/I Say sum up their 
overarching goal as “to offer students a user-friendly model of writing that will help them 
put into practice the important principle that writing is a social activity” (vii). The 
authors’ allusion to computer jargon (“user-friendly model of writing”) signals, from the 
very first page, the cognitive leanings of their template-based approach. But it is couched 
in explicitly social terms.  
  Interestingly, the social view has been one catalyst for the contemporary revival of 
ancient rhetorical theory and pedagogy. One of the best examples of this trend is Sharon 
Crowley and Debra Hawhee’s textbook Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students. In 
the preface, these authors clearly identify ancient rhetoric with a process-oriented social 
focus and situate it in opposition to what they see as a troubling emphasis on product in 
current-traditional rhetoric:  
We appealed to ancient rhetoric as the source of our thinking for this book 
because ancient rhetoricians invented and taught an art that was immersed 
                                                
18 Gee defines Discourses as “socially accepted associations among ways of using 
language, of thinking, valuing, acting, and interacting, in the ‘right’ places and at the 
‘right’ times with the ‘right’ objects (associations that can be used to identify oneself as a 
member of a socially meaningful group or ‘social network’)” (34).  
19 Originally published in 1975, by 2000 the book had gone through two editions and 
been reprinted 32 times (Trimble vii).  
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in the daily traffic of human events and in communal discourse about 
them. In this the art differed markedly from the modes of composition 
ordinarily taught in school today, which present writers and speakers with 
an abstracted set of pseudoscientific rules that dictate how a finished 
discourse ought to look. (xii) 
 They also cite the “ancient assumption that rhetoric cannot be fruitfully studied and 
practiced apart from the issues that engage the communities it serves” to justify their 
decision, throughout the text, to contextualize and frame ancient rhetorical theory with 
very real and very current “contested topics in contemporary political and ethical 
discourse” (xii).  
 As effective and useful as this textbook certainly is, I would argue that it contains a 
subtle but important contradiction in the way that it squares its deep investment in 
practicality and current events with the deliberate unrealism of the many ancient 
rhetorical exercises that it re-imagines for contemporary students. Unsurprisingly, this 
contradiction is most apparent when the authors discuss ancient declamation. On the one 
hand, they acknowledge the playfulness inherent to the ancient practice. They observe 
that modern writing teachers, by contrast, often miss the fact that: 
messing around with language is fun. Composition need not be undertaken 
with the deadly seriousness that moderns bring to it... Ancient peoples 
fooled around with language all the time… Romans who live during the 
first centuries CE held rhetorical contests called declamation, the object of 
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which was to compose a complicated and innovative discourse about some 
hackneyed situation involving pirates or angry fathers. (27) 
 But only a few pages earlier, they offer a sort apologetic defense of these same 
kinds of practices, arguing that the use of “artificial rhetorical situations” in the 
progymnasmata and declamation had the highly practical underlying purpose of teaching 
ancient students “something about the community they would later serve, as well as about 
rhetoric. In other words, they did not study rhetoric only to learn its rules. Instead, their 
study was preparation for a life of active citizenship” (22).  
 I would certainly agree with both of these basic claims—declamation themes were 
indeed intended to teach students something about the communities in which they lived, 
and the rhetoric schools were certainly preparation for real social engagement. But I 
disagree with the implication that the playfulness exemplified by “hackneyed” 
declamation themes (27) was somehow ancillary to the serious business of learning 
something important about real communities (22). On the contrary, I believe that one of 
the most essential and pedagogically effective aspects of ancient declamation was the 
way it used playfulness and unreality to teach students about the malleability of the 
discourses that defined their real communities and gave them practice in shaping social 
context for persuasive purposes.  
Roman Power Plays: Two Examples from Ancient Texts  
 Two stories from ancient sources are particularly illustrative of the rhetorical and 
contingent way the ancients saw their “real” social world in this kind of malleable—even 
artistic—way. The first is Tacitus’ Dialogue on the Orators: Closely modeled on 
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Ciceronian dialogues such as On the Ideal Orator, the text opens as two seasoned 
lawyers call on their friend and former colleague Maturnus, a man who has abandoned 
the courtroom and forum in favor of the theater. Despite his shift in profession, the 
orator-turned-playwright’s newest work has apparently provoked a dangerously political 
response: a public reading of the drama (a history of the controversial Republican hero 
Cato) has “offended the feelings of powerful men, because (so ran the charge) [Maturnus] 
had forgotten himself in the plot of his play and had presented the views of Cato alone, 
and there was much talk in Rome about this” (94). The lawyers seek to persuade their 
friend to abandon the stage and return to the (as they see it) more practical and less 
dangerous world of forensic oratory.  
 One of the immediately striking things about this exchange is the way Maturnus 
defends his new poetic calling: Although he sees drama as fundamentally superior to the 
practical demands of “speeches and lawsuits” and the “cases of so many friends and the 
client relationships of so many communities and towns” (94-95), he nevertheless sees it 
as a kind of rhetoric, a “loftier and holier form of eloquence” (95). Indeed, as Jeffrey 
Walker notes, the kind of poetic eloquence that Maturnus defends may be closer to the 
original notions of rhetoric than the “speeches and lawsuits” that Maturnus’ friends (and, 
indeed, most modern rhetoric teachers) see as the discipline’s proper domain. Although a 
standard history of rhetoric begins with pragmatic political and legal discourse in Ancient 
Greece (especially Athens) and gradually devolves into epideictic display oratory (of 
which declamation in the Second Sophistic is perhaps the consummate form), in his book 
Rhetoric and Poetics, Walker outlines an alternative history that begins with epideictic 
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oratory, which was then gradually expanded to include more pragmatic forms of speech 
(18).  
 According to Walker, the sophists, with their holistic approach to rhetorical 
education, were the direct successors of the poets; originally, rhetoric and poetics were a 
unified discipline (28). Over time, technical rhetoric came to represent rhetoric as a 
whole, but this severed rhetoric from its poetic roots and, since a purely technical rhetoric 
(as exemplified by the handbook tradition) is an unsustainable concept, this situation 
gave rise to many contradictions (40).  At the beginning of Cicero’s youthful work On 
Invention, for example, the great orator praises a liberal vision of a broadly defined logon 
techne, but in the rest of the book, he tightly circumscribes the realm of rhetoric within 
spaces practical, legal, and deliberative (64). Only in his later years, with more mature 
works such as On the Ideal Orator, was Cicero able to at least partially reconcile these 
two perspectives.  
 The Dialogue on the Orators is very much in response to this larger debate about 
the nature and proper domain of rhetoric. Maturnus presents an essentially sophistic point 
of view, arguing not so much in favor of poetics over rhetoric as in favor of a more poetic 
form of rhetoric (Walker 134). Even Aper, one of his interrogators in the dialogue, seems 
to recognize the implicit return to tradition in Maturnus’ chosen “task” of adding “Roman 
names such as Domitius and Cato and also events of our history to the tales of the 
Greeks” (95). And although Maturnus seems to be favoring, with this poetic and 
historical focus, a withdrawal from the domain of everyday political concerns, the 
dangerous response to his play clearly demonstrates the real persuasive power plays 
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could have—often by implicit analogies to contemporary events. Indeed, Maturnus 
makes the case that in the political stability of the Pax Romana, eloquence (of the more 
practical kind) had no other place: “Who does not know that it is more advantageous and 
better to enjoy peace than to be assailed by war? Nevertheless, wars produce more good 
soldiers than does peace. The situation with eloquence is similar” (126). But the poetic 
rhetoric he favors is still a form of politicized rhetoric, and he still refuses his friends’ 
admonitions to bow to political pressure and make his title character “a Cato who is not 
indeed better but nonetheless not so likely to cause trouble” on ethical grounds: “You will 
read [in my revised version] what Maturnus [speaking of himself in the third person] 
considered his duty and you will recognize what you have heard” (94). Furthermore, he 
speaks of his upcoming project much as an orator might have spoken of a planned 
speech: “I have already arranged the material for this play and have molded it in my 
mind” (94).  
 Plays with characters such as Maturnus’ Cato were rhetorical because of the light 
they threw on “real” events, potentially making those real events—by virtue of the spin 
that followed from their unreal performances—fundamentally different rhetorical 
situations. The idea that the same thing can be seen in more than one way is at the heart 
of the rhetorical tradition; it is also at the heart of Maturnus’ argument about the greater 
propriety of a “holier” form of poetic “eloquence” in the context of the Augustan Roman 
Empire. Proofs such as that “if some state should be found in which no one did wrong, 
the orator would be unnecessary among guiltless people, as a doctor is among healthy 
ones” (Tacitus 129) sound strikingly similar to arguments from the much older Greek 
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sophistic text Dissoi Logoi: “Some say that the good is one thing and the bad another, but 
others say that they are the same, and a thing might be good for some persons but bad for 
others, or at one time good and at another time bad for the same person. I myself side 
with those who hold the latter opinion… And again, illness is bad for the sick but good 
for the doctors” (Dissoi Logoi 2-3). Maturnus’ defense of poetics, then, uses rhetorical 
techniques and sounds much like a declamation. Indeed, when he tells his orator-friends 
that if “some god had suddenly exchanged lives and times” and placed them in a more 
politically turbulent context (like the ones he has been writing about in his plays, and like 
the ones featured in declamation themes) then they “would not have lacked that very 
great praise and glory in eloquence” enjoyed by the great orators of the past (130). The 
unstated implication of this argument is that Romans in Maturnus’ age could still achieve 
such dramatic glory and praise, still enjoy the artistic benefits of turbulence and political 
instability—in plays and declamations. And these unreal productions had a very real 
impact on the political reality of Imperial Rome.  
 To illustrate exactly how performance could affect reality during this period, I turn 
now to a second example, this one from the declamation memoirs of the Elder Seneca. 
While recounting the ways different declaimers approached a particular declamation 
problem involving a man accused of insanity for adopting a very lowborn grandson, 
Seneca tells the story of how his friend Latro inadvertently “said something that was 
harmful to himself rather than to his declamation. He was declaiming it in the presence of 
Augustus and Marcus Agrippa, whose sons—the emperor’s grandsons—the emperor 
seemed to be proposing to adopt at that time. Agrippa was one of those who were made 
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noble, not born noble. Taking the part of the youth [the father’s son, who protests the 
adoption], Latro said: ‘Now he is by adoption being raised from the depths and grafted on 
to the nobility’—and more to this effect” (315). Gunderson notes that, in this story, Latro 
has “unexpectedly made a piece of social commentary. He has just implied that Agrippa’s 
kids are like the sons of a whore. It is possible to excuse and cover over their birth, but 
there will always remain a controversy over the nature of status that reminds one of a 
controversia” (102). For Gunderson, then, the implied social critique was already in the 
air whether it was articulated in a declamation or not, and he interprets this episode as an 
interesting example of the dialogic relationship between declamation and reality. But the 
more salient point, I think, is that the world in which Augustus’ soon-to-be-adopted sons 
could be seen as socially unworthy was created by speech acts such as (indeed, 
epitomized by) Latro’s declamation. Latro could not apologize—was, as Gunderson aptly 
notes, “silenced by his own speech” (104)—because any additional speech would further 
concretize the offending rhetorical situation that his declamation had accidentally called 
into being. Intentionally or not, he had placed the real Augustus, by analogy, within the 
color of his imaginary declamation (a concept to be discussed in greater detail below). He 
had, as the linguist J.L. Austin might have put it, made an “illocutionary statement,” a 
speech act that does something real without describing or referencing a preexisting, stable 
state of affairs. As historian John Alexander Lobur notes, “the themes and arguments that 
occurred in declamation” were easily transferred “to situations in the political realm.” 
And this had real consequences. Latro’s situation as a whole “demonstrates the extent to 
which the ruling family was at the mercy of construal” (135).  
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 This potential for real political impact through declamation also helps to explain 
why the emperor was unable to retaliate or punish Latro for the speech: As Gunderson 
notes, not only did the imperial ethos, with its requisite humanitas, oblige Augustus to 
“kindly receive art as art even while appreciating that life and art converge” and thereby 
avoid “embodying the illegitimate power of a declamatory tyrant” (Gunderson 104), he 
was also forced, to use a sports metaphor, to play it as it lies—to accept the world as it 
has been called forth by speech and then remake it through further speech rather than try 
to forcefully unmake it through tyrannical action. The use of brute force would, in effect, 
attempt to deny the reality of the world created by discourse and destroy the game by 
denying (or trumping) the authority of its (declamatory) rules. This approach might have 
seemed a dangerously doubled-edged sword: the emperor’s “real world” authority was 
also, after all, partially dependent on discourse, and Augustus was acutely aware of the 
necessity of winning and keeping approval for his new political role from both the masses 
and the aristocrats (such as declaimers). Victory in battle could only go so far towards 
establishing legitimate rule; to be emperor, Augustus had to articulate the role of emperor 
and then be taken at his word. After calling the Roman Empire itself into being, he had 
colored this autocratic political organization as consonant with (if not the culmination of) 
Republican values—he had, in other words, created a kind of rhetorically effective (if 
ironic) color for his ascension to absolute power. Indeed, his very name was, as Edward 
Gibbons points out, a carefully calculated rhetorical coloration of his persona and role in 
the new empire: “It was proposed in the senate to dignify their minister with a new 
appellation [January 16, 27 B.C.]; and after a serious discussion, that of Augustus was 
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chosen, among several others, as being the most expressive of the character of peace and 
sanctity which he uniformly affected” (60).  
 Augustus’ real world rhetorical challenge as the first Roman emperor was 
analogous in many ways to the simulated challenge presented by declamation themes, 
and he responded to it with a kind of color. This worked both ways, though: imperial 
ideology may have depended, in part, on the practice of declamation for its ideological 
justification among elite Romans. As Lobur observes, declamation themes often had the 
distinct rhetorical purpose of recasting some Republican symbol (some as Cicero) as an 
“amalgam of imperial virtues”—even as (or because) it allowed an elite imperial Roman 
declaimer a venue to “foreground his mastery of and commitment to republican dictio” 
(158).  As such, declamation themes actually preceded and influenced the formation of an 
Imperial ethos (Lobur 163). Although the Emperor monopolized the ability to achieve 
“the consensus universorum so dearly sought by competing republican elites,” he 
nevertheless “did not deny the actual necessity of obtaining it”; in fact, his political 
success depended on “convincing the citizenry that it was his top priority” (8). Since 
many declamation themes could be used to creatively accommodate Republican values to 
imperial realities, in one sense declamation created imperial “ideology and symbolic 
imagery” (163), not the other way around. Given this paradoxical dynamic, it seems 
much more plausible that, for declaimers themselves (including rhetoric students from 
aristocratic Roman families), declamation also, as Gunderson puts it, exposed society as 
an “effect of the pleading”(Gunderson 7) by modeling the dependence of reality on what 
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it said about reality. But this does not necessarily mean that, for ancient Romans, a reality 
dependent on rhetorical speech acts was any less real.  
Scientific Realism vs. Emergent Cognition  
 These stories from the ancient literature are relevant for modern teachers and 
composition scholars because they crystallize an age-old and ongoing conflict between 
scientific realism and rhetorical indeterminacy. Cognitive scientist Mark Turner, for 
example, sees the search for abiding cognitive structures as the most important frontier 
for research in the social sciences, and he acknowledges that the discipline of rhetoric has 
been engaged in exactly this kind of systematic investigation for centuries: “The 
rhetorician strives for conscious awareness of these cognitive operations and conceptual 
structures, in the hope of discovering ways in which to manipulate them” (153). 
Nevertheless, he warns against taking rhetoric as the banner or umbrella for the kind of 
emerging scholarship that he predicts: “Rhetoric in our time has fallen on abject and 
humiliating circumstances. It is now associated for the most part not with research but 
with fraud, poverty, and the humanities. We cannot afford these connotations; we must 
have others: bold scientific research, emerging syntheses, new paradigms, wealth, rigor, 
power, truth” (154).   
 Turner’s argument will seem familiar to anyone with a passing familiarity with the 
history of rhetoric—it is essentially the same one that Socrates makes in Plato’s Gorgias. 
According to the anti-rhetorical tradition Turner has inherited and exemplifies, there is a 
continuum between science and quantifiable truth, on the one hand, and the humanities, 
fraud, rhetoric on the other. Poor, dissembling rhetoric, in other words, simply isn’t 
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scientific—true—enough. And Turner’s position is valid if science is defined in 
essentially dualistic, realist terms. Given this definition, in fact, cognitive science—but 
not rhetoric—seems to offer a way out of the vexing, age-old epistemological dilemma of 
subjectivity itself. As Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch note in their 
groundbreaking work The Embodied Mind, the insights of cognitive science have inspired 
a refocusing of both philosophical and scientific inquiry away “from concern with a 
priori representations (representations that might provide some noncontingent foundation 
for our knowledge of the world) to concern with a posteriori representations 
(representations whose contents are ultimately derived from causal interactions with the 
environment)” (137). This essentially sidesteps skepticism about the possibility of 
knowing the “real” external world by turning the gaze of the “realist” scientific eye 
inward, at the mind itself. The scientific way of seeing, however, is itself unchanged: 
“The cognitive scientist is thus able to remain a staunch realist about the empirical world 
while making the details of mind and cognition the subject of his investigations” (Varela 
et. al 137). If cognitive science is seen as an objective search for abiding cognitive 
mechanisms and structures, this saves (or seems to save) scientific realism from 
epistemological skepticism.  
 Rhetoric also makes the mind and cognition the focus of its investigations. But, 
despite its undeniable commonalities with the goals and even with the methods of 
cognitive science, it takes epistemological skepticism as its very starting point. The Older 
Sophist Gorgias’ epigrammatic propositions in the fragmentary text On the Nonexistent, 
composed long before Aristotle, encapsulate this kind of rhetorical anti-foundationalism: 
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“first and foremost, that nothing exists; second, that even if it exists it is inapprehensible 
to man; third, that even if it is apprehensible, still it is without a doubt incapable of being 
expressed or explained to the next man” (Gorgias 42).  The Dissoi Logoi, the work of 
another of the Older Sophists, is perhaps even more salient in its declamation-like 
assertion that there are two sides to every issue. If this is true, then there is really no 
issue—no “truth,” to use Turner’s terms—in the conventionally “real” world apart from 
the rhetorical positions people take on and in relation to it. For this very reason, rhetoric’s 
inward investigation of the nature of abiding cognitive mechanisms is also an outward 
investigation of the nature of communities, shared belief or doxa, and discourse. From the 
point of view of rhetoric, the domains of subject and object, mind and world, individual 
and community are not mutually exclusive—are, in fact, interdependent. And while 
Turner’s rejection of rhetoric epitomizes a classically dualistic, “realist” approach to 
science and cognitive science in particular, other approaches are gaining currency. As 
Varela notes, “an important and pervasive shift is beginning to take place in cognitive 
science under the very influence of its own research. This shift requires that we move 
away from the idea of the world as independent and extrinsic to the idea of a world as 
inseparable from the structure of these processes of self-modification” (139). According 
to Varela, this new perspective requires us to look at cognitive processes not in terms of 
distinct subjects and objects, but in terms of “operational closure”:  
The notion of operational closure is thus a way of specifying classes of 
processes that, in their very operation, turn back upon themselves to form 
autonomous networks. Such networks do not fall into the class of systems 
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defined by external mechanisms of control (heteronomy) but rather into 
the class of systems defined by internal mechanisms of self-organization 
(autonomy). The key point is that such systems do not operate by 
representation. Instead of representing an independent world, they enact a 
world as a domain of distinctions that is inseparable from the structure 
embodied by the cognitive system. (139) 
 So where traditional, dualistic versions of cognitive science—which are, as Turner 
makes clear, not compatible with a rhetorical way of looking at the world—sidestep 
epistemological skepticism by making the mind itself the focus of their dualistic inquiry, 
the emerging school of cognitive science that Varela discusses challenges the very 
premise of epistemological skepticism by asserting—in a consummately rhetorical way 
— that the knowing subject and the known world are deeply interconnected. As George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson similarly note, this emerging theoretical perspective in 
cognitive science denies, “on empirical grounds, that there exists one and only one 
correct description of the world” (96). Instead, “cognitive science and neuroscience 
suggest that the world as we know it contains no primary qualities in Locke's sense, 
because the qualities of things as we can experience and comprehend them depend 
crucially on our neural makeup, our bodily interactions with them, and our purposes and 
interests” (Lakoff and Johnson 26). But the concept of “operational closure” goes even 
further, asserting not only that different “correct” descriptions of an external world are 
possible but that worlds themselves are enacted as part of integrated, non-representational 
cognitive systems. From this point of view, knowing a world is the world; there is no 
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world apart from knowledge of it. But this statement is not the same thing as saying that 
any description of or response to a world inevitably follows from its cognitive enactment. 
There are limits. This is because action and response always take place in some 
preexisting context. But that context is not objectively true apart from a community’s 
collective response to it—apart from doxa, that is, the special domain of rhetoric.  
 Varela sums up the practical implications of this view with the observation that “all 
of our activities depend on a background that can never be pinned down with any sense 
of ultimate solidity and finality. Groundlessness, then, is to be found not in some far off, 
philosophically abstruse analysis but in everyday experience” (144). But accepting this 
premise does not imply solipsism. Just as our enacted experiences are interconnected 
with the world, they are also interconnected with the experiences of others. We cannot 
effectively enact anything we want at any time; our resources for responding to and 
enacting a situation are inseparable from what Varela calls “‘common sense,’” or 
“knowing how to negotiate our way through a world that is not fixed and pregiven but 
that is continually shaped by the types of actions in which we engage” (144). Even a 
groundless world requires skillful action in response to situational limits and context (i.e., 
the rhetorical situation); it requires us to pose “within broad constraints, the relevant 
issues that need to be addressed at each moment. These issues and concerns are not 
pregiven but are enacted from a background of action, where what counts as relevant is 
contextually determined by our common sense” (Varela et. al 145).  
 Theories of enactive cognition and groundlessness are perfectly compatible with the 
practice of ancient declamation. Declamation, in fact, seems specifically designed to train 
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students in seeing the world as something enacted—within broad constraints—through 
performance and discourse. In fact, there was a mechanism built into the practice that 
served this purpose so perfectly that it seems quite strange from a more “objective” point 
of view (which may be one reason declamation has, over the centuries, so often been 
marginalized as a valid pedagogical practice). This mechanism was the color. 
 The Colores in Ancient Declamation 
 The canon of invention implies, by its very nature, that rhetorical situations are not 
pregiven, stable quantities but are instead created through the process of finding the 
means of persuasion available within them. In ancient declamation, the color was the 
essential technique for practicing how to best capitalize on this kind of situational 
flexibility. As defined by Matthew Roller, “The declamatory color is a formal device for 
supporting a particular line of argument. Specifically, in Seneca's usage, it is a piece of 
information, or an interpretive framework, that a declaimer introduces in a controversy in 
order to make the case more advantageous to his side. He may introduce anything he 
wishes, provided it does not contradict the fixed elements of the case as set forth in the 
thema” (Roller 114-115). 
 Declamation themes, then, were less fully developed scenarios than the broad 
outlines of  loosely defined liminal spaces. It was the declaimer’s job to create a figured 
world within these spaces that was perfectly suited to a particular persuasive purpose. In 
the process, the precise wording of controversy themes could not be directly 
contradicted—this was a basic rule of play—but almost any twist on the situation or its 
back-story not explicitly proscribed by the theme itself was fair game. Furthermore, 
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details that were explicitly mentioned in the theme could be cast in whatever light the 
declaimer wished. As Roller notes, “the invention of prior encounters or agreements 
between two parties is a common technique for alleging motive, and thus for portraying 
the events given in the thema in a way that supports whatever standard of judgment is 
being invoked: morality above all, but sometimes also necessity, expediency, and others” 
(Roller 114).  
 Indeed, as the practice of declamation grew in sophistication, so did the complexity 
and importance of selecting and deploying effective colores. According to Bonner, “the 
term color had, before Seneca’s day, been applied only as a general word for ‘cast’ or 
‘tone’ of style… But in Seneca it takes on the quite different meaning of ‘twist of 
argument, ‘plea,’ ‘excuse’” (Bonner 55). By the time of Imperial Rome, the color had 
been systematically incorporated into the declamation game, a more free-form version of 
which had already been in play across the Greek world for hundreds of years. The 
underlying dynamic was not fundamentally new; colores were the Roman codification of 
the age-old epistemological skepticism at the heart of the rhetoric tradition and 
epitomized by sophistic texts such as the Dissoi Logoi. But the Romans systematized this 
perspective; indeed, this is but one example of the broader process by which Romans, as 
James Murphy observes, “took the comparatively loose ideas of Greek educators and 
molded them into a coherent system, which instilled in its student a habit (hexis) of 
effective expression” (37). 
 Ironically, the adaption of this rhetorical way-of-seeing/being (hexis) to fit within 
the rules and constraints of a highly systematic pedagogical practice such as declamation 
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actually stimulated and necessitated experimentation and innovation. To stand out from 
the crowd, declaimers had to try just about everything in their colores—sometimes with 
mixed results. As Bonner points out, “many [colores] were stupid, unconvincing, the 
products of exhausted ingenuity” (56). But such exhaustion actually reflects the 
incredible range of colores that declaimers would invent for any given controversy 
theme. In the declamation game, as in many creative domains, constraint was the mother 
of invention.  
 It was this creativity-by-constraint that made the declamatory color so unique and 
so pedagogically effective. Summing up the appeal and power of colores, Bonner writes:  
Making black white and the reverse was the age-old prerogative of the 
pleader, but the colores of the declaimers were something more subtle; by 
a slight shift of argument, by an added insinuation, or a guileless plea, they 
tone down the guilt or represent it in even more glaring colours. The 
colores are the Persian carpet of the declaimer; look at it from one angle 
and the colours are bright and clear, the pattern simple, but observe it from 
another angle, and the shade deepens, the pattern changes, and the whole 
appears in a different light.” (55-56) 
 From one point of view, learning to invent colores trained declaimers to see the 
diversity of rhetorical situations available within the broad constraints of any given 
scenario. At the same time, the practice trained them to see the limitations those 
constraints imposed.  The interpretation of the wording of themes was, itself, an essential 
declamatory skill, and declaimers analyzed themes much as a modern law student might 
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analyze a statute or contract. But even if a color did not explicitly contradict the theme, it 
was still possible to cross an unstated line; the mere fact that a color was technically 
legitimate did not necessarily make it appropriate or plausible. Often, a color failed to 
win the applause of audience or teacher by failing to meaningfully engage with the 
essential dynamics of the theme itself. Thus Seneca complains about far-fetched, 
irrelevant colores such as dreams or omens: “It is laughable to make a point of something 
that cannot be proved false. It makes little difference whether you put up a false witness 
or yourself where your own case is concerned: the liar is to be disbelieved—you yourself 
generally are” (242-243). Such colores broke the spirit rather than the letter of the law: 
Like the Deus-ex-machina of a Greek drama, they sought a solution to the rhetorical 
problem outside the space afforded by the theme, even if they stopped short of 
contradicting it outright. They were bad for the game because they introduced non-
debatable elements that other declaimers could not easily redeploy or respond to in their 
own speeches—since the sole witness of a dream is the dreamer, discussion ends there. 
From a pedagogical perspective, too, colores like this were trump cards that did not 
require careful analysis of the theme’s constraints and possibilities for effective use. In 
the play world of declamation, they were unethical. But if Seneca’s judgment is any 
indication, for this very reason they generally failed in practice.  
Declamation Themes and Dialogue Wheels 
 The Mass Effect videogame franchise has been an undeniably massive critical and 
commercial success, leading to two game sequels, selling millions of copies worldwide, 
and garnering almost universally positive reviews. Even more interestingly, perhaps, it 
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has spawned a variety of narrative adaptations in a variety of other media, including a 
series of “tie-in novels,” a comic book series, and a major motion picture rumored to be 
in the works (Mass Effect Wiki). This proliferation into different media is perhaps 
unsurprising given that, from the first installment, what set the game apart arguably had 
less to do with action sequences, graphics, and game play than with a ground-breaking 
approach to dialogue and story. As a review of Mass Effect 2 in a popular online gaming 
magazine points out, the game was so effective in part because its designers found a way 
to take narrative inspiration from linear forms such as cinema without sacrificing the 
interactivity that makes videogames such an appealing medium in the first place 
(McNeilly).  
 As the reviewer observed, “it is often the case that film's narrative devices feel 
overly contrived in a dynamic, interactive setting in which the player should be calling 
the shots” (McNeilly). But Mass Effect avoided this problem by finding a way to balance 
what a player can control in cinematic, narrative sequences with what they cannot—and 
actually making the gap between these two domains a source of interest and engagement. 
To achieve this, the game introduced a sophisticated dialogue interface in which the 
player is given, at set points within a conversational exchange with other characters, a 
series of broadly paraphrased rhetorical choices arrayed on a “conversational wheel” 
(Mass Effect Wiki). The player chooses one of these options, then watches them play out 
in much more specific cinematic detail.  As the Mass Effect wiki page explains, 
…one choice may appear [on the conversational wheel] as "Don't try to 
study me," while the actual spoken line is "I'm not some artifact you can 
 63 
take back to your lab, doctor." Dialogue choices impact how others react 
to Shepard, the rewards for completing quests, possible discounts from 
merchants, romance paths and, most importantly, the Commander's 
morality. It is also possible to defuse tense situations without violence, or 
actually provoke it.  
 From the perspective of composition theory, this game interface is interesting 
because it creates a critical space between the player and the rhetorical actions of her 
digital avatar20. This interface exemplifies the balance between constraint and free-play 
that is an essential aspect of any game; I discuss this dynamic in greater detail in the next 
chapter. In the present context, though, the more salient point is that it encourages the 
player to think about rhetorical actions in epistemic terms: What the avatar says will 
fundamentally change the field of play in unpredictable and far-reaching ways that will 
ripple out across dozens of missions and hours of game play. Allies and enemies are 
created, new missions uncovered, the protagonist’s personality shaped. The vast virtual 
world literally changes—in quite obvious and concrete ways—based on the higher level 
rhetorical decisions the player makes, then watches play out on the screen.  
 I believe that this interface involves a much more limited and closely circumscribed 
version of the kind of critical work involved in crafting colores in declamation themes. 
Like the world of Mass Effect, the world of the declamation was malleable to a point, 
                                                
20 This is why some writing teachers have found the game useful in classroom exercises. 
See, for example, Chris Ortiz y Prentice’s remarkable lesson plan involving the game, 
developed for a first-year writing class in conjunction with the Digital Writing and 
Research Lab at UT Austin. 
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dependent on a variety of rhetorical choices that were constrained, like the choices on the 
dialogue wheel, by the wording of the themes. This dispersal of epistemological stability 
is also a fundamental aspect of what Lev Manovich describes as the “flattened” landscape 
of new media. According to Manovich, new media encourages a free wandering 
antithetical to any deliberate "ordering… by a writer or orator" (78).  On the other hand, 
Manovich sees new media as inherently antithetical to rhetoric since, he argues, rhetoric 
amounts to a kind of control, the conveyance of essentially static repositories of 
"knowledge and memory" in order to change readers (whether in terms of persuasion, 
identification, etc.) in determinate ways (76). Manovich, like Turner, wants to distance 
his discipline (in this case new media rather than cognitive science) from the baggage of 
the rhetorical tradition — but for opposite reasons.  
 However, declamation has more often been criticized for its indeterminacy, its lack 
of stable (let alone static) content or identity: As Cassius Severus put it, “real” oratory 
deals with the concrete, while declamation deals only in illusion: “it is one thing to fight, 
quite another to shadow-box” (Seneca 387). In the ancient literature, declaimers are 
usually seen as suspect because their speeches lack real substance, not because they exert 
control over the way their audience relates to knowledge. They are also suspect because 
they lack stable identities: Severus states of declaimers that, “With their surroundings, 
they will change their character” (387). But this ethical and epistemological flexibility is, 
in fact, the clearest and most important area of overlap between declamation and 
contemporary media such as video games. As discussed above, the shadows in which 
declamation dealt had the power to refigure social realities in powerful ways. Similarly, 
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modern games are increasingly valued not only as entertaining escapes from the real 
world but as potent tools to refigure it.  
 I would contend, however, that this view assumes a split between reality, on the one 
hand, and rhetoric, new media, games, declamation, on the other. The colores, as a key 
part of the declamation dynamic, tell a somewhat different story. Learning how to enact 
situations within broad constraints in an effective and ethical manner was a key part of 
the declamation game. It’s a lesson from which modern students living in a world 
characterized by new media, video games, and a vast dispersal of authority and identity 











Chapter Four:  
Real Play: Immersion and Reflexivity in the Declamation Dynamic 
It is hardly controversial to point out that every act of communication is a kind of 
performance and involves some element of role-playing and audience construction. 
Nevertheless, contemporary rhetoric students are often encouraged to write as 
“themselves” and to convey their “real,” informed opinions to “real,” directly accessible 
audiences. But even without venturing into the realms of philosophy or epistemology, a 
close analysis of the nature of argumentation shows the degree to which speakers always 
invent and reinvent their ethical positions vis-à-vis changing notions of particular 
audiences. In an important sense, both poles are equally functions of the speaker’s 
imagination; this is because, as Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca note in The 
New Rhetoric, the particular persona a speaker chooses to play at any given moment in 
the course of a speech or text will depend on her evolving image(s) of her audience(s) 
(19-23): “Even when an orator stands before only a few auditors, or indeed, before a 
single auditor, it is possible that he will not be quite sure what arguments will appear 
most convincing to his audience. In such a case, he will, by a kind of fiction, insert his 
audience into a series of different audiences” (22). The variety of “masks” that the 
speaker selects will entirely depend, then, on the variety of audiences that she imagines. 
These two key aspects of the rhetorical situation—the ethos invented by the speaker and 
the audience imagined by the speaker— are codependent, and co-constructed: Like the 
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mask the rhetor creates and wears in a given situation, “the audience, as visualized by one 
undertaking to argue, is always a more or less systemized construction” (19).  
The observation that audiences are constructed obviously does not imply that the 
speaker is at liberty to construct any audience she wishes for any situation. It does mean, 
however, that invention is always an imaginative act—an act upon which the success or 
failure of a discourse largely depends. By contrast, many contemporary approaches to 
teaching audience analysis and persona give the impression that generalizations about 
audiences can correspond directly to “reality.” On closer analysis, though, audiences are 
seen to be abstractions, and there cannot even be analysis of the people a speaker or 
writer addresses as an audience until images—based on but separate from those people—
are invented by the speaker (for whom they exist as an audience). The role the speaker 
chooses to play is, likewise, entirely dependent on these constructed images. When we 
teach invention and audience analysis, then, we are actually teaching specialized, 
pragmatic acts of imagination. 
 While I do not, as mentioned above, find this dynamic to be particularly 
controversial, I do believe that its implications, when taken to their logical conclusion, 
conflict in many ways with predominant approaches to teaching rhetoric. In this chapter, 
I will describe these conflicts and present ancient declamation as a pedagogical model 
that naturally foregrounds this often-overlooked but essential imaginative process. The 
bulk of the chapter will be taken up with a comparative analysis focused on ancient texts 
that shows how and why declamation was an effective method for teaching ancient 
rhetoric students to construct audiences. Finally, I will show why any pedagogy that 
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addresses these skills necessarily engages with what I call the declamation dynamic, and I 
will discuss some of the implications of my claims for contemporary rhetoric teachers.  
 
 Audience construction is inherently difficult to teach. Take, for example, 
Lunsford and Ruskiewicz’s highly successful and effective textbook Everything’s An 
Argument. This text directly references the imaginative aspect of conceptualizing 
audiences, pointing out that “as a writer, you’ll almost always be addressing an intended 
reader who exists in your mind” (28). They further illustrate this dynamic through some 
interesting meta-analysis of their own writing process, noting that “you are our intended 
reader… Though we don’t know you personally, we see you in our minds, for we intend 
to write for you” (28). And yet, as straightforward and frank as this pedagogical approach 
seems to be, I think it epitomizes a kind of subtle confusion that often results from 
conflating real and imagined audiences. The authors are teaching students about the 
imaginative process involved in addressing intended audiences while at the same time 
addressing those imagined student-readers directly, as though they were speaking straight 
to the “real” people. They imply that although they do not know the eventual readers of 
their text, they are nevertheless in direct, conscious communication with them and, as 
such, have imagined them exactly as they are—so much so that the distance between 
imagined and real audiences has all but disappeared. Some real student-readers may pick 
up on the implicit irony—the “you” in the text is not actually “me” as reader, as the 
authors have just pointed out—but as this would require a fairly sophisticated critical 
awareness, it amounts to pedagogical begging of the question: students would have to 
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already understand the operative concept to get the joke. The authors can hardly be 
blamed here: When writing about audience construction while addressing an imagined 
audience, it takes an extremely unnatural and artificial critical maneuver to 
simultaneously acknowledge the distance between this construction and the eventual, 
actual audience. This makes it a very difficult concept to codify or convey adequately in a 
textbook.  
 The situation is even more difficult for teachers directly addressing students in a 
classroom setting. The constructed audience in a live exchange is just as much a function 
of the imagination as in a written exchange, but the imaginative dynamic is inherently 
more difficult to grasp in such a context because of the physical presence of the actual 
audience. As such, if a teacher presenting this concept points to her own act of teaching 
as an example rhetorical performance, her ideal and actual student audiences are likely to 
be instantly conflated in the minds of the actual students. Since a live audience is 
immediately present and able to respond to the speaker, enabling her to modify her 
persona in appropriate ways based on real-time feedback, there is an intuitive impression 
that the ideal and actual audiences are one and the same. This impression is particularly 
strong in the case of a teacher using her own teaching as an illustrative example: the 
actual student audience is so obviously present to itself that the notion of a student 
audience is instantly obscured. But, in fact, rhetors must imagine physically present 
audiences just as they must imagine the audiences of written discourse. The speaker must 
still “break down” the live audience in various ways and organize and characterize it as 
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falling into one or more social groups21. Indeed, this act of audience construction is 
perhaps the most important part of argumentation, since, according to Perlman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, “the essential consideration for the speaker who has set himself the 
task of persuading concrete individuals is that his construction of the audience should be 
adequate to the occasion” (19).   
 The main challenge here, from a pedagogical standpoint, is achieving enough 
critical distance to avoid obscuring for students the mediation involved in the act of 
inventing audiences: Students are likely to assume that they must simply analyze the 
attributes of their real readers or listeners in order to directly appeal to them in an 
effective way, but, as Perlman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observe, the task of the speaker or 
writer is actually one of creation and correspondence rather than direct analysis: An 
image must be created that is as “adequate” to the real occasion as possible (19) since the 
occasion-as-occasion or the audience-as-audience is always a function of thought or 
language. Though this distinction might seem somewhat abstract or even irrelevant to the 
exigencies of an actual writing class, the implications are, as I hope to show, actually 
very concrete and practical.   
  
 Given the difficulties just outlined, how do we teach the imaginative act of 
audience construction, for both spoken and written mediums of communication? Simply 
                                                
21 As Perlman and Olbrechts-Tyteca further note, “The breaking down of a gathering into 
sub-groups will also depend on the speaker’s own position. If he holds extremist views 
on a question, there is nothing to restrain him from considering all his interlocutors as 
forming a single audience. On the other hand, if he holds a moderate view, he will see 
them as forming at least two distinct audiences” (23).  
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focusing on exemplary, real acts of speaking or writing is not an adequate solution. To 
cite an example from the third edition of another excellent textbook, Lester Faigley and 
Jack Selzer’s Good Reasons introduces the concept of audience through the example 
Rachel Carson’s environmental expose Silent Spring. The authors note that Carson 
succeeded where other similar but more technical arguments had failed because “she not 
only knew her purpose for writing Silent Spring, but she also thought a great deal about 
who she was writing for—her audience. If she was going to stop the widespread spraying 
of dangerous pesticides, she knew that she would have to connect with the values of a 
wide audience, an audience that included a large segment of the public as well as other 
scientists” (12). As apt and well-explained an example as this undoubtedly is, it 
nevertheless seems to conflate—on the level of process rather than product or effect—the 
act of audience construction that enabled Carson to create such an effective argument. 
One could perhaps phrase the authors’ point differently by saying that Carson tailored her 
argument to connect with the values of an imagined, composite audience, which she 
broke down into different segments according to levels of technical expertise. But even 
this would be misleading because the mere actuality of her text and its impact are still 
likely to leave the impression that the audiences Carson imagined and the actual readers 
she influenced were one and the same.   
 Alternatively, one might approach audience construction from the standpoint of 
invention: that is, teaching students concrete strategies for investigating and categorizing 
audiences according to specific characteristics. This approach, which is grounded in the 
technical tradition of ancient rhetoricians and, as such, is closely related to the practice of 
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declamation, is perhaps best encapsulated in an ancient context by the method of 
audience analysis outlined in Cicero’s early work On Invention22. While discussing the 
manner of crafting an effective introduction, Cicero outlines “how topics intended to 
enable the orator to work his way into the good graces of his hearers ought to be handled” 
(I.XVII). The strategies he advocates depend on such basic criteria as whether or not the 
“hearer is adverse to one” (I.XVII); whether or not “your adversaries appear to have 
made an impression on your hearers” (I.L); whether the audience is tired or uninterested 
in the subject matter (I.L); and so forth.  
 In Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee’s accessible yet comprehensive rhetoric 
textbook Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, this tradition is engaged on a 
very sophisticated level; the authors not only list some of the technical traits of audiences, 
as outlined in ancient rhetorical treatises, but also ground this analysis in contemporary 
cognitive science, discussing factors that render people more or less likely to change an 
opinion. In summation, they note that “rhetors need to assess the emotional states of their 
audiences as well as the intensity with which they cling to those states. Rhetors need to 
decide as well whether those emotional states render their audiences receptive to 
themselves and/or their proposition. Next, they should decide whether an audience can be 
persuaded to change their minds and, if so, whether they will be moved by appeals to 
their current emotional states or to a different one induced by a rhetor” (255).  
                                                
22 According to H.M. Hubbell’s introduction to the Loeb edition of this work, “The 
treatise de Inventione is a youthful work of Cicero, which was probably written while he 
was studying the elements of oratory, and is in fact hardly more than an elaborate note-
book in which he recorded the dictation of his teacher” (vii).  
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 As effective as this tradition is, particularly in the scientifically grounded form it 
has been given by Crowley and Hawhee in this excerpt, on its own it still falls prey to the 
same conceptual limitations as the earlier examples. First, in both Cicero’s and Crowley 
and Hawhee’s texts, audiences are implicitly presented as singular and stable entities. 
There is no discussion of the multilayered, complex manner in which an aggregation of 
people must generally be considered in order to create an audience construction that is, as 
Perelman and Tyteca put it, “adequate” to the actual rhetorical situation (19). Indeed, in 
both these examples, the audience envisioned by the rhetor is not presented as a 
construction at all but simply as the audience itself – despite the obvious simplification 
that is involved in categorizing an audience according to singular characteristics23.  
  
 It is nevertheless instructive to note that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the 
modern theorists with perhaps the most insightful analysis of audience and persona—an 
analysis they partly base on principles drawn from ancient rhetorical theory—are 
concerned only with the analysis of argumentation itself, not with its production, its 
pedagogy and certainly not with its delivery or performance, which they somewhat 
dismissively write off as “the province of conservatories and schools of dramatic art” (6). 
Their slight disdain for pedagogy is also seen in their critique of classroom exercises, 
“mere essay writing,” in which the imagined audiences do not correspond to real 
                                                
23 According to Perelman and Tyteca, this is true regardless of the size of the audience; it 
is even true if the audience being addressed is simply oneself. In fact, they argue that 
“agreement with oneself is merely a particular case of agreement with others. 
Accordingly, from our point of view, it is by analyzing argumentation addressed to others 
that we can best understand self-deliberation, and not vice versa” (41).  
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“concrete individuals” (19). Although declamation is surely the epitome of the kinds of 
artificial exercises they deride here, I would argue that the deliberate artificiality of such 
school-exercises is not necessarily to blame for the unwanted consequence of an ill-
defined (or poorly imagined) audience and that they need not necessarily result in flat, 
aimless discourse—although, as many composition scholars have previously argued, this 
is one possible result.  
 In fact, I will attempt to turn Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s point on its head, 
arguing instead that a critical awareness of, and skill in, the imaginative act of audience 
construction can best be cultivated through exercises based on un-real—that is, 
counterfactual—rhetorical situations because the presence of real situations and real 
audiences always tend to obscure the mediating role of imagined audiences. That is why 
the declamation dynamic is an essential part of any pedagogy that effectively teaches this 
skill.  
 Nevertheless, one might object that Cicero was, himself, a declaimer, and the 
techniques he outlines in On Invention were surely employed in relation to declamation 
exercises. So how could declamation, or the underlying declamation dynamic, escape 
what I have been describing as the problems inherent to technical systems of rhetoric 
with regards to audience construction?   
 Although declaimers were, like Cicero himself, trained to analyze audiences in 
the somewhat singular and reductive ways advocated (by necessity) by technical systems, 
the performative aspects of the practice mediated between these techniques and the 
complexities of real speaking situations. Declamation—or the declamation dynamic—is 
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the essential link between rhetorical techniques (or techne, technical handbooks) and the 
contingences of kairos, between rules and free play. I trace this function in part to 
declamation’s structure as a game, since games naturally depend on the interplay between 
constraints and, within those constraints, flexibility.    
In particular, I see two key aspects of declamation that, taken together, help to 
explain why the practice was able to mediate between the reductive (but practical and 
teachable) methods of audience analysis advocated in technical systems and the complex, 
shifting, multilayered contingences of audience constructions adequate to real speaking 
situations (but very difficult to codify or convey in precept form).  The first of these 
relates to the liberating transformation from rhetoric student to full-fledged rhetor that, 
according to Jeffrey Walker, took place in declamation (Genuine Teachers 199). Since 
this transformation leads to the direct experience, through play and the suspension of 
disbelief, of the fictive world called forth by and for the declamation, I refer to this as 
immersion. The other, seemingly contradictory, aspect is the constant awareness (overt or 
implicit) of the declamation’s artificial context—the classroom, the speaker’s “actual” 
student identity, the actual audience of peers; I call this reflexivity. Immersion and 
reflexivity are operative in any rhetorical exercise (including modern college essays), 
regardless of the degree of overt performativity. But declamation worked so well for so 
long in large part because it did not (like many modern rhetorical exercises) ignore or 
deny this tension but instead embraced it, making the skillful management of rhetorical 
double vision an explicit learning objective and a key part of the game. The declaimer 
had to play his dramatic role seriously, to the hilt, while simultaneously (and often 
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ironically) playing his role as real world student to the hilt as well. To fully succeed in the 
exercise, in fact, he had to effectively combine these roles, both for himself and for his 
student audience, using their real world identities to strengthen his own play ethos and 
persuasive power. In so doing, the declaimer naturally learned how to construct and adapt 
to complex, multilayered images of audience.  
To explain and theorize this process, I will borrow an idea from cognitive science: 
Declamation was a preeminent exercise in conceptual blending. This term, coined by 
Giles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, refers to the blending of two contributing conceptual 
spaces into a third, emergent conceptual space “identical to neither of its influences and 
not merely a correspondence between them” (Turner, Cognitive Dimensions 17). 
According to Turner, it is an essential feature of human thought. It is also a key overlap 
between the domains of theater and rhetoric. According to cognitive theater theorists 
Bruce McConachie and F. Elizabeth Hart, theater—like declamation—always involves 
multiple levels of mediation and meaning because it relies on this key cognitive faculty: 
Spectators never lose sight of either contributing space—actor as actor on a certain stage 
at a certain real time, on the one hand; actor as character in a fictional time and place, on 
the other. As such, theater is not actually representational since “mind/brain’s ability to 
project and compress information about these relationships into a blend that constitutes a 
person’s mental image of a millisecond of a performance defies the notions of mimesis” 
(20).  
The same dynamic is operative in any form of communication, but since 
rhetorical pedagogy ostensibly trains people for speaking in “real” situations, this 
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performative double consciousness is easily overlooked (or deliberately ignored). In 
declamation, however, it was deliberately emphasized. For example, surviving 
declamation texts often display clear double entendres or passages with multivalent 
meanings, which I take to be evidence that declaimers were practicing the ability to 
imagine audiences on multiple levels simultaneously. According to Erik Gunderson, for 
instance, this dynamic is even apparent in the interplay between the archetypal “rhetoric 
teacher” teaching about declamation and the archetypal “father persona” character in 
declamation excerpts found the Minor Declamations attributed to Quintilian. In this text, 
the teacher draws implicit comparisons between his own “real” persona, as figured in the 
sermo or commentary sections accompanying most of the declamation themes, and the 
father-persona figured in the excerpted declamations themselves. Since the students 
would be expected to actually perform this father figure (based, of course, on the example 
and advice of their paternal teacher) in their own compositions, the process provided “a 
chain of association whereby the ‘I’ of each of these is offered as an orthopedic double 
for the ego of the young speaker who accepts them as his own” (Gunderson 144).  
Because they share this kind of double-vision or constant oscillation between 
immersion and reflexivity, theater and declamation can be seen, for similar reasons, as 
threatening to stable epistemologies. Along these lines, Richard Lanham notes that 
theater provides an “alternate conception of human reality” characterized by artifice and 
self-consciousness and that, although our historical tendency has been to “ritually 
condemn” this point of view, it is now more important than ever before: as our ability to 
thrive in a new information economy depends, he argues, on our ability to toggle back 
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and forth between conceptions of “life as information” and “life as drama” (Economics 
177)—the very kind of training declamation was designed to provide. 
 
I will now offer three declamation case studies to ground my claims about its 
immersive and reflexive qualities: The first is an actual student declamation from the 
third century B.C.E. Although it predates the other examples by hundreds of years, it 
provides a rare glimpse of what declamation was like for an ancient rhetoric student. The 
second and third examples, by contrast, are from psd.-Quintilian’s Major Declamations 
and Minor Declamations, respectively, and were probably composed by rhetoric teachers 
as a classroom models for student imitation. Nevertheless, this function makes the 
“double vision” even more apparent since the “actual” identities of the teachers also 
figure in the declamations and interact and contrast with the teacher-speakers’ persona in 
distinct, representative ways that are both similar and radically different from the first, 
student example. All three provide key insights into the ways this double vision affected 
the conceptual process involved in declamation and characterized the experience of 
writing and delivering these performances.  
 
Extant declamations “texts” are few and, for the most part, fragmentary. Student 
declamations, in particular, are extremely rare, as they were primarily created for 
purposes of oral performance rather than as  final, written products and, furthermore, 
because student exercises were not seen as important enough to preserve through the 
centuries. But the rare exception has, by chance rather than design, survived. Walker 
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includes the complete text of one such fragment found in “necropolis in Middle Egypt 
(where it was used as mummy wrapping)” (Genuine Teachers 190). Walker sums up the 
declamation scenario as follows:  
The speech is set in the historical context of the Lamian War of 323 
B.C.E., in which a combined Greek force of Athenians and their allies 
tried to throw off Macedonian domination after the death of Alexander the 
Great. This is relatively recent history — about fifty to eighty years before 
the declamation’s composition — but not exactly current events either. 
Athenian independence was not a realistic possibility when this writer 
wrote, a non-issue outside the garden of declamation. The speaker appears 
to be Leosthenes, an Athenian general who had assembled a large force of 
unemployed mercenaries at Taenarum, at the southern tip of the 
Peloponnese, and upon Alexander’s death joined to it the Athenian and 
other forces… In what remains of the declamation it appears that 
Leosthenes is speaking just after the death of Alexander and urging the 
Athenians to seize the opportunity to regain their liberty. The speech is 
thus set in the moment of decision to launch the Lamian War. (Genuine 
Teachers 191)  
Despite its historical distance from this young declaimer’s real life, the events in 
this theme did indeed have a direct relation to the real political and social order in the 
Ptolemy II’s Egypt. Leosthenes—whom he is performing in the theme—represented an 
unsuccessful opposition to the origins of that social order; as Walker notes, “the student 
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and contemporaries know that Leosthenes and his contemporaries died and the rebellion 
failed” and that “it accomplished nothing” (Genuine Teachers 195). Furthermore, for 
people in the declaimer’s social class, the political stability and relative wealth that 
resulted from that failure and its aftermath “probably looked rather good” (Genuine 
Teachers 195). Thus, the boy is arguing against the social order in which he finds himself 
(advantageously) situated. But, as Walker also notes, he (as Leosthenes) primarily bases 
his argument on “appeals to national honor and shame,” not on pragmatic arguments 
about the likelihood or feasibility of success or even on the longer-term implications of 
his rebellion, which he mentions only in passing. I would venture to suggest that the 
ethical “ideal” performed by his character—bravery, self-sacrifice, honor—was very 
much in keeping with the ideals of his contemporary society, even if the practical, 
political goal of his proposed revolution was not.  
I would also suggest that the young declaimer’s imaginary audience is 
consciously blended with his real audience of fellow students: It is surely not coincidental 
that this young man speaking for an audience of young men focuses so much, in his 
speech, on an imagined audience of young Athenians:  
I entreat especially the younger men among you who have had, since 
childhood, an adequate military training—to be strong in their thought, 
and to employ their own bodies in a timely demonstration of their virtue—
so that your quietude at other times is not attributed to cowardice but to 
caution—and may we not, men of Athens, go into action without your 
power, and may you not be compelled in any way by us either to do what 
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others command, or to go into battle with inferior forces…” (Genuine 
Teachers 192)  
The theme of the declamation, then, is inherently multivalent: it was about a 
highly dramatic and historically remote moment, but it was also about the present 
moment, the present audience, the present ethical ideal. The declaimer was speaking as a 
failed rebel addressing a doomed rebel army, but he was speaking in a way that his 
student audience could understand and identify with, and he emphasizes this overlap in 
the content of his speech itself.  
On one level, all this would have simply been an exciting, fun, pedagogically 
effective rhetorical game. As Walker notes, students probably enjoyed speaking in “a 
historical moment of high drama where speech and judgment were highly consequential. 
The sense of high stakes emphatically foregrounds the elements in the rhetorical situation 
that the declaimer, in character, must attend to” (Genuine Teachers 195). By the same 
token, though, it would have cultivated through performance a kind of structural 
awareness of the constructed and contingent nature of the social and ethical ideals that 
(the character of) Leosthenes represents and, by extension, of the declaimer’s own social 
and political world: The declaimer is performing those ideals against the backdrop of 
their practical failure. Leosthenes is not part of the declaimers’ social system—in fact, he 
is directly opposed to it—yet he is close enough in ideology and ethos that his military 
and political failure would strike very close to home, especially for a performer literally 
standing in his shoes.   
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This dynamic, and the fun it involves, was made possible by and through 
performance itself. The student was not simply engaging in a thought experiment or 
abstract case study: he was actually playing Leosthenes. As Walker points out, the format 
of the surviving text indicates this purpose, as it is punctuated only by dashes “probably 
to indicate pauses in delivery, which suggests that the text was probably meant as a script 
for performance” (Genuine Teachers 191).  
Though fragmentary, this speech clearly shows the essential role, from the 
student’s perspective, of both immersion and reflexivity in declamation— the real 
experience of playing Leosthenes and directly experiencing a doomed-but-strikingly-
familiar ethical position, on the one hand and, on the other, the conscious juxtaposition of 
the imaginary world of the declamation theme and the immediate context of real, 
schoolroom performance before an audience of peers. My next example shows how a 
very similar dynamic could be employed by a teacher wishing to model this skill for his 
students.  
 
 In the outlandish theme of Declamation XII from psd.-Quintilian’s Major 
Declamations, an isolated island colony recently stricken by a sudden and unnatural 
famine sends an agent in search of grain; he is provided with money and ship, and a date 
is set for his return. But in his absence things grow so desperate that the populace resorts 
to eating the bodies of the dead, an almost unforgivable sacrilege. The agent returns on 
the agreed upon date with twice as much grain as expected, thanks to some shrewd 
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business dealings during an extra stop on his way home, but he is charged with 
undermining, by delay, the city’s very humanity and precipitating an ethical disaster.   
In this speech, a prosecution of the agent by an angry citizen, the speaker 
repeatedly blurs the distinction between declaimer and audience. As in most 
declamations, he assigns the audience a role in the fiction—in this case as a group of 
citizens and former corpse-eaters like himself. Since, in their roles, both speaker and 
audience stand guilty of the same terrible act, both are also tasked with the same 
fundamental responsibility of reconstituting the violated category distinctions  
(animal/human, forgivable/unforgivable) by refocusing blame on the agent. As such, the 
underlying exigency of the situation is explicitly extended from the speaker to the entire 
classroom audience:  
As his accuser do I not share a common grievance with the jury? Does 
anybody defer to another in this revenge?... To all nations, for all ages to 
come, we have been damned. Everybody will describe these monstrous 
acts, everybody will curse us except those who would not believe it. We 
have defamed the very word famine, and what is the last straw for the 
unfortunate, we have also lost our claim to pity. Yet there was still a single 
defense—we seemed to be forced into all these acts through the 
dereliction of that man over there. If he is innocent, the guilt belongs to us. 
(146) 
This function of ethical reconstitution was a key element of many declamation 
themes. Robert Kaster notes that it often  “becomes the declaimer's job to put the surfaces 
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back into some sort of acceptable, more or less conventional order—which is precisely 
the role for which the declaimer is being trained” (328).  
But in addition to the intense, immersive focus on the ethical quandary and high 
drama of the imagined scenario, the speaker also weaves in subtly disjunctive references 
to the student-audience’s real-world context throughout the speech—making playful 
allusions, for example, to the progymnasmata or graduated series of preliminary 
exercises that prepared students in the grammar schools for higher rhetorical training. For 
example, in the speech’s confirmation or proof, the speaker calls upon traditional stories 
and fables as evidence for the almost unimaginable (imagined) horrors he has been 
calling up in his auditors’ minds’ eyes: “Whoever fabricated the talk to the Cyclops, the 
Laestrygonians, the Sphinx, or the maiden Scylla whose barking loins resounded along 
the shores of Sicily, and whatever else I learned by heart at home when I was just a poor 
boy, let all these receive proof and confirmation from our city” (162). Similarly, when he 
equates rhetorical invention (which he calls “concoction”) with “gluttonous leisure time,” 
it would surely have been interpreted as an ironic jibe at the artificial, safe space in which 
the audience of rhetoric students actually found themselves—what “Juvenal calls this the 
rhetorica umbra, the ‘shade of the rhetorician's school’” (qtd. in Kaster 323).  
In this passage, then, the speaker—probably the teacher himself—performs not 
only the deft use of authoritative source material to support his narration of events within 
the fiction, but he also alludes to the student-audience’s educational progression outside 
the fiction. This passage alludes to the educational progression in which the audience was 
actually engaged and, specifically, to the transition from early exercises such as mythos 
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to more advanced exercises such as refutation and confirmation. And the speech actually 
performs this progression as part of the most advanced exercise of all, declamation, the 
purpose of which was to incorporate all of the earlier skills into a single organic whole. 
The effect, I argue, would be to create a second-order conceptual blend between 
classroom context (including the rhetorical lessons learned and to be learned) and the 
fantastical fiction of the declamation theme. In actual performance, though, it would have 
gone even further: The teacher is directly moving and persuading his student audience 
through the rhetorical techniques they have learned and are continuing to practice while 
at the same time calling attention to the power of those techniques in performance. 
Moreover, he uses this overlap between direct experience and classroom reflection to 
strengthen his own (reflexive) ethos as teacher and, thus, his persuasive power in the 
(immersive) scenario. Most importantly, perhaps, he is modeling through virtuosic 
performance how these kinds of conceptual blends between immersive and reflexive 
domains can be crafted and manipulated by a skillful speaker. 
 
This skill was not only rhetorically effective; it also facilitated critical awareness.  
This function is particularly evident in Declamation 256, “Mad father of three sons,” 
from psd.-Quintilian’s Minor Declamations, which maximizes reflexive awareness of the 
classroom context of performance and also of the logical contradictions inherent in 
Rome’s patriarchal social structure as depicted in the theme itself. The scenario is as 
follows: “A father of three sons killed two of them in madness. Cured by the third, he 
disowns him” (107). Although it would seem natural that declaimers speaking on this 
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theme would have spoken in the persona of, or as an advocate for, the son, psd.-
Quintilian’s example declamation is in the persona of the father and defends the father’s 
decision to disinherit the son who cured him, thus forcing him to face up to his 
murderous actions. A young declaimer, speaking on this theme before an audience of 
young male students and sons, would be making a case directly counter to the interests of 
their nearest analogue in the theme—to, no doubt, ironic effect. But in addition to its 
potential irony and humor, this theme demonstrates the ways performance functioned, in 
declamation, as a mode of serious—though not necessarily radical—social critique at the 
conjunction of the immersive and reflexive dynamics that it involved.  
The son in this theme in no way contradicted the Roman moral ethical imperative 
of absolute filial service; in effect, he did nothing wrong. Yet the patriarchal system itself 
is upended by the fact of the father’s madness. The son is caught in a grey area of 
structural failure that hinges on an unresolvable ambiguity: In a society of absolute 
paternal authority, what is a son’s responsibility to a mad (or, in less radical terms, 
fallible) father? Like many declamation themes, this is such an extreme case that it can 
seem blackly humorous or even absurd, but its implicit cultural critique becomes more 
obvious if its underlying ethical dilemma is put in milder terms: How can a son best serve 
a father whose wishes are not in his own best interest? Can a son know best? If so, what 
becomes of paternal authority?    
From this point of view, this declamation theme can be viewed as a brute exercise 
in social indoctrination: The declaimer, a son himself, is confronting an area of structural 
failure within Roman ethics by arguing against a “son” as a father on behalf of what is at 
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once the most conservative and, perhaps, counterintuitive possible resolution to this 
ethical crisis—a resolution that seems specifically engineered to strike as close to home 
in his (and his audience’s) “real” world as possible. This shows, as in the previous 
example, the typical “reconstitution” dynamic discussed by Kaster. The declaimer will 
presumably, after all, someday play the role of patriarch himself, and by pointing out this 
breakdown in paternal authority and then fixing it by doubling down on that same 
authority, the declaimer may, in effect, be forcing himself to view the archetypical father-
figure and his authority in an even stronger, less alienable light.   
However, the fact of performance puts this dynamic in a somewhat more complex 
and ambiguous position. The declaimer is not merely subjecting himself to the father’s 
authority within this declamation; he is actually embodying that authority and 
experiencing its failure and (somewhat irrational) reconstitution first-hand. At the same 
time, the ironically reflexive tendencies of Roman declamation—such as a son speaking 
(on tenuous grounds) against a son, as a father—keeps the real world experience of son 
directly in view. The practical effect of this exercise on declaimers may indeed have been 
a restrengthening of their commitment to and acceptance of the Roman ethical and social 
order; even so, it also cultivated an awareness of the limits and constructed nature of that 
order by actively performing its limits.  
Gunderson makes a similar point, noting that by employing the syntax and 
grammar of real legal and political life in Rome, declamation served to “expose society” 
itself as an “effect of the pleading”—in other words, of discourse (7), but at the same 
time that the practice was a “mode of reflection” mobilized not “in the name of critical 
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break with the rules of the game, but instead… in the name of a fuller reinvestment in the 
game itself” (233). Gunderson’s analysis of this dynamic is extremely insightful, but he 
focuses mainly on the textual side of the practice—declamation as it continues to exist on 
the page—yet the “mode of reflection” that he identifies is even more effectively 
cultivated through, and dependent upon, performance itself.  
That essentially theatrical experience was a key part of rhetorical training and 
technique in antiquity. In the remainder of this chapter, I draw on cognitive science and 
theater studies to help explain why this was so important in ancient declamation and why 
it continues to be important in modern rhetorical pedagogy.   
In a passage partially quoted in the previous chapter, Quintilian notes that: 
The chief requisite, then, for moving the feelings of others, is, as far as I 
can judge, that we ourselves be moved; for the assumption of grief, and 
anger, and indignation, will be often ridiculous, if we adapt merely our 
words and looks, and not our minds, to those passions… In delivering, 
therefore whatever we wish to appear like truth, let us assimilate ourselves 
to the feelings of those who are truly affected, and let our language 
proceed from such a temper of mind as we would wish to excite in the 
judge. (6. 2. 26) 
Quintilian draws an important distinction here between real emotional experience 
and its outward—visual or verbal—appearance. Presaging one of the core tenets of 
modern method acting, he contends that only by genuinely experiencing an emotion can a 
performer excite a corresponding emotion in auditors. On the other hand, Quintilian 
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acknowledges the inherent artifice involved in this process: Rhetors must move 
themselves to effectively move others—indeed, such is the power of involuntary 
imitation that, being moved, they will move others. But, as Quintilian further notes, 
speakers are as helpless as the audiences they hope to persuade: “our feelings are not in 
our own power” (2. 6. 29).  
Lee Strasbourg, one of the fathers of American method acting, articulated a 
similar difficulty: “Essentially the actor acts a fiction, a dream; in life the stimuli to which 
we respond are always real. The actor must constantly respond to stimuli that are 
imaginary. And yet this must happen not only just as it happens in life, but actually more 
fully and more expressively” (209). Quintilian’s solution to this paradox is disarmingly 
simple: By vividly imagining the situations about which one is speaking, he writes, 
orators can evoke in themselves images of the appropriate real emotions, and, in turn, 
move their audiences in persuasive ways. For Quintilian, then, imagination is a rhetorical 
skill like any other and must be improved through training. Indeed, the most imaginative 
speaker is also the most persuasive: “Whoever shall best conceive such images, will have 
the greatest power in moving the feelings” (2. 6. 30). Cicero, following Demosthenes, 
makes the very similar point that delivery is the key part of rhetoric precisely because 
performance is what “penetrates the mind” and allows the speaker to “seem such a man 
as he wills to seem” (Brutus 143).  
 
Almost all modern acting schools teach similar imaginative techniques, whether 
they also teach that actors should be completely immersed in their roles or not. The 
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introductory handbook for the influential Atlantic Acting School, for example, states that 
“the great debate throughout the history of acting is whether the actor must feel what his 
or her character is ostensibly feeling at any given moment” (31), and—in direct 
opposition to figures such as Stanislavsky and Strasbourg—its answer is “no”: the actor’s 
job is simply to convey an illusion through learned techniques. Yet even from this point-
of-view, an imaginative process is necessary to achieve the desired illusion. The actor, 
like the young rhetor in an ancient Roman rhetoric school, creates an “as if,” a “fantasy in 
which [she uses her] imagination in a way [she] can readily accept” (28). The fantasy 
need not be the same as the depicted situation because its only measure of success is 
external, illusion, appearance, the way the audience sees the action rather than what the 
actor herself is directly, immersively experiencing.   
For Quintilian, rhetorically effective imagination depended largely on the 
techniques of enargia or ecphrasis, one of the basic modular skills taught in the 
progymnasama or preliminary exercises that led up, in his pedagogical system, to the 
capstone exercise of declamation. Ecphrasis generally involved “a vividly detailed 
account of some person, place, time or event which aimed to ‘bring the subject before the 
eyes’ of an audience” (Webb 295). But reframed as an “as if” exercise designed to 
conjure up emotional images in a speaker in order to excite corresponding emotions in an 
audience, it differs in its internal direction: A rhetor must call up an image for herself 
rather than for an outer audience—in effect, she is her own audience—for purposes of a 
second order appeal to an outer audience. By successfully moving herself, she 
successfully moves her audience. In both stages of emotional response, feeling is 
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involuntary: Orators can be trained to control their mental images, as Quintilian 
advocates, but they cannot actually be trained to control their affective responses to their 
own mental images; likewise, their audiences may be brought to anger, or grief, or tears, 
by the force of the image of the speakers’ feelings, but this result depends on involuntary 
rather than rational response. It is inherently unpredictable.  As such, a speaker’s goal in 
this context, Quintilian writes, is “to force” an emotional response upon an audience (2. 
6. 27). 
This “force” follows from a layered process of involuntary response that both 
post-modern philosophy and cognitive science and neuroscience tell us is actually a mode 
of imitation: the speaker imitates the emotional response appropriate to an imagined 
scene, and the audience imitates the speaker’s emotional response. But since there is no 
“real” originary object to set off this chain of imitation, the “hall-of-mirror” dynamic is 
closer to the “theory of primary mimetism” described by Judith Butler than to genuine 
Aristotelian mimesis. Identity, according to Butler, is an imitative, embodied 
performance devoid of an “authentic” source: It merely “produces the illusion” of a 
“core” by producing “on the skin, through the gesture, the move, the gait (that array of 
corporeal theatrics understood as gender presentation), the illusion of an inner depth” 
(134). In the same way, the emotionally fraught roles adopted in declamation were 
imitations “for which there is no original” (127).  Much of the deconstructive or 
subversive potential of declamation can be traced to this dynamic. Like the subversive 
gender performances analyzed by Butler, declamation used performance to establish “the 
instability” of the very categories that it constituted (Butler 125).   
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Modern neuroscience has provided compelling support for Butler’s performative 
account of human identity. According to neuroscientists such as Vittorio Gallese, systems 
in our brain mirror the actions or feelings of others as if they were our own; we enact 
representations”of other people’s experiences, but we do so on a direct, pre-linguistic, 
pre-theoretical level. As such, we imitate an external other before (or below) the 
distinction between self and other even arises, and this kind of performance actually 
constitutes the self. Embodied simulation is a game we can’t not play: as Gallese puts it, 
“we-ness and intersubjectivity ontologically ground the human condition, in which 
reciprocity foundationally defines human existence” (530). Imitation makes us who we 
are. The implications of this line of research for performance studies are vast. Amy Cook, 
a scholar working on the border between cognitive cultural studies and performance 
theory, has argued that the function of conceptual blending and the imitative processes 
dependent on the mirror neuron system are essential aspects of the theatrical experience. 
Because of the physical presence of audience and actor, she contends that in live 
performance the mirror neuron system creates a particularly powerful “shared neural 
substrate linking imagination and understanding, doing and feeling, fact and fiction, actor 
and character, me and you” (589).  
These observations apply equally well to the context of declamation and help 
justify the relevance of the declamation dynamic in the modern classroom. Performance 
is always immersive because (when it works effectively) the audience directly 
experiences, through a mirroring process, what the speaker experiences. At the same 
time, the very nature of this “shared neural substrate” blurs or even erases the distinctions 
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between character, performer, and audience, between reality and fiction, which 
paradoxically results in a reflexive awareness of the “real” theatrical conditions and the 
real speaker and audience (because these are all superimposed on their imaginary 
counterparts). This complex interplay is a pervasive aspect of human cognition and 
communication and, as such, is an essential aspect of what I call the declamation 
dynamic. The historically situated practice of declamation—ancient oddity that it may 
seem to be from a modern point of view—was an extraordinarily efficient vehicle for 
training students to be aware of this interplay and to understand, to directly experience, 
and to master it. An awareness of how and why ancient declamation achieved this result 
will give contemporary rhetors a critical view of their own pedagogical practices and 
better enable them to activate this same dynamic in their own classrooms.  
 
In this chapter, my intention was not to argue that declamations are the same as 
games or theater. However, I do think declamations, plays, and games all perform related 
cognitive and social functions in their respective cultures. They are all ludic spaces at 
once inside and outside the “real-world” concerns they parallel and represent. And they 
are all what Martin Bloomer (writing about declamation) has called “technologies of the 
self” (Bloomer 59); that is, they, as James Gee (writing of video games) puts it, “recruit 
identities and encourage identity work and reflection on identities in clear and powerful 
ways” (Gee 51). These kinds of trans-historical connections are made possible by the fact 
that, as Mark Turner argues, certain “basic cognitive operations” are “universal among 
human beings, fundamental to cognition, and indispensable to reason, inference, and 
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invention” (15). An analysis of basic cognitive operations involved in declamation such 
as imitation and conceptual blending can help us form a new conceptual blend between 
past and present that enables us to see declamation not only as a historical artifact but 
also as a living pedagogical technique with something to teach us about rhetoric today.   
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Chapter Five:  
The Good Man Playing Well: Declamation and the Ethics of Rhetorical 
Performance 
 The previous chapter focused on the importance of audience construction as a 
fundamental skill and a key aspect of what I call the declamation dynamic that is often 
obscured in modern approaches to rhetorical pedagogy. I further argued that the historical 
practice of ancient declamation was so pedagogically effective, in part, because of its 
emphasis on unreal, counterfactual rhetorical situations, which created a critical distance 
between the declaimer’s “real” student audience, on the one hand, and his imagined 
audience, on the other. This distance—a key aspect of the declamation dynamic—
naturally foregrounded audience construction while sidestepping the contradictions and 
difficulties that arise from attempting to explicate the imaginative process directly. Put 
simply, audience construction is a skill more easily experienced than explained. 
 The same is true of a directly corresponding aspect of the declamation dynamic 
that was briefly introduced in the last chapter and will be the primary focus here. As the 
practice of declamation directly exposed students to the process of audience construction, 
it simultaneously exposed them to the process of persona construction—indeed, the two 
poles are completely interdependent: The image of an audience that a rhetor accepts at 
any point in a discourse will (or should be) be reflected in her decisions about persona. 
Because a rhetor’s image of her audience and her choices about persona are so 
interdependent, the challenges inherent to teaching audience construction as discussed in 
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the last chapter have corresponding difficulties with regards to teaching effective persona 
construction: Whereas direct explication of audience construction has a tendency to 
essentialize audiences as stable entities rather than as complex, shifting images, direct 
explication of persona construction has the tendency to essentialize the roles that rhetors 
play in different discourses (or at different points in one discourse) as grounded in stable, 
core identities.  
 In this chapter I will start with a few examples of this essentializing tendency as 
reflected in contemporary rhetoric textbooks, then move on to contrast it with the 
approach taken in the pedagogy of ancient rhetoric schools as epitomized by the practice 
of declamation. I will argue that, as with the process of audience construction, in 
declamation ancient rhetoric students were directly confronted by the otherwise elusive 
process of persona construction by virtue of the practice’s imaginative and counterfactual 
nature: It was an immersive experience that complemented (and perhaps completed) the 
rhetorical theory constituting the rest of their school curriculum.  
 Throughout the chapter, however, I will keep in view the likely objection that 
rhetorical role-playing of the kind practiced in declamation—and which I am holding up 
as a kind of pedagogical ideal—is not only impractical but also potentially immoral. One 
might argue, for instance, that training students to effectively play rhetorical roles without 
appealing to their actual identities or beliefs amounts to a kind of training in 
disingenuousness. One might worry that such an approach flies in the face of Isocratean 
and Quintilian ideals of rhetorical training as a kind of ethical training, of the ideal 
product of rhetoric schools (or of contemporary writing classes) as not just people 
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speaking or writing well, but of good people speaking or writing well. I will argue, 
however, that the flexibility to persuasively perform any subject position can, in itself, be 
seen as a kind of ethical ideal and one that does not necessarily contradict other pro-
social ethical ideals. Indeed, this form of ethical training is integral to the declamation 
dynamic itself. 
 
 In the insightful discussion of ethical appeals in the popular textbook Everything’s 
An Argument, Angela Lunsford and John Ruszkiewicz point out that, in addition to 
establishing authority over a subject, a rhetor must establish credibility with an audience 
and that this often depends on such difficult-to-quantify effects as “plain old likeability” 
and “humor” (59). They further acknowledge that audiences can often “make 
assumptions” about “people’s competence based on nothing more than good looks,” and 
point out that, “like it or not, readers and audiences are going to respond to how you 
present yourself as a person” (60). In Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, 
Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee go further down a similar path in their discussion of 
the differences between ancient and modern views of ethical appeals. As this passage 
nicely sums up the most common ethical objection to practices such as declamation, I 
will quote it at length: 
Today we may feel uncomfortable with the notion that rhetorical character 
can be constructed, since we tend to think of character, or personality as 
fairly stable. We generally assume as well that character is shaped by an 
individual’s experiences. The ancient Greeks, in contrast, thought that 
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character was constructed not by what happened to people but by the 
moral practices in which they habitually engaged. An ethos was not finally 
given by nature, but was developed by habit (hexis)… Because the 
ancients thought that character was shaped by one’s practices, they 
considered it to be much more malleable than we do. Within certain limits 
imposed by class and gender restrictions, one could become any sort of 
person one wished to be, simply by engaging in the practices that 
produced that sort of character. It followed, then, that playing the roles of 
respectable characters enhanced one’s chances of developing a respectable 
character. Playing a virtuous character, in turn, increased the chance that 
the rhetor would enjoy a positive, and hence persuasive, situated ethos. 
(198) 
 Crowley and Hawhee’s account of the ancient view of identity has much in 
common with post-modern composition theory. According to Lester Faigley, postmodern 
theory “would situate the subject among many competing discourses that precede the 
subject” and “understands subjectivity as heterogenous and constantly in flux” (227). 
Nevertheless, in Crowley and Hawhee’s account of ancient ethics there is an implied 
distinction between the rhetorical subject and the presentation of the subject to an 
audience: The former is a product of a nexus of practices, but the latter depends on 
strategic decisions by the rhetor. This is reflected in the authors’ practical advice that 
“rhetors can construct a character that seems intelligent by demonstrating the ways that 
they are well informed about issues they discuss” and that “rhetors can create a character 
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that seems intelligent by demonstrating that they are informed about the issues they 
discuss” (202).  
 There is an illustrative interplay between “seeming” and “being” in these 
statements: Rhetors can “seem” a certain way for audiences by showing these audiences 
that they actually “are” a certain way. Even though their overview of ancient views of 
persona critiques notions of stable subjectivity, the distinction that the authors draw 
(whether intentionally or not) between the subject and the subject’s rhetorical ethos gives 
the impression that the subjectivities or personae that speakers or writers project depend 
on presentational choices about an abiding or stable core persona rather than on the 
performance of a radically malleable subjectivity. I point this out not to accuse the 
authors of inconsistency but to highlight an inherent, almost grammatically inevitable, 
tendency in the discussion or teaching of persona construction as a rhetorical skill. In 
short, it is very difficult to stimulate critical awareness of the constructed nature of 
subjectivities or personae while also teaching students methods for actually constructing 
personae for specific audiences and rhetorical situations. A method or techne always 
seems to imply some kind of stable, underlying basis for its system. 
 If this amounts to a tension between theory and practice in this sense, then there is 
a corresponding tension between ethics and practice—between, to paraphrase Quintilian, 
“speaking well” and “being a good person who speaks well.” This raises a number of 
age-old questions: To what extent is the necessity of teaching rhetoric students to 
construct personae an ethical exercise? Is it the business of rhetoric teachers to teach their 
students to simply “be persuasive” by playing different roles in various situations, or 
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should they also teach them to “be a good people who are persuasive in different roles for 
different situations”?    
 In their overview of the Ancient Sophistic view of identity quoted above, Crowley 
and Hawhee outline what seems to be a two-part process of ethical development: First, 
they suggest that by “playing the roles of respectable characters,” a rhetor is more likely 
to, herself, develop a respectable character (198). And just as this can be expected to have 
a positive internal ethical effect, it may also have a positive effect on way the rhetor is 
perceived by an audience (198). This line of reasoning has the benefit of endowing 
rhetorical role-playing with an ethical purpose without grounding it in essentialist notions 
of stable subjectivity. It gives rhetoric teachers a reason to teach the process of rhetorical 
role-playing by explaining why such a skill is important in persuading audiences, but it 
protects against the threat of amoral relativism by linking persuasive ethical appeals and 
persona construction with the internalization of the moral values of a community. Playing 
a good person, in this view, is being a good person.   
 However, in his analysis of postmodern composition theory, Lester Faigley 
suggests a slightly different ethical imperative. According to Faigley, “ways of theorizing 
subjectivity are needed that neither hold out for liberal humanism, collapse subjectivity 
into vague notions of community, nor reject the idea of the subject altogether (239). 
Drawing on Lyotard’s notion of the “differend,” Faigley suggests that, in the context of 
rhetorical pedagogy, the real ethical imperative lies not in merely teaching students to 
select one “external theory of ethics” over another—which is essentially what it means to, 
as Crowley and Hawhee put it, “play the roles of respectable characters” for particular 
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communities. Instead, students should be taught to “consider the implications of their 
linkages” (238)—that is, the way units of discourse connect with other units of discourse 
and broader generic conventions and context to create meaning (Faigley 236). A 
“differend,” in Lyotard’s sense, occurs whenever two possible systems of linkage are in 
conflict, such that each party “does not agree on the relevant rule of justice” (233). 
Faigley finds in this the non-foundational ethical imperative to recognize that “no one 
regime of phrases can serve as a metalanguage” (235)—that there is no single way to 
interpret discourse—and he argues that this ethical vision can be applied to composition 
pedagogy: “Lyotard would not have us look to external discourses of the ‘true’ but to the 
discursive practices of the classroom” (236). Instead, “in a postmodern theory of rhetoric, 
there is no legitimate preexisting discourse of values for rhetoric to convey,” so “ethics 
becomes a matter of recognizing the responsibility of linking phrases” (237). Ethics, in 
this sense, is less a matter of effective practice than of a special kind of critical awareness 
about the nature of discourse. 
 What I find most interesting about a comparison of these two visions of a non-
foundational ethical imperative for composition pedagogy is their underlying 
compatibility. Just as Crowley and Hawhee’s summary of Sophistic ethics emphasizes 
the internal and external importance of an ethical persona, even if operative criteria for 
ethics is(are?) determined only by the contingent values of specific communities, Faigley 
sees serious ethical stakes in a rhetor’s awareness of and “responsible decision” regarding 
her linkages, even though there is no “external discourse to validate this choice” (237). 
The fact that Crowley and Hawhee’s account nevertheless seems to imply a more-or-less 
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stable foundation for a rhetor’s subjectivity while Faigley and Lyotard’s does not follows, 
I would argue, from their differences in purpose and context. Faigley is operating on a 
theoretical level and, as such, is primarily focused on an ethics of awareness about the 
nature of discourse. Crowley and Hawhee, however, are writing a textbook for student 
writers and, as such, are operating on the level of practical ethics—the actual practice of 
effective ethical appeals. Their aim (in this passage) is to teach students to play ethical 
personae, while Faigley’s aim is to make his reader aware of the nature and stakes of 
interpretation and discourse.  
These are really two aspects of the same postmodern pedagogical vision, and the 
fact that apparent contradictions between them arise follows from a very basic limitation 
of language: It is not possible to articulate the limits of a system within that system. This 
is the same limitation that the enigmatic, 20th century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein 
investigates in his controversial early work the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:  
Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.  
 What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. 
 What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of 
language.  
 Propositions show the logical form of reality.  
 They display it. (4.121) 
This complex dynamic is reflected in the unique rhetorical structure of the 
Tractatus itself, a finely calibrated system through which a reader is brought to grasp a 
realization that could not be contained in the text. As such, it is also a kind of template for 
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the novel rhetorical devices found in Wittgenstein’s later work, all of which share the 
strategic goal of manifesting realization beyond an illustration or analogy by clearly 
elucidating that illustration or analogy. This is no less true of the “language games” in 
Wittgenstein’s posthumously published Philosophical Investigations than it is in the self-
proclaimed “nonsense” propositions of the Tractatus. In both cases a process of implicit 
delimiting occurs in which the most important elements of the argument lie beyond the 
implied boundary.  
 On the surface, Wittgenstein’s rhetorical method in the Tractatus, as 
demonstrated in the following line of argument, is fairly simple: 1) All experience is 
preceded by logic, the “scaffolding of the world” (6.124). Logic is not part of experience, 
but its necessary condition, its basis. It finds its common expression in language, so that 
“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (5.6). Thus, “We cannot think 
what we cannot think, and we cannot say what we cannot think either” (5.61). 2) But 
because logic is the condition of thought or language, it cannot itself be the object of 
thought or language – such thought would require a perspective outside the world: “Logic 
is transcendental” (6.13). 3) Thus any previous arguments establishing the nature of logic 
are ruled out. 4) Still, the comprehending reader has come to a realization through them. 
Like the logic of language, the nature of ethics and aesthetics makes them, too, unsayable 
(6.42). In all these cases, the transcendental shows itself but cannot be said. This apparent 
paradox leads to the infamous proposition 6.54: “My propositions serve as elucidations in 
the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as 
nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them.” 
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 What complicates matters are the various possible interpretations of this 
statement. What, exactly, is the reader supposed to make of the “nonsense” propositions? 
Presumably they are intended either to communicate sense in spite of their nonsensicality 
(as posited in the outline above) or simply to make their nonsensicality obvious. In the 
latter case, the purpose of the book hinges entirely on 6.54 because it is only there where, 
like an actor, Wittgenstein removes his mask and exposes his true purpose, which is 
exactly opposed to his apparent one. In this reading, the propositions of the text have no 
validity beyond disabusing the reader of the inclination to pursue such lines of thought in 
the first place.  
 David Rozema argues from a related perspective in his article “Tractatus Logico-
Philosphicus: A ‘Poem’ by Ludwig Wittgenstein,” that the Tractatus performs a form of 
poetic catharsis: “Thus, though Wittgenstein neither considered the Tractatus to be a 
poem nor intentionally wrote it as a poem, it turned out to be a kind of poem in the sense 
that its form fits its content, both of which, in turn, accurately picture a specific form of 
life, and the passional result of this poetic construction is (and was, for Wittgenstein) a 
certain appropriate disdain for the form of life it pictures” (346). In this reading, the 
logical “scaffolding” preceding experience discussed in the book is nothing more than a 
faulty perspective that leads to a depraved worldview by excluding “transcendental” 
elements such as ethics.  
 Although their analysis does not, like Wittgenstein’s, imply any particular disdain 
for the “form of life” they depict, Crowley and Hawhee nevertheless run into the same 
fundamental contradiction that Wittgenstein performs in his work. In short, Crowley and 
 105 
Hawhee cannot fully commit to a non-foundational, constructed ethical view while 
simultaneously teaching students how to actually play ethical personae, just as an actor 
cannot fully commit to a role while describing its artificiality. By the same token, the 
critical awareness Faigley calls for24 cannot be taught while simultaneously teaching 
concrete skills of rhetorical performance. This is not to say that a single teacher can’t 
strive to achieve both goals, or even that an actor cannot play a role ironically, but merely 
the teacher or actor can only achieve reflexivity by alternating between contradictory 
dynamics. The tension between these two points-of-view is directly analogous to the 
immersion/reflexivity binary discussed in the last chapter in terms of audience.  
 Although post-modern composition is, in many ways, a direct repudiation of the 
assumptions about subjectivity made by expressivist scholars such as Peter Elbow, I 
would nevertheless argue that Elbow identifies more or less the same tension or binary in 
his discussion of the modes of knowledge that he refers to in his seminal work Writing 
Without Teachers as the “doubting” and “believing” games. According to Elbow, both 
modes are integral to the acquisition of knowledge, despite the typical privileging of the 
skeptical “doubting game” in most forms of academic discourse. Elbow questions this 
discounting of the “doubting game,” arguing instead that only by a willing act of belief 
(even of seemingly absurd or abhorrent positions) can propositions be fully understood 
                                                
24 I would suggest that Faigley’s view of the ethical goal of post-modern composition 
pedagogy is exactly analogous to the intended critical effect of the Tractatus. Just as 
Wittgenstein wanted his readers to see something unsayable about their world by 
performing a analogous but more closely circumscribed version of that world in 
language, post-modern rhetorical pedagogy strives to make students aware of the implicit 
implications of different forms of discourse through practice in those very forms of 
discourse.  
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and evaluated. From this point of view, Wittgenstein’s whole approach in the Tractatus—
in which he presents the whole work as a demonstration of its own limitations—is a kind 
of believing game. This is? what Wittgenstein means when he says that his propositions 
in the work have a merely indexical function, such that “anyone who understands” them 
“eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb 
up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up 
it)” (6.54). The meticulously constructed text is, in the final analysis, a deliberately 
limited and artificial system designed to direct the reader beyond its limits through a 
transcendence that cannot be directly explained in the work but must be performed by the 
work. 
Similarly, Elbow notes that “by believing another point of view in a sincere way, 
one is able to get farther and farther into it, see more and more things in terms of it or 
‘through’ it, use it as a hypothesis to climb higher and higher to a point from which more 
can be seen and understood—and finally get to the point where we can be more sure 
(sometimes completely sure) it is true” (163). This certainty (or comparative certainty) 
about the truth-value of a statement is made possible by experiencing the statement 
through willing, immersive belief. Immersion is helpful in this way not because it makes 
one more likely to ultimately accept the statement in question but because getting inside 
the statement enables one to, in effect, see beyond it, to evaluate it from a higher point of 
view. Nevertheless, this critical vantage point depends on presence rather than distance, 
on what Elbow describes as “a kind of inner commitment” such that “it helps to think of 
it as trying to get inside the head of someone who saw things this way. Perhaps even 
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constructing such a person for yourself. Try to have the experience of someone who 
made this assertion” (149).  
 According to Elbow, the believing game can sometimes lead to greater level of 
critical insight than the more agonistic, dialectical doubting game. The doubting game is 
“the self-extraction game, the logic game, or the dialectic of propositions,” and thus 
always remains bound to the basic structure of the disputed propositions. The believing 
game, by contrast, is the “the involvement or self-insertion game, the metaphor game, or 
the dialectic of experience,” and allows for the direct experience of things that can point 
towards a higher level of critical awareness that transcends the dialectal system that is 
under investigation (149). 
This kind of critical awareness can only be achieved by performing the contested 
object, identity, or institution. It requires, in other words, an element of role-playing. And 
it is an inherently ethical exercise.  As Wittgenstein puts it, “the sense of the world must 
lie outside the world” (6.41), and that, therefore, “it is clear that ethics cannot be put into 
words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same)” (6.421). 
This is why the believing game (broadly defined) is an ethical enterprise, both in terms of 
ethos and in the sense of broader ethical values. From this point of view, in fact, ethical 
performance is ethics.  
 
 I would argue that ancient declamation was a highly systematized form of the 
believing game and, thus, an ethical exercise for exactly these reasons. Students 
performed imaginary personae and perspectives in imaginary situations that were 
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nevertheless in dialogue with the values and sites of social tension in their “real” social 
world. This fostered the kind of critical awareness that is called for by post-modern 
rhetorical theory. At the same time, they practiced practical, technical skills of invention, 
arrangement, and delivery. As such, it mediated between the seemingly contradictory 
ethical visions discussed above and resolved the apparent tensions between a practical 
and a critical approach to rhetorical ethics. As a “real” rhetorical performance, it gave 
students the opportunity to sincerely and wholeheartedly make ethical decisions and 
engage in persona construction; at the same, it took place within an explicitly artificial 
system, the limits of which were never far from view. The game gave players a sincere 
and immersive experience, while the game’s obvious limits—limits experienced rather 
than explained—fostered a critical awareness that prevented techniques or ethical 
decisions from seeming to be grounded in essentialist notions of “self.”  
While my argument thus far in this chapter has been inspired by ancient 
declamation, it has focused primarily on the declamation dynamic in a trans-historical 
sense rather than on the practice and institution of ancient declamation itself. But I want 
to further argue that ancient rhetoric teachers and their students actually viewed this 
practice in this way and that as a pedagogical tool it was designed to strike this mediating 
balance. The following section of this chapter, then, will focus on analyses of ancient 
texts. In particular, I hope to show that declamation was seen—by at least some ancient 
teachers—as an inherently ethical exercise, and that the flexible and immersive 
performance of different identities was viewed as having an ethical function that went 
beyond mere value-neutral rhetorical skill.  
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In a fragmentary text entitled “On Mistakes Made in Declamation,”25 psd.-
Dionysius of Halicarnassus writes enigmatically of something he calls the “one great 
character (i.e, that from philosophy)”—the meta-persona that he believed declaimers 
must learn to truly master their art. By embodying this “great character,” Dionysius 
expected rhetors to be able to comprehend, perform, and address any type of audience. In 
illustration of the possibilities of this “role,” he gives three preeminent examples: Plato, 
Demosthenes, Homer. Each excel in their respective rhetorical spheres — philosophy, 
public speech, poetry — because of their ability to master and encompass a variety of 
disparate personae: Plato assumes the characters of “sophists, politicians, workers, young 
boys, men, old men, women, slaves, and free men engaged in speech with him”; 
Demosthenes assumes “the character of a statesman” then entangles “with it that of a 
flatterer”; Homer “takes up the assumed personages with great art regarding their 
differences and makes them distinct” (1-2). In each case, psd.-Dionysius precedes these 
specific accomplishments with an allusion to “it,” “this character,” the elusive “great 
character” that is not the same as the aggregate of these specific characters but is essential 
to their effective performance.  
 I believe that this “great character” is the subjective aspect of what I am referring 
to as the declamation dynamic. It is, in other words, the intersection between a critical 
awareness of the constructed and emergent nature of subjectivity, on the one hand, and 
                                                
25 I would like to thank Professor Jeffrey Walker for making his unpublished translation 
of this text available to me.  
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the specific skills that teachers such as psd.-Dionysius taught to help students investigate 
and perform rhetorically effective personae, on the other. I further believe that seeing the 
“one great character” in this way can reconcile three predominant views of the ethical 
import of declamation and help to explain and justify my larger argument for its abiding, 
trans-historical relevance in rhetorical pedagogy.  
These three views are as follows: Scholars such as Robert Kaster argue that 
declamation was little more than an ideological prop, firmly grounded in (and in the 
service of) the dominant social structure of imperial Rome26. Other scholars, such as 
George Kennedy, critique declamation as superficial and disengaged from the broader 
social world (of ancient Rome or any other time and place)27. From this point of view, the 
extravagance of declamation themes is a function of their a-political nature, which was 
itself a calculated response to the political pressures of an increasingly tyrannical power 
structure with no place (or tolerance) for real, Ciceronian-style oratory. Finally, post-
modern scholars such as Erik Gunderson argue that declamation did inadvertently serve 
to expose the artificiality of social structures themselves, even as it prepared students to 
                                                
26 Kaster notes that it often  “becomes the declaimer's job to put the surfaces back into 
some sort of acceptable, more or less conventional order—which is precisely the role for 
which the declaimer is being trained” (328).  
 
27 Kennedy sees declamation as of limited pedagogical value because it was disconnected 
from reality, not demanding of the student’s “careful observation of the world” or 
“profound background knowledge” (333). 
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enter into and, indeed, lead and propagate those institutions28. This final view is the 
closest to my own.  
 But none of these perspectives fully accounts for the possibility that declamation 
had a real, ethical intent that was inseparable from its nature as artificial exercise. 
Ancient rhetoric teachers themselves, at any rate, took it very seriously, even if it was 
widely criticized. Since at least the time of Isocrates, an ideal rhetorical education was 
seen as having an ethical dimension. For Isocrates, in fact, this ethical dimension was 
both more important and more teachable than persuasiveness or mere rhetorical skill. 
Isocrates argued that great speakers, like great athletes, are born not made; teachers and 
trainers can nurture innate talent, but “neither has that knowledge by which he could 
make anyone he wished an adequate athlete or orator” (Antidosis 185). Nevertheless, he 
claimed that his unique educational system, although incapable of fashioning “either 
good debaters or good speech writers from those who lack natural ability,” may still 
“make them more intelligent in many respects” (Against the Sophists 15). As Edward 
Schiappa notes, these other forms of intelligence involve primarily ethical, rather than 
persuasive or oratorical, qualities: “While Isocrates does not deny that his educational 
program assists in the production of discourse appropriate to the rhetor, he chooses 
instead to emphasize the goal of epieikeia – which can be translated as decency, 
reasonableness, or virtuousness” (42-43). Through the dissemination of a specific form of 
political discourse (which was deeply entwined with a particular ethical perspective), 
                                                
28 As Gunderon puts it, declamation exposed society as an “effect of the pleading” by 
modeling the dependence of reality on what is said about reality (Gunderson 7). 
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Isocrates hoped to “cultivate the psyche of individual students and, by extension, the 
psyche of the polis” (Schiappa 47).  
 According to Takis Poulakos, the ethical focus in Isocrates’ speeches and 
pedagogy is closely related to his skepticism about the ability of any systematized 
rhetorical art to effectively manipulate community opinion or doxa for narrowly defined 
persuasive goals. In fact, for Isocrates, persuasion and influence “with the sole end of 
winning over auditors in particular situations” were a secondary concern (Poulakos 64). 
His brand of discourse therefore diverges sharply from the paradigm typically associated 
with the classical period by focusing chiefly on rhetoric’s “constitutive possibilities,” its 
“power to create a world of its own making and situate audiences as potential inhabitants 
of that world” (Poulakos 65)—to create, that is, a world very similar to the world of 
declamation.  
Quintilian had very similar views on the essentially ethical function of his 
discipline. As the foremost rhetoric teacher in the Roman Empire during his time, he was 
certainly an establishment figure. The pedagogical program laid out in his monumental 
The Orator’s Education both reflected the school system already in use across the Roman 
Empire by the first century AD and also codified it for continued use throughout much of 
Western history. And yet Quintilian’s program is striking and appealing (now and, 
perhaps, in its day) for its contrast to the amoral excesses and oppressive politics of the 
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Roman Empire under emperors such as Domitian.29 Quintilian saw the ideal orator as a 
good man speaking well; ethics, moral education, and rhetoric were, for Quintilian, 
inseparable, regardless of political context; as such, politics is something he touches on in 
only the most oblique of ways (Murphy XX). His example would seem to argue, then, 
that rhetorical instruction in Ancient Rome could (or at least was intended to) serve an 
ethical function beyond expedient ideological indoctrination; indeed, it seems to have 
formed a counterweight to the predominant moral climate.  
 As the capstone of that educational process, declamation must also have served 
some ethical purpose. Quintilian himself was a foremost proponent and defender of the 
practice, even if he did harbor some reservations about the practical value of some of its 
more outlandish manifestations, and two of four or so major collections of Roman 
declamation literature still in existence have been (rightly or wrongly) attributed to him. 
This raises the obvious question of how a rhetoric teacher as concerned as Quintilian was 
with a seemingly stable ethical ideal would encourage a practice like declamation that, on 
the surface, seems to emphasize ethical fluidity and flexibility. 
 The answer to this has to go deeper than the superficial response that Quintilian’s 
ethics were perfectly in line with the stereotypical Roman values actually promoted in 
declamation themes (such as paternal authority, rigid class structure, propriety), even if 
the prevailing spirit of his day was not. Instead I would argue that, for ancient 
                                                
29 James Murphy writes of Quintilian that “his continuous concern with moral virtue can 
best be understood in the context of an age in which public morals seemed to have 
descended to a savage low” (Murphy XX).  
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rhetoricians like psd.-Dionysius and Quintilian, the ability to persuasively inhabit and 
perform a variety of subject positions was, in itself, an ethical as well as a rhetorical 
quality.  
That is why declamation was an ethical exercise, regardless of the content or overt 
ethics of specific declamation themes, regardless, even, of the relationship between those 
themes and the dominant power structures of Ancient Rome. But this nevertheless leaves 
open the question of declamation’s relationship with “real” life: How did this indefinable 
or “great character” play out in the real-world speaking situations rhetoric students were, 
at least ostensibly, being prepared to enter? A scene from the Elder Seneca’s memoirs 
clearly indicates both the ambiguity of this relationship as well the intrinsically ethical 
significance that the performance of declamation nevertheless held for Ancient Romans.  
 Seneca is an interesting figure in this regard because of the internal contradiction 
that he so clearly presents. On the one hand, he had a very high estimation of rhetorical 
skill and of one of the primary forms (and forums) for rhetorical skill in his day—
declamation. On the other hand, he is adamant that a distinction should be maintained 
between declamatory performance and reality; the consequences of attempting to cross 
that line—for example, by speaking “declamatorily” in a real court—could be 
humiliating or worse, as his example of Albucius shows: This sophist’s inappropriate use 
of declamatory tropes in a real court proceeding effects a kind of rhetorical apocalypse 
when the opposing counsel calls a figurative bluff, costing Albucius the case and causing 
rhetorical figures themselves to be effectively (if facetiously)  “banished from the world,” 
or at least from that court (preface 7. 11). For Seneca, they no more belonged there in the 
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first place than real speech belongs in the play-world of declamations: later in the text, he 
notes that nothing is more “indecorous” than when schoolmen imitate “the practices of 
the forum,” and he praises the declamations of the sophist Capito precisely on the 
grounds that he didn’t cross this line in either direction: “he was a genuine schoolman” 
(preface 10. 363).  
 But despite his insistence on an unbreachable stylistic line between declamation 
and real life, he evidently sees no distinction between the ethical value or 
accomplishment of “real” and “play” orators themselves. The most extreme example of 
this comes early in his text when he explains his purpose in composing a memoir to the 
great declaimers of his day; in true epideictic fashion, his text will be a kind of 
monument, he hopes: “something to prolong their memory” that is “handed on to 
posterity” (1. preface. 11). He is qualified for the purpose because he had the chance, in 
his lifetime, to hear “everyone of great repute in oratory” with the exception of Cicero, 
whom he missed in his native Spain only because of “the raging civil wars, which… kept 
me behind the walls of my colony; otherwise I might have been present in that little hall 
where he says two grown-up boys declaimed with him, and got to know that genius, the 
only possession of Rome to rival her empire: and, use a common saying that is 
particularly appropriate of him, I could have heard the ‘living voice’” (1. preface. 13).  
 As historian John Alexander Lobur argues, the character of Cicero was—
particularly in his role as the star of many declamation themes—a complex ethical 
signifier. These themes, Lobur claims, often had the distinct rhetorical purpose of 
recasting this Republican figure as an “amalgam of Imperial virtues,” even as (or 
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because) it allowed an elite Imperial Roman a venue to “foreground his mastery of and 
commitment to republican dictio” (158). Ironically, an elite Imperial Roman was never so 
successfully in character as when he was Ciceronian in character; to achieve legitimacy, 
Imperial culture had to perform its Republican antithesis. 
 Needless to say, Cicero was more than a historical figure, particularly within the 
declamation culture Seneca was chronicling: He (or his character), in all its shifting 
permutations, was a kind of embodiment of the ideal Roman ethos. Given this context, 
what is perhaps most striking about Seneca’s reminiscence of the historical Cicero he 
almost met is that, for Seneca, Cicero’s ethical significance is evident in his declamatory 
eloquence; the “living voice” could be heard just as clearly in a declamation as an actual 
political oration. Evidently, for Seneca there is no essential difference. To cast this 
argument as an enthymeme: Cicero was an important signifier for the Roman ethos, and 
Seneca’s imagined (since he wasn’t actually present) example of Cicero’s ethical glory is 
a declamation (in which, by definition, Cicero would have been performing as a different 
character). Ergo, the locus of ethical accomplishment in Rome was, at least in the 
context of rhetoric, not one’s “real” character. In this scene, at least, Cicero exemplifies 
his ethical accomplishment by playing someone else. The “one great character,” after all, 
is always on stage.  
 
There is something obviously theatrical in this irresolvable and fluid approach to 
ethos and persona, so it is not surprising that Quintilian saw theater as an important 
component of a broader rhetorical training. For younger students, he advised that the 
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canon of delivery be taught by reading aloud, a practice that could be improved by 
training with actors. Later, he makes the point that actors can help orators master the use 
of gestures and expressions (Bk. II, Chap.10). In a similar vein, the Greek sophist 
Libanius not only had his younger students study and recite literature as training in 
delivery, he even went so far as to cast them in plays they were studying and have them 
literally perform the texts (Cribiore 165). This striking level of engagement with theater 
implies that, for ancient rhetoricians, drama taught delivery but also more: Through the 
artistic practice of playing characters, students were learning something essential about 
how to be persuasive speakers.    
 In a passage from Book VI of The Orator’s Education discussed in the last 
chapter, Quintilian gives a fascinating hint as to what he might have understood that 
“something” to be when he draws an explicit connection between embodied performance 
and affect: “In delivering, therefore, whatever we wish to appear like truth, let us 
assimilate ourselves to the feelings of those who are truly affected, and let our language 
proceed from such a temper of mind as we would wish to excite in the judge” (427).  
 Nowhere in this passage is “truth” or “genuine” feeling mentioned in distinction 
to its performance or appearance. Assimilating oneself to the feelings of one’s persona in 
a rhetorical situation is not distinguished from one’s “actual” ethical position with regards 
to that situation. The only index of authenticity is the rhetorical situation itself: one 
should be what one needs to be in order to elicit a desired response from a specific 
audience. In the context of declamation, this passage could even be interpreted to imply a 
double remove from “authentic” reality: Quintilian seems to imply that rhetors should 
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assimilate themselves not only to their own persona in a speech, but also to the 
characters in their imaginary rhetorical situation—the disinherited son, the poisoned 
father, the divorced wife, the deposed hero, etc. This kind of theatrical identification is 
even more remarkable since it would have to be integrated into a primary act of role 
playing: To effectively connect with an audience, then, good declaimers had to directly 
and sincerely empathize with imaginary characters from the point of view of the 
imaginary characters they were playing. 
 That skill is very close to the skill required of good actors. In the context of 
rhetoric, however, it may strike the modern (though probably not the post-modern) 
sensibility as somewhat un-ethical. But as I hope this chapter has established, there is 
ample evidence to suggest that, in the tradition of ancient rhetoric that Quintilian 
inherited from the Greeks and codified for over a millennium of subsequent Western 
culture, role-playing and ethics were actually complementary and perhaps even co-
dependent.  
 This ethical vision remains relevant today, in part, because it is extremely 
practical. Perhaps the most effective way to train students to effectively perform the 
rhetorical subject positions required by their future careers is to give them playful 
practice playing them right now. Take, for example, the “mobile games” described by 
Eric Klopfer in which handheld technology such as PDAs or smart phones are used to 
“augment reality” through elaborate role playing scenarios in which players assume the 
persona of an expert in a given field (for example, an environmental engineer 
investigating a chemical leak). Klopfer argues that such “epistemic games” are effective 
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learning tools, particularly when they cause players to truly “see themselves” in the role 
that they are playing (107). At the same time, superimposing these game in real 
environments reinforces learning by incorporating a wide range of sensory details and 
peripheral information, all of which complicates simplistic, rule-governed responses to 
problems (think techne) and fosters complex, context-specific thinking (think 
philosophia): “Buildings, people, smells, sounds, and even feel become a part of the 
game, allowing for tight connections between the player, the game, and the real world” 
(123). Presumably the player’s real identity and reflexive experience of the intersections 
between “play” and “real” worlds fall into this category. The player would not only 
immersively experience the imagined role but also experience the limits of that role, 
limits made manifest by the obvious but unspoken borders between the game and the 
“real” world. 
 
 I would like to close this chapter with some quotes from actual students in a 
rhetoric class I taught focused on political argumentation.30 These are culled from 
responses following a declamation-inspired exercise in which the students wrote and 
delivered speeches in the personae of specific stake-holders in political controversies that 
they had been researching throughout the semester. The exercise required them to use 
their research to imagine a character and outline, in preliminary writing assignments, both 
his or her characteristics as well as a specific rhetorical situation and audience that he or 
she might realistically address.  
                                                
30 Student names have been changed.  
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In some cases, students imagined themselves to be playing the role of an expert or 
authority on the issue at hand; this often gave these students a new sense of confidence. 
Jennifer, for example, spoke on the issue of health care reform in the persona of a doctor. 
She wrote that she “found it less intimidating to speak as someone other than myself, 
firstly because the assignment was more fun than a normal speaking assignment, but also 
because I felt like my opinions were strengthened and validated by the professional that I 
embodied.” James similarly noted that “speaking in a persona allowed me to act with 
more authority, which I felt was helpful. It made it easier to decide a position and present 
because it was removed from myself.” 
This effect was particularly marked if a student’s authoritative persona coincided 
with his or her long-term professional goals. Jennifer indicated that the act of role playing 
deepened her interest in the political issue and gave her a direct, personal, empathetic 
understanding of multiple points of view in the controversy in part because the role she 
was playing corresponded to the way she imagined herself in the future: “I had not felt so 
much connection to the issue while reading other peoples’ stories online. It wasn’t until I 
literally put on a suit and imagined myself many years from now as a doctor with a 
passion and devotion to medicine that I came closer to understanding that perspective.” 
This sense of overlap between students’ “real” identities and their imagined 
personae was something of a motif in their feedback about the exercise. In some cases, 
declamation actually seemed to increase their sense of sincerity and innate voice, despite 
the fact that they were playing imagined roles. Jack, for instance, wrote that the 
experience of role playing allowed him to express his actual feelings more fully and 
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sincerely: “Being able to speak in character allowed me to completely express my feeling 
without feeling as though someone would judge me since nobody knew if I was agreeing 
with that persona or not. It was a great experience that allowed me to show my full voice 
and potential.”  
As positive as this response appears to be, it raises the question of just how far 
Jack’s declamatory persona really was from his real world identity: If his liberating sense 
of free expression followed merely from the opportunity to express his “real” feelings 
without overtly claiming them as his own—and thus having to answer for them to his 
fellow students—this would seem to call into question the value of declamation as a 
critical or ethical practice. Far from raising his awareness of the limits of identity and 
social structures, the practice seems almost to have reinforced his commitment to them.  
In a similar fashion, Rosa wrote that declamation made public speaking less 
intimidating for her despite the fact that her persona was very close to her real world 
identity: “While I don’t typically enjoy public speaking, I found this exercise to be easier 
than other presentations, partly because I wasn’t speaking as myself. This was surprising 
because the speaking I was portraying was practically me as far as our beliefs are 
concerned, but because I was not presenting as [myself], I was able to overcome being 
nervous and just present without fear of being judged because it wasn’t me speaking, but 
the persona I created.” Again, it would seem that Rosa’s declamatory persona was little 
more than a thin (if comforting) veil on her “real” identity. 
I would argue, however, that both Jack and Rosa may well have gained critical 
awareness through the act of performing an imagined or artificial version of their “real” 
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identity. In fact, Rosa’s observation that “it wasn’t me speaking, but the persona I 
created” is striking because of the similarity between this persona and her “real” identity. 
Just as the use in ancient declamation of the syntax and grammar of real legal and 
political life served to “expose society” itself as an “effect of the pleading” (Gunderson 
7), the realistic performance of a “created” persona so close Rosa’s “real” identity may 
well have caused her to view that “real” identity as likewise “created.” 
 
In conclusion, I would argue that it is possible to reconcile the ethical goal of 
performance-based pedagogies that seek to cultivate “critical consciousness” with the 
harsh historical realities of Roman culture in which the original performance-pedagogy, 
declamation, was embedded. Even if all that classicists such as Bloomer and Kaster say 
about its ideological context are true, this does not negate the role the practice played in 
cultivating an (perhaps the) essential critical faculty: The one great character. This kind 
of training—the origins and effects of which can be traced from Isocrates to modern-day 
rhetorical pedagogies—may not have created revolutionaries, but it certainly did train 
ancient Romans to see their identities as well as their institutions as contingent and 
constructed. This understanding, by its very nature, trained them to see rhetorical 
flexibility and skill as an ethical value in its own right, since ethics follows from as well 
as defines and constitutes such identities and institutions. That this kind of training is the 
anti-essential goal of any rhetorical pedagogy in any historical period. What is frequently 
overlooked in our historical period, however, is the key element played by performance 
in achieving it.   
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Chapter Six:  
Playing Between the Rules: Techne, Kairos, and the Mediating Power of 
Games 
 Each of the three preceding chapters applied similar claims about how ancient 
declamation used playfulness and un-reality to stimulate critical awareness in ways that 
more straightforwardly “realistic” exercises cannot: Chapter Three focused on how the 
colores trained students to see rhetorical context as governed by constraints but partly 
created through discourse; Chapter Four focused on how the interplay between real and 
imagined audiences taught the process of audience construction; Chapter Five focused on 
how the performance of personae taught students to think of effective rhetorical ethos as 
dependent on the ethical values of a community but also as fluid and contingent—and 
furthermore to see that flexibility as itself an ethical quality. Implicit in each of these 
arguments has been an interplay between rules, technical precepts, and limits on the one 
hand, and a fluid, direct experience through performance, on the other. This interplay in 
all its permutations is at the very heart of what I am setting forth as the declamation 
dynamic.  
Since at least the classical period, there have been two archetypal and somewhat 
contradictory “images” of what it is that we teach when we teach “rhetoric.” As David 
Roochnik has argued, it is precisely this paradox—hinging, as it does, on an ambiguous 
view of determinacy—that has fueled traditional, philosophical critiques of the discipline: 
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The rhetoricians’ view of determinacy is an exact counterpoint [to the 
philosophers]. If Socrates praises determinacy while denying the 
possession of a determinate body of knowledge, they praise indeterminacy 
while simultaneously hanging their shingles…The rhetoricians typically 
require some measure of democratic openness and free speech to ply their 
trade. They affirm contingency and change and tailor speeches to their 
specific circumstances. In this manner, they advocate the open hand of 
indeterminacy. In sharp contrast, however, they claim a specific expertise 
allowing them to teach students and, very significantly, charge tuition. In 
other words, even if stochastic, rhetoric is nonetheless a techne, the 
paradigmatic form of teachable, marketable knowledge. (Roochnik 193) 
According to Roochnik (a philosopher, after all), the dispute hinges on 
fundamentally opposed views of the nature of reality. Where philosophers assert a 
determinate truth at the heart of reality despite the indeterminacy of both immediate, 
relative experience and their own philosophical investigations (which may point towards 
absolute truth but nevertheless remain part of relative experience), the rhetorician asserts 
only an indeterminate relativity-as-truth (kairos) despite the limited determinacy of 
relative experience (including rhetorical situations). This allows for rules and guidelines 
(i.e., rhetorical techne—rules, precepts, personae, forms) to exist and function 
pragmatically in the world—even though ultimately, upon analysis every seemingly 
determinate rhetorical situation dissolves, along with its rules, into indeterminacy.  This 
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privileging of kairos over absolute knowledge has often brought rhetoric into conflict 
with the western philosophical tradition.  
 But it would be a mistake to simply label this as a conflict between philosophy 
and rhetoric. In fact, two views exist in an analogous tension even within the tradition of 
rhetorical pedagogy itself. From the first point-of-view, the discipline looks like a system 
of rules and precepts of the kind elaborated in ancient rhetorical handbooks or techne. 
This quantifiable and teachable subject matter corresponds to the step-by-step classroom 
approach that characterized a young rhetoric student’s days with the grammarian and the 
early stages of his study under a rhetorician. Quintilian, for instance, was particularly 
emphatic about the importance of gradual progress in a student’s early studies, 
admonishing teachers to not, “through ostentatious haste, begin where they ought to end, 
and, while they wish to show off their pupils in matters of greater display, retard their 
progress by attempting to shorten the road” (1.4.22). In Quintilian’s school, this gradual 
progress was achieved primarily through repetitive practice in the progymnasmata; 
Quintilian believed that if students were able to master the skills contained in narrowly 
delimited exercises, they would ultimately be able to transmute them into an overall 
rhetorical way-of-being that functioned effectively in the complexities of real rhetorical 
situations. Indeed, the relationship between the acquisition of a rhetorical hexis and the 
acquisition of narrowly defined skills is a fundamental principle in Quintilian’s 
pedagogical vision. Describing the exercise of paraphrase, for instance, he noted that 
whoever “shall successfully perform this exercise which is difficult even for 
accomplished professors, will be able to learn anything” (my emphasis, 1.9.2).  
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  The other view of rhetoric corresponds more, perhaps, to the “anything” that 
Quintilian saw as the larger, ultimate purpose made possible by all the preceding lessons 
and exercises: the habit of spontaneous, context-dependent receptivity to situation and 
kairos and the ability to speak persuasively in whatever way was called for in an 
unpredictable and fluid situation. Although for many rhetoricians, including Quintilian, 
these two views are progressively linked stages rather than a dichotomy, there has often 
been controversy over which should take precedence and of the best way to facilitate the 
transition from the first to the second.  
Quintilian refused to come down on either side. As James Murphy notes, “even if 
Quintilian disdains reliance on ‘rules,’ he describes a systematic, programmatic 
educational program” (Murphy 49): 
But let no man require from me such as system of precepts as is laid down 
by most authors of books of rules, a system in which I should have to 
make certain laws, fixed by immutable necessity, for all students of 
eloquence… for rhetoric would be a very easy and small matter, if it could 
be included in a short body of rules; but rules must generally be altered to 
suit the nature of each individual case, the time, the occasion, and 
necessity itself. Consequently, one great quality in an orator is discretion, 
because he must turn his thoughts in various directions, according to the 
various bearings of his subject. (2.13.1-2) 
According to Quintilian, rules become a problem if they are adhered to in an inflexible 
way. Far from calling for the abandonment of guiding precepts, though, he specifies a 
 127 
context-sensitive method for their application in which they are “altered” to suit any 
given rhetorical situation. In this light, they are taken as guidelines as valuable for the 
ways they can be bent or broken as for the ways they are directly followed. Indeed, 
Quintilian’s assertion that “one great quality in an orator is discretion” bears comparison 
to psd.-Dionysius’s assertion that the most important “persona” for a declaimer to master 
was the “one great character (i.e, that from philosophy),” a meta-persona that was, by 
definition, no particular persona at all but, rather, the flexible ability to adopt whatever 
persona best suited a particular rhetorical situation (1). “Rules,” in this sense, like the 
personae adopted by well-trained orators in different rhetorical situations (as discussed in 
a previous chapter), have abiding value insofar as they are adaptable, in one form or 
another, to many rhetorical situations, but rhetors should not identify themselves with or 
become too attached to the particular personae or to rules themselves.  
Logical as this view sounds, it was in some ways a departure from the prevailing 
pedagogical traditions of the day. According to Maria Silvana Celentano, Quintilian is the 
“only author in the history of classical rhetoric to have codified two distinct levels of 
oratorical exercitatio, one aimed at reinforcing the basic skills in young pupils and the 
other at consolidating what pupils have learned during their studies of rhetoric (357). The 
use of specialized, skill-focused, progymnasmata exercises had been an important part of 
rhetorical pedagogy since at least the time of the psd.-Aristotelian Rhetoric to Alexander, 
but there had been a long standing debate among rhetoricians about what kind of exercise 
was most effective—the skill-based progymnasmata or more naturalistic exercises such 
as declamation (Celentano 359-360). Quintilian saw both aspects as interrelated and 
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equally important (Celetano 360) and therefore suggested the need for higher-level, 
integrative, and holistic forms of practice that enabled students to combine and integrate 
modular skills into more deeply ingrained habits or characters.  
 This was so important because, in the Isocratean tradition of rhetorical education 
that Quintilian had inherited and codified, the ultimate goal was less the transfer of 
discrete skills as the production of a certain kind of person. Students were taught rhetoric 
so that, as Jeffrey Walker notes, they would “develop a capacity, a dunamis of thought 
and speech, a deeply habituated skill, that can be carried into practical, grown-up, public 
life—as the student gathers experience and matures” (“What a Difference” 148). Such a 
rhetorical dunamis is, itself, a kind of character or persona, but not in the sense of a stable 
or essentialistic subjectivity. Rather, like the “one great character” of psd.-Dionysius, it is 
a chameleon-like ability to employ critical judgment as an active response to rhetorical 
situations; it is a kind of judgment in performance. Declamation was the final step in the 
progressive ladder of rhetoric school exercises because it played this integrative function, 
but it was not fundamentally separate from the more rigidly structured exercises that 
preceded it. Declaimers had to call on the technical skills that they had amassed but, at 
the same time, could not rely on them in an individual or slavish way.  
 Robert Terrill has argued that the progymnasmata themselves played an 
independently important role in creating a holistic, integrated habit, or rhetorical hexis. In 
particularly, he points to imitation exercises such as translation and paraphrase as not 
only effective in nurturing specific rhetorical skills but also in cultivating “a form of 
duality that is an especially productive resource for citizenship, and that these doubled 
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attitudes are among the outcomes of a rhetorical education that are its most significant 
contributions to public culture” (297). According to Terrill, this duality forces students to 
oscillate their attention between model texts and their own texts, which causes them to 
interrogate norms of “sincerity,” on the one hand, while reminding them of the 
intertextual, dialogic nature of all public discourse, on the other. According to Terrill, 
imitatio juxtaposes the activities of reading and writing, but without combining them 
completely: 
Although a mimetic pedagogy seeks to understand the two processes of 
analysis and genesis as depending on and feeding each other in a 
productive symbiosis, the rhetor is not expected to find a middle way 
between interpretation and production, or to synthesize a third practice 
that entails them both. Rather, a rhetor schooled through imitatio learns to 
oscillate her attention between analysis and genesis, so that she constantly 
is shifting her identity between ‘‘interpreter’’ and ‘‘performer.’’ (304) 
 For Terrill, this oscillation is at the very heart of the kind of “character” or habit 
that rhetorical pedagogy was designed to foster. Since imitatio would have fallen 
primarily into the first of the two levels of exercise envisioned by Quintilian—the “one 
aimed at reinforcing the basic skills in young pupils” rather than the one aimed at 
“consolidating what pupils have learned during their studies of rhetoric”—from this point 
of view, the process of habit formation is fully operative from the earliest stages, not 
something that happens later as a result of the holistic integration of discrete skills 
through capstone exercises such as declamation. This interpretation makes particular 
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sense in light of Terrill’s claim that rhetorical hexis is marked not by seamless integration 
of skills but by the incommensurability of fundamentally contradictory modes: “the 
mixed motives of rhetorical awareness constitute interpretation and production—uneasily 
coalesced and dynamically liquid, but never fully amalgamated into a bland mash—and 
their pull and push keep the rhetorical art from slipping into irrelevance either through a 
fatal rupture with the past or through a tradition-bound calcification” (304). According to 
Terrill, then, an attitude of internal duality and oscillation is both rhetorically effective 
and productive of ethical civic engagement.  
 Although, as discussed in previous chapters, I agree that rhetorical “doubleness” 
is an integral element of rhetorical consciousness31, I think it is going too far to label it as 
the ultimate goal towards which rhetoricians such as Quintilian and psd.-Dionysius 
aspired. I also think it is a mistake to see the progymnasmata exercises as pedagogical 
endpoints in themselves. Instead, I would argue that psd.-Dionysius’s description of the 
“one great character” so important in declamation lends support to the view that this 
highest ideal went beyond irresolvable binaries—but without completely collapsing them 
into, as Terrill puts it, “bland mush” (304). Psd.-Dionysius’s description of this faculty is 
suggestive in the way it emphasizes both the variety of particular characters a rhetor 
might need to imagine and perform in the course of a declamation and the underlying 
“great” character that must govern all of them, but without setting up an opposition 
between these two poles. The interplay between the “great” and specific characters is 
indeed paradoxical, but it is apparently not irreconcilable. In describing it, psd.-Dionysius 
                                                
31 As in my discussion of immersion and reflexivity in Chapter Five 
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uses progressively linked, parallel clauses to evoke a sense of inseparability or pervasion 
that nevertheless does not imply identity: 
Just as in the soul it is necessary for reason to rule, and for passion 
(thumos) and desire (epithumia) to be obedient to it and as much as we act 
from passion we must be impassioned with reason, and as much as we 
comply with desire we must not comply too unreasonably thus speech 
requires this one greatest character from philosophy, since reasoning must 
underlie speech and must guide everything else (I mean passionate 
expressions, wailings, witticisms, bitter remarks, and hateful remarks) 
according to what is useful. (my emphasis; 1)  
 In distinction to the determinate precepts of rhetorical techne or the concrete 
modular skills taught in progymnasmata or even the rhetorical double-vision cultivated 
by imitation exercises such as paraphrase or translation, the “great character” psd.-
Dionysius describes is notable for its unified but paradoxical ambiguity. It exists in the 
irresolvable but unified space between reason and passion, between desire and restraint—
put differently, between rules and free play.  
I would argue that this structured ambiguity is the very core of any rhetorical 
pedagogy because of the necessity of mediating between techne and kairos, between 
precepts and a habitually rhetorical mode of being. It is necessarily ambiguous because 
these two pedagogical imperatives are always in tension. But this ambiguity makes it 
difficult to quantify, reproduce, or teach—an undeniable problem, given its central 
importance in the classroom. 
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I would suggest that there were, in ancient rhetorical schools, two main sources of 
this essential structured ambiguity. One was the practice of declamation. The other was 
the teacher. Although, as I will further argue, I believe that the former came to replace the 
latter as the focus of Roman rhetorical pedagogy for a variety of historical reasons, I see 
them as closely related both in terms of method and effect, insofar as the ideal Isocratean 
or Quintilian teacher and the practice of declamation were both pedagogically productive 
but ultimately indeterminate spaces. This overlap enables me, after discussing each of 
these sources individually in the next two sections of this chapter, to conclude by 
suggesting a synthesis between them with significant implications for contemporary 
pedagogy.  
The Declamation Game 
Declamation provided rhetors with the opportunity to both practice and go beyond 
the precepts and exercises that structured their early rhetorical education and to hone their 
receptivity to kairos, but in a safe, circumscribed space: This is precisely what made it, as 
Walker points out, “a sort of game” (Genuine Teachers 340). And like any game, 
declamation depended on rules to both separate it from and connect it to reality. As 
discussed in other chapters, much of its fun and its effectiveness followed from its 
deliberate artificiality, but this very artificiality depended, to a large degree, on its rules. 
This is a fundamental concept in much performance and game theory. According to 
Richard Schechner, for instance, “games, sports, theater, and ritual” are all domains in 
which “the rules are designed not only to tell the players how to play but to defend the 
activity against encroachment from the outside
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perform, this better way must conform to the rules… Special rules exist, are formulated, 
and persist because these activities are something apart from everyday life. A special 
world is created where people can make the rules, rearrange time, assign value to things, 
and work for pleasure” (11).  
Such a world was the world of declamation—an imaginary place that D.A. 
Russell, as previously noted, dubbed “Sophistopolis” (22). Clear rules and artificial 
challenges set this world apart from the amorphous and constantly changing real world, 
creating a clearly delineated (and protected) space within which spontaneity, creativity, 
and learning could flourish. This is a large part of what made it such an effective learning 
technology, and also what made it fun. As Jane McGonigal similarly notes of games in 
general, “By removing or limiting the obvious ways of getting to the goal, the rules push 
players to explore previously uncharted possibility spaces. They unleash creativity and 
foster strategic thinking” (21). 32 Rules, in this sense, actually become catalysts for 
innovation. Similar observations have been made in many other creative domains. For 
example, writing of the techniques of modern visual artists such as Claude Monet, Jasper 
Johns and Paul Mondrian, Patricia Stokes notes that “subject matter is often constrained 
to emphasize the multiplicity of ways to represent or present the same thing. The goal is 
to learn how to do different things as well as the importance of doing things differently, 
of applying constraints that preclude getting or staying stuck in an old solution. In such a 
                                                
32 This is closely related to the delimiting function identified by Michael Winterbottom in 
his argument that the farfetchedness and unreality of declamatory fictions enabled 
declaimers to focus on the rhetorical skills involved in argumentation rather than on the 
real world issues that might have obscured and complicated the learning process (65). 
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context, problem finding, an important component of creative behavior, can be seen as 
constraint finding” (303). Similar sentiments are evident in Wordsworth’s sonnet about 
the pleasure of limiting oneself to the sonnet form:  
In sundry moods, twas pastime to be bound 
Within the Sonnet’s scanty plot of ground; 
Pleased if some Souls (for such there needs must be) 
Who have felt the weight of too much liberty, 
Should find brief solace there, as I have found.  
Play in this fundamental but paradoxical sense—what ludologist Roger Cailliois calls 
“response which is free within the limits set by the rules” (9)—is at the very heart of 
creativity. It is also the crux of the practice of declamation, if not of ancient rhetorical 
pedagogy as a whole. As Quintilian notes that “the beginnings of every kind of study are 
formed in accordance with some prescribed rule. We must, indeed, be either like or 
unlike those who excel, and nature rarely forms one like, though imitation does so 
frequently” (10.2.2). Quintilian presents imitation, then, as a kind of productive 
constraint, a “prescribed rule,” and it is for this very reason that he considers it to be 
natural and effective and accepts it (like Isocrates before him) as one of the pillars of his 
pedagogical program. At the same time, he insists that imitation alone is neither sufficient 
nor desirable. Instead, students must strive to thoroughly understand and internalize the 
excellent aspects of whatever orator they are trying to imitate, then surpass the model 
through innovation and creativity: “But he who shall add to these borrowed qualities 
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excellences of his own, so as to supply what is deficient in his models and to retrench 
what is redundant, will be the complete orator whom we desire to see” (10.2.28).  
Declamation was a technology for achieving this integrative goal because it was a 
game and, therefore, had rules that functioned as catalysts for the creative exploration of 
rhetorical problems within a delimited space, set  apart from real life, with a finite 
number of variables. But these very elements were, by definition, artificial, and thus set 
the practice up for persistent critique. Quintilian himself relates an anecdote that seems to 
dramatize both the creative potential and potential hazards of declamation’s rules and 
structures: 
The danger stems from the effect of the retirement in which they have 
almost wasted away their life that they should shrink from the field of 
action as from too dazzling sunshine. This is said indeed to have been the 
case with Porcius Latro, who was the first professor of rhetoric of any 
eminence, so that, when he was called on to plead a cause in the forum, at 
the time that he bore the highest character in the schools, he used earnestly 
to entreat that the benches of the judges might be removed into the hall, 
for so strange did the open sky appear to him that all his eloquence seemed 
to lie within a roof and walls (10.5.17) 
 This story is about more, I think, then the need for real world experience. After 
all, Latro was—despite his ineffectuality in this real legal case—an “eminent” rhetoric 
teacher. Quintilian does not critique his abilities in that role, nor question his “eloquence” 
within the context of the schoolroom. Quintilian’s warning is, instead, about the dangers 
 136 
and difficulties of transitioning from one domain to the other, from enclosed schoolroom 
to open-air forum. In this, he is echoed by the Elder Seneca in his critiques of otherwise 
excellent declaimers who misapply their skills in real world contexts.33 The “roof and 
walls” upon which Latro depends seem to symbolize the creative delimitations—the 
rules, themes, and precepts—of the school environment. The “highest character” that he 
enjoyed as a teacher in this circumscribed realm is of little direct use in the unbounded 
realm of reality, but this in no way detracts from its preeminence in that circumscribed 
realm. But this raises the obvious question (as relevant now as then): If transfer of 
rhetorical skills from the rule-governed space of the schoolroom to the unpredictable real 
world is so problematic, how can game-like rhetorical exercises ultimately benefit 
students?  
 I suggest that for Latro (and teachers and declaimers like him) the limits of the 
schoolroom roof and walls represented not only a comforting source of confidence but, 
much more fundamentally, the rules and limits of a game. This was (and remains) 
important because games resolve (or at least mediate) the paradoxical tension between 
the dual imperatives of kairos and techne, teacher and handbook, imitation and precept. 
The essence of game and play is, as Caillois writes, “a response which is free within the 
limits set by the rules” (8). But, unlike the amorphous “goal” of rhetorical facility or the 
(proudly) unquantifiable Isocreatean teacher, games are very concrete. According to 
McGonigal, games all share four key elements: “a goal, rules, a feedback system, and 
                                                
33 As in Seneca’s account of the declaimer Albucius’s courtroom humiliation (preface 7. 
11). 
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voluntary participation” (21). With the possible exception of the fourth—participation in 
a school context is rarely “voluntary” in the way McGonigal intends—the systematic 
pedagogical system of Roman rhetoric schools, and the exercise of declamation in 
particular, added these traits to an otherwise less manageable and, potentially, less fun 
domain of human experience.  
Teacher as Game Master 
The mediation between techne and kairos might be ambiguous and unquantifiable 
in its nature, but for Quintilian and Isocrates before him, its source, at least, was quite 
clear: The teacher himself. According to Quintilian, the teacher must “speak much every 
day himself, for the edification of his pupils. Although he may point out to them, in their 
course of reading, plenty of examples for their imitation, yet the living voice, as it is 
called, feeds the mind more nutritiously—especially the voice of the teacher, whom his 
pupils, if they are but rightly instructed, both love and reverence” (2.2.8). Quintilian, 
then, saw the teacher is the core of any rhetorical education precisely because he was a 
bridge between artificial content such as examples and technical precepts and the “living 
voice” of a real rhetorical hexis.  
 The origins of this view can be traced directly to the Greek rhetorician Isocrates—
the originator of the rhetorical tradition inherited by both Quintilian and psd.-Dionysius. 
Isocrates criticizes teachers who make the error of “using an ordered art (tetagmene 
techne) as a model for a creative activity (poietikon pragma)”; such teachers are, he 
argues, missing the essential point. This is because the art of rhetoric lies not in forms or 
ideai, important though they may be, but in the ability to “to choose from these the 
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necessary forms for each subject, to mix them with each other and arrange them suitably, 
and then not to mistake the circumstances (kairoi)… these things require much study and 
are the work of a brave and imaginative soul” (Against the Sophists, 12-13). The content 
or techne of a rhetorical education is, in short, simple stuff, and correspondingly easy to 
convey. But this knowledge is useless without the much more ambiguous and 
unquantifiable knowledge of how to combine and deploy it—a creative activity that can 
only be taught (if it can be taught at all) through the guiding influence of the master. 
As such, by thus calling the value and feasibility of the techne tradition into 
question, Isocrates’ invested much greater authority in the person of the teacher. Michael 
Cahn has argued that this shift in the “center of rhetoric” was a calculated response to a 
disciplinary crisis precipitated by increasing skepticism about the efficacy of sophistic 
“crash courses” in oratory and the correspondingly poor repute of the ” rhetoric teachers” 
who provided them (Cahn 134-135). Isocrates’ alternate educational model—set apart by 
his use of the term philosophia—was dependent not on any art or set of rules but on 
himself; his selling point was not a handbook but personalized, long-term, transformative 
relationships with students. As such, his greatest achievement was “a deconstruction of 
the art in favor of the guiding voice of the teacher” (Cahn 135).  
 However, if the teacher’s voice is to retain its value as a flexible alternative to 
rigid sophistic systems of rhetorical education, it must itself resist appropriation and 
codification, remaining ever “beyond the bounds of a technical reconstruction,” never 
becoming “a historical achievement for the discipline of rhetoric” (Cahn 140). Therefore, 
as a model for both individual students and a broader community, Isocrates had to retain 
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flexibility by remaining strategically ambiguous. Yun Lee Too has identified this 
flexibility as a key element of his “pedagogical contract,” in which student comes to 
mirror teacher through an emulative process without either party sacrificing their 
independent identities. Just as contingency and kairos invalidate any rigid rhetorical 
techne, they also preclude simplistic imitation; instead, a student must  “revise and adapt 
the identity provided by his paradigm to his particular needs at any moment: he cannot 
take his teacher to be a rigidly prescriptive model for rhetorical action” (191).  
 I would argue that the strategically ambiguous  “teacher” of Isocrates’ educational 
system is the pedagogical model for the “one great character” described by psd.-
Dionysius. It is no coincidence that the term Isocrates used to describe the foundation of 
his discipline, philosophia, is the same term Dionysius uses to describe the source of “the 
one great character (i.e., that from philosophy) on which everything that is fitting at every 
point depends” (1). For Dionysius, the one great character exemplified by Plato, 
Demosthenes, and Homer was indeed something to imitate; but it was also, by its very 
nature, inimitable, at least in any specific, singular sense. Similarly, the ultimate object of 
emulation in an Isocratean school emerges not from the “teacher” as a single model or 
example, not from the teacher’s model speeches, nor even from the teacher’s voice or 
persona, but from the complex interplay of all of these elements, which creates a fluid 
network of meaning open to multiple, subjective interpretations circumscribed only by 
the overarching ethical program. This dynamic enables students (or, more broadly, 
audiences) to respond to speeches in rhetorically effective fashions despite contingency-
based obstacles such as divergent political perspectives, intelligences or interests. It also 
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models the rhetorical ideal described by Dionysius and Quintilian: Playing the part of the 
rhetor that can play the part called for by any particular audience in any given situation—
the “one great character.”  
This shared ideal between Isocrates and later rhetoricians is perhaps most evident 
in his famous Panathenaicus, a literary “speech” in which the ambiguous interplay 
between examples and authorial voice is not only made particularly explicit but actually 
performed within the text itself. The work is framed as a display speech delivered at the 
Panathenatic festival in Athens, but this dramatic setting is abandoned towards the end of 
the work when Isocrates shifts into an account of a discussion with several former 
students, each summoned to help evaluate the preceding speech. One of the sharper 
student-critics, unconvinced by Isocrates’ ostensible purpose in assembling the group 
(which he sees as ill-qualified and disinclined to offer any real critique), offers a radical 
reinterpretation of the speech’s apparent meaning through an equally radical 
reinterpretation of Isocrates’ pedagogical intention: The teacher is in fact testing his 
pupils, seeing if they are “still lovers of wisdom” who remember their “lessons” well 
enough to decipher his work’s hidden meaning (Panathenaicus 236).  
 The student thus recasts the work’s message (which includes a vitriolic critique of 
Sparta) and its apparent discrepancy with earlier, more sympathetic speeches—such as 
the Archidamus, a highly declamatory speech which, interestingly enough, is written 
from the perspective of a Spartan general—as a double entendre designed to “appear to 
those who are hostile to the Spartans that you are accusing them while they do not notice 
that, in fact, you are not doing this but praising them” (Panathenaicus 239). Only the 
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careful, knowledgeable reader will be capable of unraveling the speech’s complex 
interplay of examples from “history and philosophy, and all sorts of decoration and 
fiction,” thereby discerning Isocrates’ true authorial intent (Panathenaicus 246). 
Isocrates’ dramatized speaker indeed maligns the Spartans through “random abuse of 
their actions” and “harsh words,” but by merely presenting the rival city-state’s battles 
and achievements (even in a negative context), “gathering them all together and setting 
them next to each other,” he will actually increase public awareness of these noble acts 
and ultimately reflect praise on the Spartans (251-252).  The subtle strategy is, according 
to the student, a response to the fallibility of an Athenian audience, which would be likely 
to reject Iscorates’s pro-Spartan perspective; only by concealing “as long as possible the 
intention” he had when composing the discourse can he achieve his rhetorical purpose 
and become “especially famous” (Pananthenaicus 249).   
 Importantly, that rhetorical purpose—the speech’s underlying ethical message—
remains unchanged by either interpretation. As Isocrates states earlier in the text, “virtue 
(arête),” defined “as a quality found in the souls of good men” together with piety and 
justice “is the topic of the whole discourse,” and this remains true whether it is read as 
harsh indictment or veiled encomium of Sparta (Panathenaicus 183). According to the 
student, the speech’s most brilliant achievement (an achievement which in his eyes 
elevates Isocrates to the level of Homer himself) is its ability to respond to contingency 
and kairos by simultaneously appealing to disparate audiences through exoteric and 
esoteric levels of meaning:  
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And you have come upon this justly, for you have praised both cities well 
and appropriately. The one, Athens, is praised according to the judgment 
of the multitude, a judgment that no famous person would despise; all long 
for it and would endure anything in order to get it. The other, the truth, 
among whom some would prefer to have a better reputation than among 
other people, even if the latter were twice as many as they are now.” 
(Panathenaicus 261) 
 Because the ethical import is not anchored to the “real” message of the speech, 
the “real” message is, from a pedagogical point of view, irrelevant. Isocrates performs 
this key aspect of his educational program in the speech’s enigmatic finale when his 
persona in the speech refuses—despite evident pleasure in the student’s critical 
acumen—to validate (or refute) his interpretation: “… I did not comment at all on what 
he said, either on how his suppositions had hit on or missed my own thoughts, but I let 
him continue to hold the opinions he had expressed” (Panathenaicus 265). The reason for 
his silence, it would seem, is that the teacher whose “own thoughts” he could definitively 
confirm or deny was not the teacher that the students were being trained to imitate. The 
real teacher-as-object-of-emulation was ambiguity and rhetorical flexibility itself, which 
the student in question had successfully identified and praised. 
 It might appear that there are two distinct elements in the speech that Isocrates 
(through his student interlocutor) sets forward as objects of praise and emulation: First, 
the arête that he identifies as the underlying subject of the entire discourse; second, the 
ambiguous manner in which that arête is expressed, which strategically conforms to the 
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abilities and inclinations of the audience. In actuality, though, I would argue that for 
Isocrates and the heirs to his tradition of rhetorical pedagogy, ethical virtue and 
performative ambiguity are deeply intertwined. The Panathenaicus does not present a 
coherent ethical vision despite the ambiguity of its overt argument; it presents a coherent 
ethical vision because of this ambiguity. Indeed, this ambiguity is what set Isocrates, by 
his own account, apart from the techne-toting Sophists who were his chief competition. It 
is the essence of what he is performing in this textual monument to his own pedagogical 
ideal. “It”—indefinable as it is, because it is indefinable—is Isocreatean arête itself. And 
it was this ambiguous and unquantifiable but rhetorically effective arête that mediated 
between rules and kairos—that was, in other words, the teacher.  
Although one of the key purposes of this speech would seem to be the 
foregrounding of the essential role of the teacher, if the student auditor’s interpretation is 
correct, then the speech itself also exemplifies the declamation dynamic in each of the 
aspects discussed in this dissertation’s previous chapters. To begin with, like 
declamation, the speech bends rhetorical genres: Just as declamation was epideictic 
oratory masquerading as judicial or deliberative speech34, the Panathenaicus is—owing 
to its secret political message—a kind of deliberative speech masquerading as epideictic 
oratory. Furthermore, the speech (again, according to the student’s reading) presents 
                                                
34 Robert Kaster has pointed out the way that declamation served to reinforce accepted 
values by giving declaimers practice in reconstituting those values in extreme situations 
that might call them into question (328). This corresponds to Perlman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s view of epideictic rhetoric as discourse that “sets out to increase the intensity of 
adherence to certain values, which might not be contested when considered on their own 
but may nevertheless not prevail against other values that might come into conflict with 
them (51).  
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historical and political context in the form of the actions of the Spartans as fluid and 
subject to interpretation through discourse and rhetorical spin; the student sees the whole 
speech, in fact, as a very subtle color on the Spartan’s actions. In addition, It is carefully 
designed to address its audience on multiple levels simultaneously, since Isocrates was 
supposedly speaking both to the general populace of Athens and to a small intellectual 
elite. And this construction of audience directly determines the speaker’s construction of 
a complex ethos on both explicit and implicit levels, as the student further observes.  
Finally, the speech remains, like the declamation dynamic itself, ultimately 
ambiguous and irresolvable. The student never knows whether his interpretation is 
correct because Isocrates never tells him. In the end, the teacher remains silent and lets 
his example do the teaching, just as, in the end, there was never a single right way to 
approach a declamation theme. Isocrates refrains from validating or invalidating the 
student’s interpretation because to do so would have placed the teacher within “the 
bounds of a technical reconstruction” and completely undermined his pedagogical 
function (Cahn 140). As such, despite his positively central, indispensible role in 
Isocrates’ pedagogical system, in the end, the teacher is less important than the dynamic 
that he sets in motion, as exemplified by the student’s speculative reading of the 
Panathenaicus. For all of these reasons, the structural ambiguity of the Isocratean teacher 
was in many ways analogous to the structural ambiguity of the practice of declamation, 
and the dynamic cultivated by ideal teacher (as exemplified in the Panathenaicus) was 
very close to the declamation dynamic that I have been analyzing throughout this 
dissertation.    
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Game as Teacher 
With the standardization and propagation of schools under the Roman empire35, 
the concept of the irreproducible, singular teacher presented a significant problem. The 
ideal teacher is precisely what cannot be reproduced and exported, what cannot be 
guaranteed in every rhetoric school in every far-flung colony. But the practice of 
declamation could. I would suggest that the centrality of declamation in the Roman 
rhetorical curriculum was, in some ways, a response to this need for reproducibility. Just 
as in Classical Athens, Isocrates moved the focus of rhetorical pedagogy from techne to 
teacher (Cahn 134-135), the exigencies of the Roman Empire necessitated moving it 
again from teacher to declamation. But because of the correspondence between the 
teacher dynamic and the declamation dynamic outlined above, this did not amount to a 
return to the reductive emphasis on the techne tradition that Isocrates had repudiated. The 
Panathenaicus shows why this was possible: At the highest level, the teacher’s job was to 
create a rule-governed space within which free-play could occur rather than to simply 
convey a static repository of information. Declamation had exactly the same purpose and 
function.  
So by encapsulating the mediation between rules and constraints in the game-
structure of declamation, Roman rhetoricians also made their discipline more 
                                                
35 As James Murphy notes, “The remarkable thing about Roman education is that it took 
the comparatively loose ideas of Greek educators and modeled them into a coherent 
system, which instilled in its students a habit (hexis) of effective expression. Moreover 
the Romans embedded this system in a network of ‘public’ schools (i.e., classrooms of 
numerous students, each under one master), which used a common curriculum 
throughout the Roman world” (Short History 49). 
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systematically teachable. Systematization was, after all, perhaps the Romans’ greatest 
educational accomplishment:  
Virtually every individual element found in the program described by 
Quintilian was inherited from the Greeks, and especially from Isocrates… 
What was not inherited, however, was the deftly designed correlation of 
these elements into a ‘system.’ As a system the process could be—and 
was—replicated over time and space. As a system it could be promoted 
worldwide as a tool of public policy equal in geopolitical value to the 
legions and the tax collectors in making the world Roman. (Murphy, Short 
History 50)  
There were, no doubt, many good or even great Roman rhetoric teachers, but they 
could hardly have been counted on in each of the countless schools across the far-flung 
empire. I would argue that the game-like elements of the pedagogical system as it 
developed—the introductory exercises as well as the full-fledged practice of 
declamation—partly filled this gap. To recap the argument thus far, systemized rules, 
precepts, or rhetorical exercises on their own inevitably prove, as rhetoricians have 
always asserted, insufficient in the face of the contingencies of kairos. At the same time, 
students (and teachers) need quantifiable, teachable techniques to prepare them for 
ultimately unquantifiable contingencies. In the Isocratean pedagogical tradition, a balance 
was struck between precepts and exercises and the imitation of the irreducible ambiguous 
teacher; but without singular teachers upon which to ground their mass-producible, 
world-wide program, the Romans needed a substitute; systemization, in and of itself, 
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would have simply emphasized rule and precept at the expense of kairotic flexibility—
producing graduates with few rhetorical skills of real world value.  
This is precisely why the systematization of rhetorical pedagogy came as kind of 
gamification. This process, in the form of declamation, opened the schools to critique 
(much as much gamification in schools and other contexts is criticized today36). But it is 
also what made the rhetoric schools so appealing and fun for so many students. As 
Walker notes, “Through declamation, rhetoric’s regime of ‘exercise in evenly balanced 
cases’ in a fictive parallel reality, students both cultivated through performance their 
rhetorical capacities and entered the ‘sweet garden’ of practical philosophia and a 
democratic civic imaginary, where students… experienced a kind of revelation and 
intellectual liberation” (Genuine Teachers 199). 
Declamation was a game because it was a domain where the “rules” applied more 
than in the real world. And these rules were replicable. At the same time, the game was 
not accounted for by the rules in and of themselves but by the “play” between them; 
learning the game meant learning to mediate between the constraints of rules, themes, 
and precepts, on the one hand, and creativity, innovation, and kairos, on the other.  Since 
not every teacher could be an Isocrates or a Quintilian, the game of declamation provided 
systematically reproducible liminal space within which students could learn about the 
play between determinate but stochiastic rhetorical “rules” and the indeterminacy of 
                                                
36 See, for example, Ian Bogost’s article “Gamification is Bullshit,” as discussed in a 
previous chapter.  
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kairos. This happened through low stakes experimentation, playful imitation of each 
other as well as the teacher, and through play itself.   
And this play was a significant part of what made the practice so effective. 
Writing about games in general in a passage that seems to echo Walker’s description of 
the “sweet garden” of the rhetoric school (for which many ancient rhetoric students 
remained nostalgic throughout their lives), McGonigal argues that while “the success we 
achieve in games is not, of course, real-world success,” nevertheless “for many people it 
is more realistic than the kinds of success we put pressure on ourselves to achieve—
whether it’s money, beauty, or fame. It’s depressing to spend our lives pursuing 
unrealistic goals… they shift our attention away from depressing goals and train us to be 
more flexibly optimistic. Today’s best games help us realistically believe in our chances 
for success” (71).   
In the context of rhetorical pedagogy, the revolutionary shift McGonigal is calling 
for looks a lot like a return to the ancient past. And, in fact, the resistance and skepticism 
about gaming that she takes on it her book sounds strikingly similar to the critiques of 
declamation that arose when it reached its most game-like state. I would argue that this is 
an inevitable result of the uneasy coexistence of competing, separate domains of 
experience. Unlike the more basic, trivial games discussed by theorists such as Caillois, 
McGonigal sees the astounding popularity of modern gaming and game culture as an 
indictment of (and alternative to) unenjoyable and ill-designed aspects of real life: “What 
if we decided to use everything we know about game design to fix what’s wrong with 
reality? What if we started to live our real lives like gamers, lead our real businesses and 
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communities like game designers, and think about solving real-world problems like 
computer and video game theorists? Imagine a near future in which most of the real 
world works more like a game” (7). In answer to these questions, she concludes that it is 
“high time we start applying the lessons of games to the design of our everyday lives. We 
need to engineer alternate realities: new, more gameful ways of interacting with the real 
world and living our real lives” (115).  
At first glance, the shift McGonigal calls for seems to be an inversion of one of 
the essential qualities that early ludolgists such as Caillois thought made games games: 
The clearly delineated boundary between game and reality. But, in fact, the games and 
game-like strategies that McGonigal advocates do not involve a blurring of this boundary 
(which would presumably make games much less fun) so much as a shifting of it: She 
suggests, for example, that games be played in “real” places and contexts, to achieve 
“real” ends, and that game dynamics influence the design of real world institutions. All of 
this follows, I would argue, not from an increasingly game-like reality, but from an 
increasingly powerful alternative “play” domain that is in competition with reality. And 
this is, perhaps, the real reason why modern video games and the trend of gamification 
are—like ancient declamation in its day— so popular and, at the same time, seem so 
threatening (even immoral) to so many people. 
Nevertheless, games are astoundingly popular aspects of modern life and—as 
scholars such as James Gee, Ian Bogost, McGonigal herself, and many others have noted 
in recent years—incredibly powerful classroom tools. But this potentiality seems to have 
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become most apparent at the very moment of their most public and prominent critique37. 
The same was true for declamation: At the practice’s height of systematization and 
popularity, a cottage industry of declamation critique simultaneously sprang up alongside 
it, many examples of which have been previously discussed.  
Although modern scholars have often pointed to these critiques of ancient 
declamation as a symptom of the decline of rhetoric during this period, I argue that the 
opposite is actually true: As declamation became more fully developed as a 
pedagogically effective game, it became (like the games discussed by McGonigal) an 
increasingly self-sufficient, alternate domain of experience appealing enough to actually 
compete with reality. When even passionate fans of declamation such as the Elder Seneca 
took offense at declaimers who attempted speak declamatorily in real situations, perhaps 
their ire followed as much from the threat that the play domain posed (or seemed to pose) 
to the real one as from the real-world incompetence of the declaimers. In this light, 
Latro’s request that the benches of the “real” judges be removed into the hall can be read 
as a double-entendre: Perhaps there was a desire (even an unarticulated one) among many 
graduates of Roman rhetoric schools that the real court rooms they had moved into might 
be made more like the “play” courtrooms they had inhabited in the “sweet garden” of the 
rhetoric school. If this is the case, it calls into question the widely-held belief—drawn by 
Quintilian himself and by many subsequent authorities—that unrealistic declamation 
                                                
37 See, for example, the records of the 2006 congressional hearings entitled “What’s in a 
Game: Regulation of Violent Video Games and the First Amendment” 
(http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/resources/transcripts/). 
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themes were less pedagogically effective. On the contrary, they may have been too 
pedagogically effective. 
All of this matters now because modern rhetoric departments face challenges 
similar, in many ways, to the challenges faced by the far-flung Roman educational 
system. Most lower-division rhetoric and composition courses in colleges and 
universities today are taught by graduate students or instructors who may or may not 
specialize in rhetoric and who may or may not have interest or expertise in pedagogy. 
While this was not the case in ancient Rome, the implications of two situations are 
comparable: modern departments must develop introductory rhetoric curriculum that can 
be easily reproduced and that can be effective whether or not a master teacher is running 
a class. As in ancient rhetoric schools, they need an easily replicable method of teaching 
students to balance the precepts of rhetoric textbooks with the fluid demands of kairotic 
discourse. I argue that, as in ancient Rome, the declamation dynamic can fulfill this need. 
But what would this actually look like in practice?  
In my conclusion, I will discuss some of my own classroom experiments with 
declamation-inspired techniques, drawing heavily on real student feedback to test—in a 
modern classroom context—the theoretical assertions made in the previous chapters of 
this dissertation.  
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Chapter Seven:  
Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I have tried to use close analysis of a historical practice to 
make a trans-historical argument about the teaching of rhetoric. To this end, I have 
identified four key elements of what I refer to as the declamation dynamic, each 
epitomized by the ancient practice of declamation but essential to rhetorical pedagogy in 
any time period: 1) scenario construction, 2) audience construction, 3) persona 
construction, and 4) mediation between rules and free play. These four elements are 
nothing new. In fact, I have argued that they are essential aspects of any rhetorical 
exercise, including the kinds of papers that are already typically assigned in 
contemporary writing classes. However, I contend that they are generally not as skillfully 
or thoroughly engaged as they were in the historical exercise of ancient declamation. It 
has been the primary goal of this dissertation, therefore, to analyze how ancient 
declamation channeled these elements so efficiently and why they made the practice so 
effective, as well as to suggest their implications for contemporary classroom practice. I 
would now to like to explore, in more concrete detail, some approaches that might 
achieve a similar result in rhetoric classes today. 
 First, though, I want to again acknowledge that I am not the first person to suggest 
the benefits of applying of ancient rhetorical practices in the contemporary classroom—
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indeed, this is a long-established38 but also quickly growing area of interest in the field. 
Summing up what is becoming an an increasingly widespread view, Marjorie Woods has 
aptly observed that historical exercises should be seen not only as artifacts but as 
“epistemological experiences that can help generate sophisticated verbal discourse at any 
time, including our own” (163). However, the focus in this project on declamation, in 
particular, rather than the progymnasmata exercises that preceded it in an ancient 
rhetorical curriculum sets it apart from most of these other trans-historical projects. To 
cite one illustrative example, Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee’s Ancient Rhetorics for 
Contemporary Students provides assignment prompts modeled on progymasmata 
exercises but barely mentions declamation. A good place to begin this concluding 
discussion of concrete pedagogical applications, then, is with the question of why the 
progymnasmata exercises seem to have been an “easier sell” for contemporary teachers 
than declamation and what declamation can offer as a closely related but alternative 
model for modern teachers from ancient rhetorical pedagogy. 
The simplest answer to the first part of this question is that declamation is more 
ambiguous and (even now) more ethically suspect than the much more straight-forward 
modular progression of the progymnasmata exercises. Declamation was both part of this 
progression and beyond it, a final stage that drew on all the previously mastered exercises 
yet was less constrained or rule-governed than any of them. Declamation also straddled 
                                                
38 See, for example, Edward P.J. Corbett and Robert Conner’s seminal Classical Rhetoric 
for the Modern Student, now in its fourth edition and still a popular textbook for 
contemporary rhetoric classes.   
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the boundary between pedagogical exercise and adult recreational activity—all of which 
may make it seem less easily controllable and adaptable for pragmatic purposes by 
teachers today. This impression is likely to be strengthened by the fact that 
progymnasmata exercises seem less vulnerable to the kinds of ideological critique that 
are so frequently leveled against declamation. Woods observes, for example, that 
medieval rhetorical exercises (which are closely related to the tradition of ancient 
progymnasmata) are particularly relevant today because they were designed to function 
well with diverse groups of students: “Students in the modern classroom increasingly 
resemble their pre-modern counterparts in their varied backgrounds and levels of 
achievement,” such that “in my experience, the more diverse the strengths of the students 
in the classroom, the better such exercises work, and this is especially true if an oral, 
performative component showcasing different kinds of talents and insights is included” 
(161). Declamation, however, is often thought of in simplistic terms as a kind of social 
conditioning for a monolithic bloc of economically and politically elite Greco-Roman 
students.  
I would suggest, though, that the benefits Woods identifies in historical 
exercises39 generally are just as applicable to declamation as they are to medieval 
exercises or to the progymnasmata. In fact, I would suggest that the effectiveness of these 
other exercises, like the effectiveness of declamation itself, followed from the effective 
                                                
39 Woods herself certainly does not exclude declamation from her argument for the 
benefits of historical exercises. However, I would suggest that declamation is 
nevertheless often neglected to the point of exclusion from these kinds of discussions, 
which tend to focus on the preliminary exercises.  
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engagement of different aspects of what I call the declamation dynamic. As preliminary 
exercises, however, they engaged the dynamic piecemeal, while declamation engaged it 
in toto. From a modern perspective, it is perhaps tempting to view this holistic integration 
of rhetorical skills as a complication if not a drawback in the classroom; indeed the more-
or-less rigid structure of the progymnasmata progression is part of what has made it so 
appealing for use today. According to Woods, for example, the most pedagogically 
effective aspect of medieval rhetorical exercises—and I think this observation is just as 
applicable to the ancient progymnasmata—is that they were “extreme”: “as short as 
possible, as concentrated as possible, and as structured as possible. Imitation, variation, 
and playfulness are the key” (160). In this observation, Woods clearly identifies the 
importance of free play within constraints that made these exercises so effective. This 
paradoxical dynamic was, of course, just as essential to ancient declamation—indeed, it 
was the subject of my last chapter. But I would suggest that the dynamic was approached 
in fundamentally different ways in the two domains: The progymnasmata emphasized the 
constraints of narrowly defined rhetorical tasks—which created a space for creativity and 
free play. Declamation was an infinitely more variable zone of free play—but was, 
nevertheless, ultimately governed by conventions and constraints. Both practices mediate 
between rules and free play in the ways I have discussed, but in declamation this 
mediation was much subtler and more central, precisely because free play rather than 
constraints were taken as the starting point of the practice. This is why declamation was 
the ultimate training method for the kairotic contingencies of real life and was the goal 
towards which all the progymnasmata, with their increasing levels of ambiguity and 
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complexity, were meant to lead.  
But this suggests yet another reason about why declamation may seem less 
appealing to contemporary teachers than the progymnasmata: In the idealized curriculum 
of ancient rhetoric schools, declamation took place at the end of a very long and difficult 
educational process. As Raffaella Cribiore observes, this process consisted of “rigorous 
training” in “intellectual gymnastics” (the progymnasmata) that “were structured like the 
links of a chain that a student had to master in a process of accumulation” (“Short Road” 
77-78). As such, “if a student aspired to become ‘a good man, skilled in speaking,’ with 
the broad education that Quintilian advocated, the training inevitably took a long time” 
(Cribiore, “Short Road” 77-78). But contemporary rhetoric teachers often only have a 
single semester with their students; as such, they clearly do not enjoy the luxury of 
leading their students down such a “long road” to rhetorical mastery. Given this situation, 
it is perhaps natural that in adapting ancient rhetorical pedagogy, contemporary teachers 
tend to focus only on the initial, fundamental stages of that road. There simply is not time 
to go any further.  
 But in this situation, contemporary rhetoric teachers are actually much more 
similar to some of their ancient counterparts than they might initially realize. In ancient 
schools, too, changing social and political dynamics eventually called into question the 
sanctity of the traditionally lengthy and involved approach to rhetorical education 
characterized by the progymnasmata. As Cribiore points out, by the fourth century many 
“students who wanted to engage successfully in forensic activities without knowing 
Roman law did not need to follow the long road to rhetoric,” but were able to achieve 
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similar levels of success though “a shorter training” that would enable them to “engage as 
speakers in public displays in the theatrical form of oratory that was so popular” (“Short 
Road” 83). Cribiore is, of course, referring here at least in part to declamation. In fact, the 
reasons ancient authorities such as Lucian were critical of this new-fangled “short road” 
to rhetoric are almost exactly the same as the reasons they were critical of declamation 
itself. Lucian claimed that short-road rhetors “compensated for their lack of mastery of 
traditional techniques by strategies of various kinds, which included flamboyant dress, 
elaborate gesturing, modulation of voice, and keen understanding of their audience’s 
expectations” (Cribiore, “Short Road” 83). Nevertheless, he also recognized that the 
“smooth continuity of education stood in contrast to the changed times” and that rigidly 
traditional approaches to rhetoric were indeed becoming outdated and unnecessary 
(Cribiore, “Short Road” 86).  
 I would suggest that the changing dynamics that made the short-road to rhetoric— 
with its tendency to skip over fundamental stages of the long-road and leap directly to 
instruction and practice in declamation—so appealing in the later Roman empire also 
make declamation much more relevant to the circumstances faced by contemporary 
teachers. Now, for all practical purposes, the “short road” is the only road—and it’s a 
good deal shorter than even the most cursory of ancient rhetoricians would have been 
likely to advocate. Contemporary students, like the students of which Lucian lamented, 
are often narrowly focused on the pragmatic, career value of their educations, and may 
have little patience for step-by-step, graduated systems that seem disconnected from real-
world applications. 
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 This is not to say, however, that a shift in pedagogical focus from progymnasmata 
to declamation necessarily entails a rejection of systematic process or careful cultivation 
of fundamental rhetorical skills. It means, instead, situating this process in the context of 
a single synthetic and holistic exercise rather than in the context of many modular and 
analytic ones. This need not be a haphazard or disingenuous process. On the contrary, 
psd.-Quintilian’s sermo commentaries in the Lesser Declamations clearly indicate the 
ways ancient rhetoric students engaging in declamation approached speeches and 
rhetorical analysis analytically: The master advises them, for example, on persona, 
handling of audience, choice of colores, etc.40, and presumably the students then engaged 
in similar analyses of their own before imitating his examples. But in engaging in these 
individual analyses, students never lost sight of the ultimate form and venue for their 
eloquence in fully developed speeches—something that would have been barely visible 
in the tightly constrained forms of the progymnasmata exercises. This is a subtle 
distinction that, I suggest, made a very big difference.  
By way of conclusion, then, I want to suggest  that this short-road approach, in 
which declamation is emphasized from the earliest stages, might have more relevance for 
contemporary pedagogy than the more traditional long-road approach that began with 
years of intense training in the systematically ordered preliminary exercises, though the 
latter approach has received much more attention by contemporary scholars. But what 
                                                
40 Similarly, the Elder Seneca usually critiques or praises the great speakers of his day in 
terms of their handling of fundamental aspects of declamation—especially their use of 
colores, their handling of persona, and their choice of pithy sententiae—rather than their 
declamations as a whole. 
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would a short-road approach, adapted for the contemporary classroom, actually look like?
 In these final pages, I would like the present some speculative suggestions for 
classroom practice. These are general approaches rather than fully formed exercises, 
intended as hypotheses rather than as conclusions, meant to inspire future research and, 
much more importantly, classroom experimentation. Each of these three approaches 
emphasizes one aspect of the declamation dynamic as discussed in the preceding chapters 
and, in this way, performs an analytic function analogous to the progymasamata 
exercises. Unlike the progymnasmata, however, this analysis takes place in the synthetic 
and performative context of the overall practice of declamation, with the goal of holistic 
rhetorical performance constantly in view.  
Pick a Color: Contextual analysis of political speech 
 In the sermo or commentary sections of the Lesser Declamations, psd.-Quintilian 
often explains his choice of color for a specific theme before actually demonstrating that 
approach. Contemporary teachers could ask students to perform similar kinds of critical 
analysis of concrete rhetorical situations and then present their analysis to the class. If 
several students analyzing the same rhetorical situation come up with several different 
ways of “spinning” its contextual facts, a productive discussion (perhaps even a debate) 
of the relative benefits and drawbacks of each approach is likely to result. Furthermore, 
this approach will naturally train students to see rhetorical context as a function of 
discourse rather than as (mere) objective facts.  
 There are, of course, many different kinds of themes that could be employed for 
this type of exercise. However, I think it is important to note the importance of imitation 
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as a key pedagogical tool in teaching declamation—just as in the progymnasmata— 
especially in the early stages of a “short road” approach. To wit, in the Lesser 
Declamations psd.-Quintilian always illustrates his analysis with model declamations, 
presumably with the ultimate goal of student imitation41. Rather than relying on a 
contemporary teacher to produce her own model declamations (although this would also 
be an interesting and plausible approach), a theme might be distilled from a real political 
speech, either from contemporary public discourse or from history. The students could be 
given basic facts surrounding a political crisis or scandal as material for their analysis of 
potential colores, then compare their approaches to the actual approach taken by a real 
politician in this situation. Conversely, a class could first analyze the approach taken by a 
politician, then investigate alternative ways they  might have “spun” the facts to different 
effect. As in Woods’s discussion of medieval, progymnasmata-inspired exercises, 
“imitation, variation, and playfulness are the key” (160), but, unlike those exercises, this 
variation and imitation takes place in the context of a fully-formed speech rather than a 
narrowly constrained exercise.   
 That being said, one of the key elements of declamation that made the game so 
fun and effective was—as discussed throughout this dissertation—the dramatic and 
heightened nature of many declamation themes. A contemporary teacher employing this 
                                                
41 But imitation in the creative, indirect sense discussed by Robert Terrill: “Imitatio is not 
a single-minded process in which the rhetor simply absorbs and then regurgitates 
another’s ideas, but a double-minded inventive process through which the student rhetor 
analyzes both the model text and the target situation in order to craft discourse fitted to 
her purposes, abilities, and audience” (302). 
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method would be well advised to channel this playful dynamic by broadening her 
definition of “political speech” to include not only current political discourse, but also 
persuasive speeches from history (say, the Gettysburg Address) or literature (say, 
Antony’s speech in Julius Caesar). The more distant the time period or cultural context, 
the harder the students will have to work to imagine the different elements of the 
rhetorical situation and invent appropriate colores to suit it.  
Alternatively, a teacher might choose to invent a theme that is closer, in some 
ways, to the students’ time period and everyday experiences but that is nevertheless—like 
ancient declamation themes—highly dramatic and fraught with contested issues of power 
and authority. Whereas many ancient Roman declamation themes dealt with issues of 
paternal authority and disinheritance, a contemporary teacher might write a theme that 
focused on the power and authority of corporations—for example, by centering on a 
whistleblower who has been fired without a severance package for pointing out gross 
corporate maleficence.42  
Persona construction: 
 An exercise focused on persona might be structured along almost the same lines. 
As in the previous exercise, students could be given the basic facts of a real rhetorical 
situation, but with a closer attention to the background and situated ethos of the speaker. 
They could then be asked to produce hypothetical “game-plans” for the speaker’s 
invented ethos or persona; alternatively, they could be asked to first analyze the real 
                                                
42 I would credit James J. Murphy with pointing out, in a lecture at the University of 
Texas at Austin, this parallel between paternal authority in the ancient world and 
corporate power in the modern world.   
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speaker’s approach to persona in the actual rhetorical situation and then imagine and 
present alternate approaches. Again, the goal would be to stimulate discussion in the 
classroom through imitation, variation, and playfulness. And, as with the exercise 
focused on colores, students would be learning to see invented ethos as something 
constructed—that is, as something created through discourse within the constraints of a 
speaker’s’ preexisting, situated ethos.  
Audience construction: 
 In this exercise, students would again be given the basic facts of a rhetorical 
scenario, but here with a particular focus on the disparate elements of their audience. The 
main challenge would be to divide and subdivide this aggregate audience into smaller 
representative sections—first, for example, into friendly and hostile groups, then further 
according to shared interests, preexisting loyalties, persuadablity, etc. Students would 
have to present to the class an “audience profile” identifying the most important group or 
groups to appeal to in the speech, as well as important secondary groups worthy of 
consideration. They would also have to present a “game-plan” according to which a 
speaker could appeal to a single group or, on a more complex level, to multiple groups in 
the course of the speech. This kind of analytical work would encourage the students to 
view audiences as constructed and, furthermore, would emphasize the necessity of 
forming an appropriately approximated “image” of an audience to effectively invent and 
deliver rhetorical appeals. As in the previous exercises, a productive discussion could 
ensue about the differences between different students’ audience constructions and about 
how these various “images” would (or should) change a speaker’s’ approach in designing 
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her speech. As in the previous two approaches, this work could take place in dialogue 
with analysis of the actual example of political speech (broadly defined and including 
literary and historical sources) from which the basic facts of the scenario were adapted. 
Looking at an existing speech from this perspective would further emphasize the 
interdependence of considerations of audience and speakers’ rhetorical strategies, as well 
as the inevitable limitations and omissions that follow from any one approximation of an 
audience. And, as in all of these approaches, the mere juxtaposition of an actual political 
speech with students’ playfully hypothetical variations would likely stimulate critical 
awareness by exposing the “real” norms of modern political speech, as Gunderson 
similarly noted with regards to ancient declamation, as partially an “effect of the 
pleading” (7).  
 
 Each of these preliminary exercises would teach essential rhetorical skills in a 
constrained, limited context, but with the ultimate goal of holistic rhetorical performance 
never far from view. In fact, each would, like the exercise of declamation towards which 
they build, involve rhetorical performance—here in the form of presentations and 
defenses of rhetorical analyses and corresponding examples. Each would, therefore, tap 
into the fun, playful, and flexible aspects of the declamation dynamic even as they focus 
on discrete rhetorical skills and forms of critical awareness. This would amount, then, to 
a kind of progymnasmata progression leading towards declamation, but already within 
the context of declamation—in other words, a shorter road with the same ultimate 
destination as the long one. As I hope the preceding chapters have made clear, this 
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approach is nothing new—on the contrary, these aspects are native to the exercise of 
declamation, and ancient rhetoric teachers (such as psd.-Quintilian in the Lesser 
Declamations) have always focused on exactly these kinds of considerations with their 
students in ways very similar to what I have suggested here. Nevertheless, this approach 
stands in stark contrast to most contemporary adaptions of ancient rhetorical pedagogy.  
It is my hope that this dissertation will encourage contemporary teachers to reassess that 
neglect and to start experimenting with declamation as a means of channeling the 
declamation dynamic in their classrooms. To do otherwise is, I think, to forfeit a 
powerful, time-tested classroom tool and—perhaps more to the point—to miss out on a 
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